Mad cow disease: EU must maintain strict controls, says Parliament

Mad cow disease: EU must maintain strict controls, says Parliament

Food safety - 06-07-2011 - 15:00 Plenary sessions

The sharp fall in bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) cases in the EU must not lead to a slackening of surveillance, say MEPs in a resolution passed on Wednesday. Any change to BSE safety rules must maintain high animal and public health standards, but the ban on feeding animal protein to non-ruminants, such as pigs, could gradually be lifted if further safeguards are put in place, they add.

Changes to current EU laws, which the Commission is about to review, could include new rules on removing specific risk materials from animal feed, a gradual relaxation of the animal protein feed ban, changes to cohort culling policy and a higher age limit for BSE testing, says the non-legislative resolution, drafted by Dagmar Roth Behrendt (S&D, DE).

MEPs reject a Commission proposal to reduce EU funding on research into transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), including BSE.

Strict conditions for any feed ban review

The Commission's TSE Roadmap 2 moots a possible gradual lifting of the prohibition on the feeding of processed animal proteins to non-ruminants. Given the EU's "protein deficit", MEPs back this idea, subject to strict conditions and safeguards. These include stipulating that the processed animal proteins must come from species not linked to TSE, and may be fed only to non-herbivores. Prohibitions on cannibalism must remain and only processed animal proteins fit for human consumption should be used, MEPs add.

Food and feed contamination

Commenting on wider food and feed safety, MEPs express concern about recent contamination cases, e.g. with dioxin, and call on EU Member States to enforce existing rules and strengthen them, if necessary.

TSEs

TSEs cause degeneration of brain tissue leading to death in man and animals. They include Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and Kuru in humans, bovine spongiform encephalopathy in cattle and scrapie in sheep and goats.

Procedure: Non-legislative resolution

REF. : 20110705IPR23380

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom/content/20110705IPR23380/html/Mad-cow-disease-EU-must-maintain-strict-controls-says-Parliament


Saturday, November 6, 2010

TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS

INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html


Archive Number 20101206.4364 Published Date 06-DEC-2010 Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 2010 (11)

PRION DISEASE UPDATE 2010 (11)

http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:5492868805159684::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,86129



Wednesday, July 06, 2011

Swine Are Susceptible to Chronic Wasting Disease by Intracerebral Inoculation


http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2011/07/swine-are-susceptible-to-chronic.html




Tuesday, July 5, 2011

Risk Assessment of BSE Introduction in the Russian Federation in Connection with Importation of Cattle from the European Union in 2005–2010

http://efsaopinionbseanimalprotein.blogspot.com/2011/07/risk-assessment-of-bse-introduction-in.html



TSS

Risk Assessment of BSE Introduction in the Russian Federation in Connection with Importation of Cattle from the European Union in 2005–2010

Risk.40: Risk Assessment of BSE Introduction in the Russian Federation in Connection with Importation of Cattle from the European Union in 2005–2010

Sergey Rybakov† and Alexander Yegorov

FGI Federal Centre for Animal Health; Vladimir, Russia†Presenting author; Email: s.s.rybakov@mail.ru

The study is aimed at quantitative assessment of risk of BSE introduction from the EU countries into Russia with breeding animals imported during 2005–2010.

Within 2005–2010 importation of cattle born in 2003–2008 from the EU into Russia totally amounted to 363,000 animals. According to the data published in the EU reports, during 2003–2008 the BSE prevalence in the EU countries reduced from 125 cases per million bovine animals above 24 months of age in 2003 to 12 cases in 2008. If the imported subpopulation had proportionally represented all age-groups of cattle from EU25 countries, according to the calculation 19.4 animals in BSE incubation period should have been imported from 2005 until 2010.

The main suppliers of breeding cattle into Russia are the following EU countries: Austria, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Hungary and The Netherlands. Since 2007 import from these countries has amounted to 67.5% of the total import. The major suppliers—not the EU member states—are Canada (12.2%), Australia (12.1%) and the US (5.8%). As for the UK, Poland and Portugal, i.e. countries having the highest BSE incidence, currently export of live cattle from there is banned. Calculations demonstrated that limitation of live cattle importation from the countries with high BSE incidence allows to reduce the risk of BSE introduction into Russia in 14.5 times.

Risk assessment in relation to BSE in animals born after 2003 was performed by EFSA in 2009. The EFSA results demonstrated that estimated number of BSE cases in EU17 countries amounted totally to 32 cases within 2003–2008 and the highest 95% confidence limit constituted 65 cases. As for seven above mentioned live cattle importing countries the estimated number of BSE cases within 2003-2008 averaged to 1.8 and upper 95% confidence limit was 3.6.

Given that share of cattle annually exported from these seven countries into Russia averages to 0.293%, according to calculations, within 2005-2010 the mean probability of importation of an animal in which BSE can be detected amounts to 0.0064 and the highest probability amounts to 0.0129.

Results of the risk assessment of BSE introduction with cattle imported into Russia from the above mentioned seven countries within 2005-2010 demonstrate that the risk of BSE introduction amounts to 0.01 case in six years and implementation of measures recommended in the OIE Code is sufficient for BSE risk reduction. More detailed information will be provided in the poster.

http://www.prion2011.ca/files/PRION_2011_-_Posters_(May_5-11).pdf




Greetings,


IN my opinion, from the following risk factors i will post below, and the fact that the OIE and the USDA systematically did away with the BSE GBR system for the BSE MRR system, for the legal trading all strains of TSE globally, and the ramifications there from (BSE MRR), MY confidence level of any TSE regulatory risk assessment is 0...that is ZERO CONFIDENCE LEVEL IN ANY REGARDS TO THE TSE PRION DISEASES AKA MAD COW DISEASE. The BSE MRR regulations were set up to fail, and make legal the trading of all strains of TSE prion disease globally. the consumers were hung out to dry around the globe, and the ramifications there from will be long and costly thanks to the OIE and the USDA et al. ...TSS



================================



DRAFT OPINION OF THE SSC ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK (GBR) AND ITS EVOLUTION OVER TIME IN THE EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES

The question: The SSC has been requested to provide an up-to-date assessment of the geographical BSE risk of the Member States of the European Union, taking account of the latest information and data that are available, including those provided by the Member States in their application for a BSE-Status categorisation.

Background: Regulation EC/999/2001 addresses the risk management measures needed for transmissible animal spongiform encephalopathies. It links these measures to the BSE-Status of the countries concerned, including Member States. It is therefore necessary that all Member States and all other countries which desire to trade certain products with the EU are categorised with regard to their BSE-status. The regulation foresees 5 categories and specifies the conditions for each of these. One condition is that a risk assessment is carried out, forming the basis for the subsequent status categorisation. The Commission has decided that for the purpose of the Regulation the SSC’s GBR assessment provides for the necessary risk assessment. Countries may, however, provide their own risk assessment in which case the SSC will be asked to provide a scientific opinion on the validity of it.

Opinion Introduction: In the year 20001 the SSC assessed, with the exception of Greece which did not provide the needed data, the GBR of all the Member States of the European Union. It applied an innovative methodology based on an integrated evaluation of "external challenge" (i.e. imports2 of live animals and MBM from countries with notified cases of BSE) and of "stability" (i.e. ability to avoid recycling of BSE-infectivity). This method was also described in the GBR-opinion of the SSC of July 2000. Two countries (UK and PT) were classified as GBR IV; nine countries (BE, DK, FR, DE, IRL, IT, LUX, NL and SP) were classified as GBR III and three (AT, FINL and SW) as GBR II. Since then, BSE-cases have been notified in DE, IT and SP, confirming the GBR assessment, but also in AT, SF and GR. The finding of BSE in AT and SF lead the SSC, among other considerations, to update its GBR-assessment methodology. This update was adopted by the SSC in January 2002. It foresees that "external challenge" results not only from live animals and MBM imports from countries with notified

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out249_en.pdf



Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of AUSTRIA July 2000

5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK 5.1. THE CURRENT GBR • The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is II: it is unlikely that domestic cattle are either clinically or pre-clinically infected with the BSEagent, however, it cannot be excluded.

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out115_en.pdf




Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of DENMARK July 2000

5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK

5.1 The current GBR The current geographic BSE-risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. BSE is confirmed at a lower level.

On 28 February 2000 one case of BSE was diagnosed.

This case was detected by a passive surveillance system that is not able to identify all cases.

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out117_en.pdf




Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of FRANCE July 2000

5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK

5.1. The current GBR The current geographic BSE risk (GBR) of France is level III, i.e. BSE is confirmed in domestic cattle at a lower level.

The observed incidence of clinical cases over the last 12 months (1st February 1999 to 29 February 2000) is 2.9 per 1 million adult cattle.

This figure is generated by a passive surveillance system not able to discover all clinical BSEcases.

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out119_en.pdf




Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of FINLAND July 2000

5 THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK

5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is II, i.e. it is unlikely but cannot be excluded that cattle is infected (clinical or pre-clinical) with the BSE agent.

Note: This assessment is based on the assumption that the MBM imports from the Netherlands or other European Countries in 1988/89 did not pose a very high challenge. Given the uncertainty of this assumption that results from the fact that thousands of tonnes of MBM were exported at that time from the UK to other European countries, inter alia to the Netherlands, and from the practical impossibility to monitor the trade flows of that MBM, this assumption might be wrong. In that case Finland would have been exposed to a very high external challenge at a moment when the system was unstable. It therefore would have to be seen as GBR-level III.

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out118_en.pdf




Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of GERMANY July 2000

5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK

5.1 The current GBR The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent but it is not confirmed.

The current surveillance system is depending on notification of suspects, i.e. it is passive, and therefore not able to detect all clinical BSE cases. The probability that BSE is confirmed in Germany within the next years is significant, in particular if active surveillance would improve the performance of the surveillance system.

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out120_en.pdf




Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of Hungary March 2001

5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK

5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge

The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out196_en.pdf




Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of THE NETHERLANDS July 2000

5. THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK

5.1 The current GBR The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. BSE is confirmed in domestic cattle at a lower level.

However, the observed incidence of clinical cases over the period 1/3/99 to 29/2/2000 was 0.5 per 1 Million adult cattle. This figure is generated by a passive surveillance system that is not able to identify all clinical cases.

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out124_en.pdf




FINAL REPORT OF AN AUDIT CARRIED OUT IN ROMANIA FROM 07 TO 18 FEBRUARY 2011 IN ORDER TO EVALUATE MEASURES CONCERNING BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE)

Executive Summary This report describes the outcome of an audit carried out by the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) in Romania, from 7 to 18 February 2011.

The objective of the audit was to evaluate the implementation of requirements concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), as laid down in Regulation (EC) No 999/2001.

In terms of scope, the audit concentrated on BSE epidemio-surveillance in bovines, measures taken after suspicion/confirmation of BSE, removal and handling of specified risk material (SRM) from bovines, and the prohibition of feeding products of animal origin to farmed animals and exceptions applicable to this ban. The evaluation included measures taken in response to the recommendations made in a previous FVO audit regarding the afore-mentioned issues.

Overall, the report concludes that very limited progress has been made in order to address the recommendations of the previous FVO audit. In particular, BSE active epidemio-surveillance and compliance with SRM rules are significantly affected by the lack of arrangements for the collection of brain samples and SRM at backyard farms, where the majority of the bovine population is kept. There are also weaknesses concerning feed-ban controls.

The report makes a number of recommendations addressed to the Romanian competent authorities, aimed at rectifying the shortcomings identified and further enhancing the implementing and control measures in place.



http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/act_getPDF.cfm?PDF_ID=8947




http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/act_getPDFannx.cfm?ANX_ID=6451




http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/ap/ap_ro_2011-8950.pdf




Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of AUSTRALIA.

Question N°

EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted July 2004

SUMMARY OF SCIENTIFIC REPORT

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Australia, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Australia. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Australia as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. In the case of Australia, an extremely or very unstable system was exposed to a very low or negligible challenge through the import of cattle. Under these conditions, it is highly unlikely that any internal challenge occurred. Given the negligible level of external challenge through meat and bone meal (MBM), it is highly unlikely that any internal challenge occurred. The risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Australia and were, at least partly, rendered for feed, due to imported cattle from BSE-risk countries has been very low to negligible throughout the considered period. Some imports of cattle in the early 80s from the UK and from the mid-80s onwards from USA, Canada and European countries increased the risk of BSE infectivity entering the feed chain. However, the probability that BSE contaminated material entered processing is seen as being very low. EFSA concludes that the current GBR Australia level is I, i.e., it is highly unlikely that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the possibility of cross-contamination exists and there are no serious changes in rendering, the system will continue to be very unstable. Thus, the possibility of cattle being (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent will remain at a low level.

Key words: BSE, geographical risk assessment, GBR, Australia, third countries

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/it/scdocs/doc/s6r.pdf



Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of CANADA

Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083

Adopted July 2004 SUMMARY OF SCIENTIFIC REPORT

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Canada, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Canada. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Canada as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into the country middle of the eighties and could have reached domestic cattle in the early nineties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Canada reached domestic cattle and led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and were at least partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle imported from UK in the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries. EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if no additional external challenges occur.

Key words: BSE, geographical risk assessment, GBR, Canada, third countries

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/s2r.pdf



Thursday, February 10, 2011

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011 and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html




Friday, March 4, 2011

Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html




Wednesday, August 11, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html




Thursday, August 19, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html




Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of United States of America (USA)

Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083

Adopted July 2004

Summary of scientific report The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties. A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries. EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.

Key words: BSE, geographical risk assessment, GBR, USA, third countries

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/s3r.pdf




Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of USA - 1 - European Food Safety Authority Scientific Expert Working Group on GBR Working Group Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2004

Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of USA - 7 - 2.3

Overall assessment of the external challenge

The level of the external challenge that has to be met by the BSE/cattle system is estimated according to the guidance given by the SSC in its final opinion on the GBR of July 2000 (as updated in January 2002). Live cattle imports: In total the country imported 2038 (other sources) or 1128 (CD) live cattle from BSE risk countries other than Canada, of which 327 (other sources) or 323 (CD) came from the UK. From Canada the imports were >500,000 animals per year. The numbers shown in table 1 are the raw import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted imports for the assessment of the external challenge. Broken down to 5 year periods the resulting external challenge is as given in table 3. This assessment takes into account the different aspects discussed above that allow to assume that certain imported cattle did not enter the domestic BSE-cattle system, i.e. were not rendered into feed. In the case of the USA, all the animals for which tracing information showed that they were not rendered were excluded from the external challenge.

MBM imports:

In total the country imported 689 tons MBM (CD) or 2,230 tons MBM (other sources) from BSE risk countries other than Canada, of which 5 tons (CD) or 101 tons (other sources) were exported from the UK (UK export data). From Canada, the imports were about 30 000 tons per year. The numbers shown in table 2 are the raw import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted imports for the assessment of the external challenge. Broken down to 5 year periods the resulting external challenge is as given in table 3. This assessment takes into account the different aspects discussed above that allow to assume that certain imported MBM did not enter the domestic BSE/cattle system or did not represent an external challenge for other reasons. As it was illegal to export mammalian MBM from UK since 27/03/1996, exports indicated after that date should only have included non-mammalian MBM. In the case of the USA imported MBM from UK in 1989 and between 1997 and 1999 was not taken into account.

Feeding Use of MBM in cattle feed

• Until 1997 ruminant MBM (RMBM) could legally be included in cattle feed and was indeed commonly fed to cattle of different age and type. Prior to the feed ban the US authorities estimated that 10% of all MBM would deliberately have been fed to cattle. Feed bans

• A ban to feed (several types of) MMBM to ruminants was put in place in August 1997. Derogation from the ban was granted for pure porcine and equine protein (MBM) coming from designated (single species) rendering plants. This MMBM might still be fed to cattle. Therefore this feed ban is a ruminant to ruminant ban.

• It is planned to prohibit the use of all mammalian and poultry protein in ruminant feed and prohibiting materials from non-ambulatory disabled cattle and dead stock from use in all animal feed.

Conclusion on the ability to avoid recycling

• Before 1997, US system would not have been able to avoid recycling of the BSEagent to any measurable extent. If the BSE-agent was introduced into the feed chain, it could have reached cattle.

• After the introduction of the 1997 ban in August 1997, the ability to avoid recycling of BSE-infectivity was somewhat improved. However, the rendering of ruminant material (including SRM and fallen stock) is inadequate (non pressurized), and cross-contamination potentials of cattle feed with other feeds remain.

• Therefore, the system is still unable to avoid recycling of BSE-infectivity if already present in the system or incoming.

Feeding

Until August 1997, RMBM was legally fed to cattle. Feeding was therefore "not OK". In August 1997 an RMBM-ban was introduced but feeding of non-ruminant MBM to cattle remained legal as well as feeding of RMBM to non-ruminant animals (farm animals and pets). An RMBM ban is difficult to maintain, as only labels can distinguish the various MMBMs. This makes control of the feed ban very difficult because analytical differentiation between ruminant and non-ruminant MBM is difficult if not impossible.

Due to the highly specialised production system in the USA, various mammalian MBM streams can be separated. Such a feed ban would therefore be assessed as "reasonably OK", for all regions where this highly specialised system exists. However, several areas in the USA do have mixed farming and mixed feed mills, and in such regions an RMBM ban would not suffice. Additionally, official controls for cattle feeds to control for compliance with the ban started in 2002. Thus, for the whole country, the assessment of the feeding after 1997 remains "not OK", but improving.

Rendering

The rendering industry is operating with processes that are not known to reduce

infectivity. It is therefore concluded that rendering was and is "not OK".

SRM-removal

SRM were and are still rendered for feed, as are (parts of) the fallen stock. SRMremoval

is therefore regarded as "not OK".

BSE-surveillance

Before 1989, the ability of the system to identify (and eliminate) BSE-cases was

limited. Since 1990 this ability is improved, thanks to a specific (passive) BSE

surveillance. The initiated introduction of active surveillance in risk populations

should improve the system significantly.

On the basis of the available information, it has to be concluded that the country's

BSE/cattle system was extremely unstable until today, i.e., it would have recycled and

amplified BSE-infectivity very fast, should it have entered the system. The stability of

the BSE/cattle system in the USA overtime is as given in table 4.

The present assessment modifies the stability assessment of the previous GBR report

in 2000 mainly due to a different perception of the impact of BSE surveillance on

stability and of the efficiency of the RMBM feed ban.

Interaction of stability and external challenge in the USA

Period Stability External Challenge Internal challenge

1980 to

1985

1986 to

1990

Moderate Possibly present

1991 to 1995

Very high

1996 to

2000

2001 to

2003

Extremely unstable Extremely high Likely to be present and growing

5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK

5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge

• The current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not

confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the

BSE-agent.

Note1: It is also worth noting that the current GBR conclusions are not dependent on

the large exchange of imports between USA and Canada. External challenge due to

exports to the USA from European countries varied from moderate to high. These

challenges indicate that it was likely that BSE infectivity was introduced into the

North American continent.

snip...please see full text ;

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/3rax1.pdf






UK EXPORTS OF LIVE CATTLE BY VALUE 1986-96


http://web.archive.org/web/20060517075059/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab11.pdf





U.K. EXPORTS OF MEAL OF MEAT AND MEAT OFFAL; GREAVES ;


http://web.archive.org/web/20060517075122/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m12/tab12.pdf






HOWEVER, my files show 44 tons of greaves for USA. ...TSS



Subject: Re: exports from the U.K. of it's MBM to U.S.???

From: S.J.Pearsall@esg.maff.gsi.gov.uk

Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 14:03:16 +0000

To: flounder@wt.net (Receipt Notification Requested) (Non Receipt Notification Requested)

Terry Meat and bonemeal is not specifically classified for overseas trade purposes. The nearest equivalent is listed as flours and meals of meat or offals (including tankage), unfit for human consumption; greaves.

UK exports of this to the US are listed below:

Country Tonnes

1980

1981 12

1982

1983

1984 10

1985 2

1986

1987

1988

1989 20

1990

Data for exports between 1975 and 1979 are not readily available. These can be obtained (at a charge) from data retailers appointed by HM Customs and Excise: BTSL (Tel: 01372 463121) or Abacus (01245 252222).

Best wishes Simon Pearsall

Overseas trade statistics Stats (C&F)C

====================================== END...TSS




BANNED SUSPECT MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE 2006-2007, SOME 10 YEARS AFTER THE INFAMOUS PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY MAD COW FEED BAN or August 4, 1997, that was nothing more than ink on paper, so really, there was no BSE triple fire wall at all, and this was improving ???

*** BANNED MAD COW FEED IN THE USA IN COMMERCE TONS AND TONS

THIS is just ONE month report, of TWO recalls of prohibited banned MBM, which is illegal, mixed with 85% blood meal, which is still legal, but yet we know the TSE/BSE agent will transmit blood. we have this l-BSE in North America that is much more virulent and there is much concern with blood issue and l-BSE as there is with nvCJD in humans. some are even starting to be concerned with sporadic CJD and blood, and there are studies showing transmission there as well. ... this is one month recall page, where 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE, TO BE FED OUT. very little of the product that reaches commerce is ever returned via recall, very, very little. this was 2007, TEN YEARS AFTER THE AUGUST 4, 1997, PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY MAD COW FEED BAN IN THE USA, that was nothing but ink on paper. i have listed the tonnage of mad cow feed that was in ALABAMA in one of the links too, this is where the infamous g-h-BSEalabama case was, a genetic relation matching the new sporadic CJD in the USA. seems this saga just keeps getting better and better.......$$$

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm



see Alabama banned suspect mad cow feed in commerce ;

Saturday, August 14, 2010

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY

*** (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)

BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMA

Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST PRODUCT

a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;

b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;

c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;

d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.

CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons

DISTRIBUTION AL

______________________________

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html

PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes,

Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons

DISTRIBUTION AL and MS

______________________________

PRODUCT

a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;

b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;

c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;

d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;

e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6;

f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6;

g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6

CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags

DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT

a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;

b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;

c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;

d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;

e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;

f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;

g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;

h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;

i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;

j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;

k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;

l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;

m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE

Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons

DISTRIBUTION AL and FL

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html

MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE

Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II

______________________________

PRODUCT

a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;

b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;

c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;

d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE

a) Bulk

b) None

c) Bulk

d) Bulk

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons

DISTRIBUTION Nationwide

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html


Saturday, November 6, 2010

TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS

INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html




Archive Number 20101206.4364 Published Date 06-DEC-2010 Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 2010 (11)

PRION DISEASE UPDATE 2010 (11)

http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:5492868805159684::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,86129




NOW, what about that mad cow feed from atypical BSE in commerce and SRM regulations ???




Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse Location: Virus and Prion Research Unit

Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Project Type: Specific Cooperative Agreement

Start Date: Sep 15, 2004 End Date: Sep 14, 2009

Objective: The objective of this cooperative research project with Dr. Maria Caramelli from the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory in Turin, Italy, is to conduct comparative studies with the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy. The studies will cover the following areas: 1. Evaluation of present diagnostics tools used in the U.S. for the detection of atypical BSE cases. 2. Molecular comparison of the U.S. BSE isolate and other typical BSE isolates with atypical BSE cases. 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.

Approach: This project will be done as a Specific Cooperative Agreement with the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, in Turin, Italy. It is essential for the U.S. BSE surveillance program to analyze the effectiveness of the U.S diagnostic tools for detection of atypical cases of BSE. Molecular comparisons of the U.S. BSE isolate with atypical BSE isolates will provide further characterization of the U.S. BSE isolate. Transmission studies are already underway using brain homogenates from atypical BSE cases into mice, cattle and sheep. It will be critical to see whether the atypical BSE isolates behave similarly to typical BSE isolates in terms of transmissibility and disease pathogenesis. If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate. Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.

http://www.ushrl.saa.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?accn_no=408490




Saturday, June 12, 2010

PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/publication-request-and-foia-request.html



Wednesday, July 28, 2010

re-Freedom of Information Act Project Number 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE UPDATE July 28, 2010

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/re-freedom-of-information-act-project.html




Friday, October 8, 2010

Scientific reasons for a feed ban of meat-and-bone meal, applicable to all farmed animals including cattle, pigs, poultry, farmed fish and pet food

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/10/scientific-reasons-for-feed-ban-of-meat.html




P.9.21

Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada

Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada

Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.

Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres. Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.

Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada.


*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.


http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf




let's take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow.

This new prionopathy in humans? the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$

ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama

In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation.

http://www.plospathogens.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156




http://www.plospathogens.org/article/fetchObjectAttachment.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156&representation=PDF



Saturday, August 14, 2010

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY

(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html




Thursday, June 23, 2011

Experimental H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy characterized by plaques and glial- and stellate-type prion protein deposits

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/experimental-h-type-bovine-spongiform.html



Saturday, June 25, 2011

Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque


"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"


http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/transmissibility-of-bse-l-and-cattle.html




Sunday, June 26, 2011

Risk Analysis of Low-Dose Prion Exposures in Cynomolgus Macaque


http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/risk-analysis-of-low-dose-prion.html




Wednesday, June 15, 2011

Galveston, Texas - Isle port moves through thousands of heifers headed to Russia, none from Texas, Alabama, or Washington, due to BSE risk factor

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/galveston-texas-isle-port-moves-through.html



Monday, June 20, 2011 2011

Annual Conference of the National Institute for Animal Agriculture ATYPICAL NOR-98 LIKE SCRAPIE UPDATE USA

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/06/2011-annual-conference-of-national.html




Monday, June 27, 2011

Comparison of Sheep Nor98 with Human Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy and Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker Disease

http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/comparison-of-sheep-nor98-with-human.html




Monday, June 27, 2011

Zoonotic Potential of CWD: Experimental Transmissions to Non-Human Primates

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2011/06/zoonotic-potential-of-cwd-experimental.html




Sunday, July 03, 2011

Prion Disease Detection, PMCA Kinetics, and IgG in Urine from Naturally/Experimentally Infected Scrapie Sheep and Preclinical/Clinical CWD Deer

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2011/07/prion-disease-detection-pmca-kinetics.html




Saturday, June 18, 2011

Self-propagation and transmission of misfolded mutant SOD1 Prion or Prion-like phenomenon?

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/self-propagation-and-transmission-of.html




Wednesday, June 29, 2011

TSEAC Meeting August 1, 2011 donor deferral

http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/06/tseac-meeting-august-1-2011-donor.html




Thursday, May 26, 2011

Travel History, Hunting, and Venison Consumption Related to Prion Disease Exposure, 2006-2007 FoodNet Population Survey

Journal of the American Dietetic Association Volume 111, Issue 6 , Pages 858-863, June 2011.

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/05/travel-history-hunting-and-venison.html




Monday, May 23, 2011

Atypical Prion Diseases in Humans and Animals 2011

Top Curr Chem (2011)

DOI: 10.1007/128_2011_161

# Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Michael A. Tranulis, Sylvie L. Benestad, Thierry Baron, and Hans Kretzschmar

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/05/atypical-prion-diseases-in-humans-and.html




Saturday, March 5, 2011

MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html




Tuesday, April 26, 2011

sporadic CJD RISING Text and figures of the latest annual report of the NCJDRSU covering the period 1990-2009 (published 11th March 2011)

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/04/sporadic-cjd-rising-text-and-figures-of.html




Monday, November 23, 2009

BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS UPDATE NOVEMBER 23, 2009 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND O.I.E. COMMISSION DECISION of 11 November 2009

http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-gbr-risk-assessments-update.html




----- Original Message -----

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

To: Debra.Beasley@aphis.usda.gov

Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2009 11:01 AM

Subject: OIE has recently published its proposed animal welfare guidelines for public comment

Greetings USDA/APHIS et al,

I would kindly like to comment on OIE proposed guidelines.

AS I said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. THE reason most every country around the globe came down with BSE/TSE in their cattle, were due to the failed and flawed BSE/TSE testing and surveillance policy of the O.I.E. NOW, they don't even acknowledge atypical scrapie it seems, as one for concern $


Monday, November 23, 2009

BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS UPDATE NOVEMBER 23, 2009 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND O.I.E.

http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-gbr-risk-assessments-update.html




Tuesday, May 24, 2011 2:24 PM

O.I.E. Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission and prion (TSE) disease reporting 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/05/oie-terrestrial-animal-health-standards.html




Sunday, June 5, 2011

PRION TSE FUNDING, WHAT ARE THE PRIORITIES of APHCA, ASEAN, OIE, Korea, and USA ?

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/prion-tse-funding-what-are-priorities.html




Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0006 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary Sr Views Add Comments How To Comment

snip...

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure....

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=APHIS-2006-0041-0006





I IMPLORE, that due to the lack of surveillance and proper BSE/TSE protocols for testing and surveillance, the fact that sporadic CJD in the USA has tripled over the last few years or so, the new findings of BASE, the fact that CWD and Scrapie are out of control in the USA, I IMPLORE that the BSE MRR policy be repealed and the BSE GBR risk assessments revised to address all TSEs i.e. TSE GBR, for the following reasons ; ----- Original Message ----- From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To: "EFSA Press" Sent: Tuesday, November 21, 2006 12:21 PM Subject: Re: re-Geographical BSE Risk: EFSA consults on revision of assessment methodology Greetings EFSA, a sad day. i think any weakening of the BSE GBR risk assessments, especially for USA, is a huge mistake. i think the BSE GBR should be revised to include all TSE i.e. TSE GBR.


snip...


your only fooling yourselves with this stupid ukbsenvcjd only theory, and the BSE methology of the OIE. most any coutnry that went by those same OIE BSE guidelines all went down with BSE. THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE. AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf




Terry S. Singeltary SR. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518


http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=APHIS-2006-0026-0012;oldLink=false





Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment

January 28, 2007

Greetings APHIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to ;

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01



http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8






layperson...tss



Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
flounder9@verizon.net

Scientific Opinion on the capacity of oleochemical processes to minimise possible risks linked to TSE in Category 1 animal by-products EFSA

Scientific Opinion on the capacity of oleochemical processes to minimise possible risks linked to TSE in Category 1 animal by-products


EFSA Journal

2011;9(2):1976 [26 pp.]. doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2011.1976

EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ)

Panel Members Olivier Andreoletti, Herbert Budka, Sava Buncic, John D. Collins, John Griffin, Arie Havelaar, James Hope, Günter Klein, Tine Hald, James McLauchlin, Christine Mueller-Graf, Christophe Nguyen-Thé, Birgit Noerrung, Miguel Prieto Maradona, Luisa Peixe, Antonia Ricci, John Sofos, John Threlfall, Ivar Vågsholm and Emmanuel Vanopdenbosch.

Acknowledgment

The Panel wishes to thank the members of the Working Group on the capacity of oleochemical processes to minimise possible risks linked to TSE in Category 1 animal by-products: Emmanuel Vanopdenbosch, Christophe Nguyen-The, John Griffin, James Hope and Reinhard Boehm for the preparatory work on this scientific opinion and EFSA staff: Alessandro Broglia for the support provided to this scientific opinion. Contact biohaz@efsa.europa.eu Type:

Opinion of the Scientific Committee/Scientific Panel On request from: European Commission Question number: EFSA-Q-2010-00969

Adopted: 20 January 2011 Published: 07 February 2011 Affiliation: European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), Parma, Italy Article Full article (0.2 Mb) send print cite

Abstract

The capacity of specific oleochemical processes including several steps (i.e. bleaching, fat splitting, hydrogenation, concentration, distillation and refinement) in order to minimise possible risks linked to TSE infectivity in tallow including Category 1 animal by-products (ABP) was assessed. Under the new ABP Regulation (Reg. EC No 1069/2009), the use of Category 1 tallow for oleochemical products may be also authorised, if the processes are proved to be capable of sufficiently inactivating any potential risks linked to TSEs. The processes considered in this opinion are based on different treatment steps in different combination, but with respect to infectivity reduction the major contribution derives from hydrolytic fat splitting and hydrogenation, so to obtain fatty acids and glycerol. It is concluded that if the parameters are fully met as declared by the applicant, certain processes can be considered effective in significantly reducing the TSE infectivity in the end products using Category 1 tallow. However, considering the uncertainties on the TSE infectivity reduction in oleochemical products derived from Cat. 1 material, these products cannot be reliably regarded to be free of infectivity and therefore could pose a risk if they entered the food and feed chain.

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/1976.htm?WT.mc_id=EFSAHL01&emt=1


Summary (0.1 Mb) Following a request from the European Commission, the EFSA Scientific Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) was asked to provide scientific advice on the capacity of a specific oleochemical processes to minimise possible risks linked to TSE infectivity in tallow including category 1 material.

The current Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002 on animal by-products foresees that rendered fats obtained from Category 2 and Category 3 materials may be used for the manufacture of oleochemical products.

Under the new ABP Regulation (Reg. EC No 1069/2009), the use of Category 1 material in the production of oleochemical products may be also authorised, provided that the manufacturing processes which are applied by the oleochemical industry are capable of sufficiently inactivating any potential risks linked to TSE. This would allow the use of such products in various applications, such as in soaps, cosmetic products and plastics, regardless of the category of animal by-products that are used as starting materials.

The European Oleochemicals and Allied Products Group (APAG), a sector group of the European Chemical Industry Council (Cefic), has submitted scientific evidence to the Commission regarding the capacity of oleochemical processes to inactivate possible risks linked to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) in animal by-products not intended for human consumption (ABPs).

The oleochemical processes considered consist mainly of hydrolytic fat splitting of tallow to obtain fatty acids and glycerol, under the conditions of 200°C, 16 bar of pressure for 20 minutes. The processes can be carried out in a unitower or multitower plant. If saturated fatty acids or hydrogenated tallow are to be obtained, hydrogenation under conditions of 160°C, 12 bar of H2 pressure for 20 minutes is applied in batch or continuous reactors. Eight different processes, consisting of a combination of different steps, can be used according to the different end products and type of reactors used.

The parameters considered are mainly temperature, time and pressure. In the opinion the reduction effects of the different steps that characterise the processes are assessed and, when possible, quantified. The two steps with experimental evidence that contribute to the TSE risk reduction are the hydrolytic fat splitting and the hydrogenation.

It is concluded that if the critical limits of the specific method considered are met, the reduction of TSE infectivity of certain processes is significant. However, considering the uncertainties on the TSE infectivity reduction in oleochemical products derived from Cat. 1 material, these products cannot be reliably regarded to be free of infectivity and therefore could pose a risk if they entered the food and feed chain.

As for efficacy of hydrogenation step, only batch processes can be compared to validated experiments, continuous processes could not be considered effective due to the lack of critical data (i.e. minimum retention time). As for the splitting step carried out in continuous reactors, the processing time represents a sufficient safety margin compared to the minimum requirement, and therefore it is considered effective.

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/s1976.pdf


Full Text ;

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/1976.pdf


Thursday, July 22, 2010

BSE INQUIRY DFA 18 COSMETICS

From: TSS

Subject: Use of Materials Derived From Cattle in Human Food and Cosmetics [Docket No. 2004N-0081] RIN 0910-AF47

Date: April 17, 2008 at 2:41 pm PST


http://bseinquiry.blogspot.com/2010/07/bse-inquiry-dfa-18-cosmetics.html


http://bseinquiry.blogspot.com/




Saturday, January 29, 2011

Atypical L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (L-BSE) Transmission to Cynomolgus Macaques, a Non-Human Primate

Jpn. J. Infect. Dis., 64 (1), 81-84, 2011


http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/atypical-l-type-bovine-spongiform.html





Tuesday, February 8, 2011


U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001


http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/02/usa-50-state-bse-mad-cow-conference.html




http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/




TSS

Meat from three cows aged over 48 months not tested for BSE exported to France, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark and the Republic of Ireland

Meat from three cows aged over 48 months not tested for BSE

Wednesday 17 November 2010

The Agency has been notified that meat from three cattle over 48 months of age has entered the food chain without being tested for BSE.

It is very unlikely that the animals were infected with BSE and, as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is now extremely low. However, testing is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 48 months of age.*

The cows were slaughtered at the Cig Calon Cymru abattoir at Crosshands, Carmarthenshire and were 64 months of age, 71 months of age and 87 months of age. The failure was discovered on 3 November during routine checks of slaughter and BSE test data. All of the affected carcasses and offal had left the premises at the time of discovery and subsequent checks indicated that all meat and edible co-product is no longer in the food supply chain.

Inspections have indicated that some of the affected product has been exported to France, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark and the Republic of Ireland. The authorities in these countries have been informed.

*SRM is that part of the animal most likely to contain BSE infectivity.

http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2010/nov/bse117nov


Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

The NeuroPrion network has identified seven main threats for the future linked to prions.

First threat

The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed. *** Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Second threat

In small ruminants, a new atypical form of scrapie currently represents up to 50% of detected cases and even involves sheep selected for resistance to classical scrapie. The consequences for animal and human health are still unknown and there may be a potential connection with atypical BSE. These atypical scrapie cases constitute a second threat not envisioned previously which could deeply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Third threat

The species barrier between human and cattle might be weaker than previously expected and the risk of transmission of prion diseases between different species has been notoriously unpredictable. The emergence of new atypical strains in cattle and sheep together with the spread of chronic wasting disease in cervids renders the understanding of the species barrier critical. This constitutes a third threat not properly envisioned previously that could deeply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Fourth threat

Prion infectivity has now been detected in blood, urine and milk and this has potential consequences on risk assessments for the environment and food as well as for contamination of surfaces including medical instruments. Furthermore the procedures recommended for decontamination of MBM (Meat and Bone Meal), which are based on older methodologies not designed for this purpose, have turned out to be of very limited efficacy and compromise current policies concerning the reuse of these high value protein supplements (cross-contamination of feed circuits are difficult to control). It should be noted that the destruction or very limited use of MBM is estimated to still cost 1 billion euros per year to the European economy,

whereas other countries, including the US,

Brazil, and Argentine do not have these constraints.

However, many uncertainties remain concerning the guarantees that can be reasonably provided for food and feed safety and scientific knowledge about the causative agents (prions) will continue to evolve. This decontamination and environmental issue is a fourth threat that could modify deeply the European approach to prion diseases.

Fifth threat The precise nature of prions remains elusive. Very recent data indicate that abnormal prion protein (PrPTSE) can be generated from the brains of normal animals, and under some conditions (including contaminated waste water) PrPTSE can be destroyed whereas the BSE infectious titre remains almost unchanged, a finding that underlines the possibility of having BSE without any detectable diagnostic marker. These are just two areas of our incomplete knowledge of the fundamental biology of prions which constitute a fifth threat to the European approach to prion diseases.

Sixth threat The absence of common methods and standardisation in the evaluation of multiple in vivo models with different prion strains and different transgenic mice expressing PrP from different species (different genotypes of cattle, sheep, cervids, etc) renders a complete and comprehensive analysis of all the data generated by the different scientific groups almost impossible. This deeply impairs risk assessment. Moreover, the possibility of generating PrPTSE de novo with new powerful techniques has raised serious questions about their appropriateness for use as blood screening tests. The confusion about an incorrect interpretation of positive results obtained by these methods constitutes a sixth threat to European approach to prion diseases.

Seventh Threat The detection of new or re-emerging prion diseases in animals or humans which could lead to a new crisis in consumer confidence over the relaxation of precautionary measures and surveillance programmes constitutes a seventh threat that could modify the European approach to prion diseases.

http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html


Thursday, August 12, 2010

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html


http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/



Tuesday, November 02, 2010

BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html



Saturday, November 6, 2010

TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS

INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html



TSS

FINAL REPORT OF A MISSION CARRIED OUT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM 19 TO 29 JANUARY 2010 IN ORDER TO EVALUATE MEASURES CONCERNING BSE

DG(SANCO) 2010-8344 - MR FINAL

FINAL REPORT OF A MISSION CARRIED OUT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

FROM 19 TO 29 JANUARY 2010

IN ORDER TO EVALUATE MEASURES CONCERNING BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE)

In response to information provided by the Competent Authority, any factual error noted in the draft report has been corrected; any clarification appears in the form of a footnote.

Executive Summary

This report describes the outcome of a Food and Veterinary Office specific audit carried out between 19 to 29 January 2010, which formed part of the general audit 2009 of the United Kingdom conducted under the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004.

As part of the general audit, the objective of this specific audit was to evaluate that official controls are carried out in conformity with the multi-annual national control plan drawn up in accordance within Article 41 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004. The specific audit evaluated the implementation of certain protective measures against Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE).

Overall, the report concludes that active surveillance was satisfactory and that some progress has been made as regards the quality of samples for BSE testing. Passive surveillance was appropriately carried out and measures related to suspect animals and following confirmation of BSE were implemented in line with Community requirements.

The arrangements in place for collection and handling of specified risk material were mainly satisfactory, although there were some weaknesses in commercial documentation.

In Great Britain, the identification of users of fish meal and feed containing fish meal has significantly progressed but the registration and authorisation process of such users was far from being completed. Some important steps have been taken to improve the risk prioritisation of inspections, but it remains affected by an incomplete knowledge of some key feed operators. In Northern Ireland, the identification of users of feed containing fish meal was still on-going. The priorities set for inspections in the national control programme were not complied with, resulting in very few visits to on-farm mixers and mixed species farms, including those using fish meal or feed containing fish meal; moreover, the prioritisation of feed ban controls did not take account of the significant use of bulk feather meal as organic fertilisers on farms. The large majority of the said farms were therefore not visited despite several incidents concerning cross-contamination of feed with feather meal that occurred in the recent past. In addition, limited enforcement actions and sanctions had been taken following a number of breaches of feed ban rules.

The report makes a number of recommendations addressed to the United Kingdom competent authorities aimed at rectifying the shortcoming identified and further enhancing the implementing and control measures in place.

snip...

5.5 FEED BAN

5.5.1 Requirements along the chain

Legal requirements

Art. 7 of Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 prohibits the feeding to farmed animals of products derived from animals in accordance with the conditions laid down in its Annex IV, which establishes a number of derogations from the said prohibition and specific conditions for the application of such derogations.

Findings

The relevant recommendation of report 8316/2006 concerned the authorisation of establishments using fish meal for the production of feed, the use of feed containing fish meal on mixed species farms and the labelling of feed containing fish meal. In response to this recommendation, the CCA undertook to take all necessary actions in the following National Feed Audit (NFA) programmes. Since the last mission, the procedure in place for authorising and registering users of fish meal or other derogated products derived from animals, which is described in detail in report 8316/2006, has been simplified. In Great Britain, authorisations to produce feed containing derogated products derived from animals have replaced registrations as in both cases the requirements to comply with were deemed very similar. Official permission to store or use complete feed containing derogated products derived from animals on premises with ruminants present is granted following a satisfactory official inspection.

According to DARD and DEFRA, there is no evidence of use of dicalcium or tricalcium phosphate of animal origin in the United Kingdom. Concerning the use of blood and blood products, both the CCAs declared their use is very limited, and one industry assurance scheme in the UK includes a voluntary ban on the feeding of blood products to pigs.

Commission Regulation (EC) No 956/2008 has not yet been transposed into BSE domestic legislation, which therefore does not provide for a derogation in relation to the use of fish meal to unweaned farmed animals of the ruminant species. Consultations are on-going or about to be launched by the different CCA in order to amend the different domestic legislations. A few samples on milk replacers have been taken in Great Britain but were tested negative for the presence of fish meal. According to DEFRA, little interest has been expressed by the feed industry and farmers associations as regards the use of fish meal in milk replacers.

The mission team noted that:

• Lists of authorised users of fish meal were being kept by AH and DARD. However, in Northern Ireland, the activities indicated on the list of users did not always reflect the actual activities carried out by the operators.

• In Great Britain, important progress has been made in the identification, authorisation and permitting process of users of fish meal and feed containing fish meal. AH achieved such progress by requesting feed mills to provide the lists of purchasers of fish meal and feed containing fish meal. As a result of this exercise, around 10,000 purchasers were identified. The central operations delivery team of AH, which has taken over the authorisation and permissions database, had already contacted around 5,200 of these premises and 393 had been sent to AHROs and AHDOs for inspections, resulting in 329 of them being authorised or permitted. However, the identification process is still incomplete as one half of the purchasers identified (around 5,000) has still to be contacted.

• The tracing exercise carried out centrally by AH focused on farms purchasing fish meal and feed containing fish meal. According to AH, intermediaries or feed stores present on the lists obtained and possibly supplying such feed to other farms or feed operators have not yet been contacted. In some of the AHOs and AHDOs visited, AH staff requested updates of lists of purchasers of feed containing fish meal from local feed business operators. In some cases, such lists (which contained significant proportions of new purchasers) have been sent to AH central operations delivery team (further delaying their authorisation or permission) while in other cases they have been dealt with at local level.

• AH staff inspecting ABP plants, in particular those handling fish meal, have been requested to forward to the NFA lead veterinary officer any relevant information allowing the identification of users. However, importers, brokers or storage plants have not yet been requested to provide list of purchasers of fish meal and it could be confirmed that a limited feed back has been received from AH staff performing ABP inspections; for instance, not all plants involved in bulk storage of fish meal were known by the NFA lead veterinary officer.

• In Northern Ireland, DARD had recently obtained lists of purchasers of feed containing fish meal from feed mills. Around 70 farms keeping ruminants and non-ruminants and buying such feed have been identified and are in the process of being registered.

• All authorised users of fish meal visited were also producing ruminant feed. Adequate arrangements, including physical separation and dedication of equipments or means of transports, were in place to avoid cross-contamination of ruminant feed except in one onfarm mixer visited, where there was an incomplete physical separation between the storage of bulk feed material used for ruminant feed and the area where feed containing fish meal was manufactured.

• Labelling requirements for fish meal and feed containing fish meal were complied with and in most cases a warning sentence was printed on the bags. In one on-farm mixer visited, bags of fish meal were not properly labelled but this had been identified by AH which had taken immediate corrective actions.

• On a number of consignments of imported fish meal checked during the mission, it was verified that microscopy testing had been carried before they were released for free circulation.

Conclusions

Legal and administrative arrangements are in place in order to ensure that the use of products derived from animals is subject to the requirements of Art. 7 of Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 and there is a good level of compliance amongst the feed operators using derogated products derived from animals. However, even if the authorisation and permission process of such users has made important progress since the last FVO mission, it is still far from being completed. As a consequence, it can not be yet ensured that the use of derogated products derived from animals is always carried out in accordance with the conditions established in Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 999/2001.

snip...

6 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

Active surveillance was satisfactory and that some progress has been made as regards the quality of samples for BSE testing. Passive surveillance was appropriately carried out and measures related to suspect animals and following confirmation of BSE were implemented in line with Community requirements.

The arrangements in place for collection and handling of specified risk material were mainly satisfactory, although there were some weaknesses in commercial documentation.

In Great Britain, the identification of users of fish meal and feed containing fish meal has significantly progressed but the registration and authorisation process of such users was far from being completed. Some important steps have been taken to improve the risk prioritisation of inspections, but it remains affected by an incomplete knowledge of some key feed operators.

In Northern Ireland, the identification of users of feed containing fish meal was still on-going. The priorities set for inspections in the national control programme were not complied with, resulting in very few visits to on-farm mixers and mixed species farms, including those using fish meal or feed containing fish meal; moreover, the prioritisation of feed ban controls did not take account of the significant use of bulk feather meal as organic fertilisers on farms. The large majority of the said farms were therefore not visited despite several incidents concerning cross-contamination of feed with feather meal that occurred in the recent past. In addition, limited enforcement actions and sanctions had been taken following a number of breaches of feed ban rules.


5.1 BSE SITUATION

The number of BSE positive cases in Great Britain and Northern Ireland is shown in the table below (data as of 31 December 2009; information provided by the DEFRA).

The last BSE positive case identified by passive surveillance in a herd without previous BSE cases occurred in 2007. In 2009, six BSE positive cases were animals born before 1 August 1996.


Great Britain Northern Ireland

Passive surveillance Active surveillance Passive surveillance Active surveillance


2007 7 46 0 14

2008 2 31 0 4

2009 1 8 0 3


snip...please see full text here ;

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/act_getPDF.cfm?PDF_ID=8070


16 March 2010

Annex 1 – Comments on DG(SANCO) 2010-8344 – MR DRAFT

BSE Measures

Section Reference Page UK Comment Abbreviations III

Amend “Department for Agriculture and Rural Development” to “Department of Agriculture and Rural Development”

1

With regards to the sentence commencing “Representatives of the Food Standard Agency and of the Meat Hygiene Service”, note that there were no representatives of the Food Standards Agency present at the slaughterhouse in England.

5.1 3

The sentence “Since then [2007], BSE cases were notified either in sub-populations of fallen stock or animals slaughtered for human consumption” is incorrect as there were cases detected as clinical suspects, by passive surveillance in 2008 and 2009.

5.1 3

The sentence commencing “In 2009, the last...” should be amended as follows “In 2009, six BSE positive cases were animals born before 1 August 1996”

5.2.1 (Bullet 1) 4

Amend “Cattle Cohort and Offspring System” to “Offspring and Cohort Cull (OCC) System”.

5.2.2 (Bullet 2) 5

Amend “In one of the slaughterhouse visited...” to “In one of the slaughterhouses visited...”

5.2.3 (Findings)

5

In sentence commencing “The relevant recommendations of report...” amend “from being slaughter” to “from being slaughtered”.

5.2.3 (First full paragraph on page) 6

Replace paragraph beginning “According to DARD...” with “According to DARD, several changes have been introduced in procedures concerning the extraction and entry of data from and onto APHIS. The Required Method of Operations (RMOPs) in all slaughterhouses were reviewed and amended to require post slaughter identification checks. These are designed to ensure the correct identification of all animals prior to BSE sampling."

5.2.3 (Fourth full paragraph on page) 6

The facility to check the cattle ID database (i.e. CTS) at slaughterhouses does not apply in GB. GB operates the policy of passport seizure. NI does not use passports.

? Amend the sentence commencing “DEFRA continued the policy which had been implemented...” to “The CCAs in Great Britain continued the policy which had been implemented...”

? Amend the sentence commencing “In addition restricted animals received special status in CTS and APHIS, which allows their identification at slaughterhouses...” to “In Northern Ireland, restricted animals received special status

16 March 2010

2

in APHIS, which allows their identification at slaughterhouses...”

5.2.3 (Bullet 3) 7

Amend the paragraph commencing “According to the OV met in the slaughterhouse...” to “According to the OV met in the slaughterhouse visited in Northern Ireland, animals with clinical signs consistent with BSE would be rejected at ante-mortem inspection, and animals with localized lesions such as distal limb lameness were not recorded as sick at ante-mortem and therefore considered as healthy slaughtered. On the spot checks detected one animal which should have been recorded as sick at ante-mortem but which was recorded as healthy slaughtered. All ante-mortem information was recorded on APHIS and this triggered the BSE testing category on the sample label, however timing of data entry could result in the default printing of the label as healthy slaughtered”.

5.2.3 (Bullet 6) 7

Amend the paragraph commencing “In Northern Ireland, there was...” to “In Northern Ireland, there was one case in 2009 where a bovine animal eligible for testing was slaughtered for human consumption and not tested. According to the CCA, this was due to a human error by the manufacturer of a replacement tag. When this error was identified, the meat from this animal had already been placed on the market. Following that case, an additional document verification procedure was put in place in the lairage for animals of all ages as an obligatory check.” 5.2.3 (Conclusions)

8

DARD considers that the conclusions reached are overstated based on the evidence identified. Further evidence of subpopulation recording can be provided. For example:

? in 2008 in NI, 426 UA (24-30 month sick at ante-mortem animals) category animals were recorded. 101 of these were identified in the slaughterhouse visited;

? in 2009 in NI, 71 TC (O48 emergency slaughter) category animals were recorded. 18 of these were identified in the slaughterhouse visited; and

? in 2009 in NI, 218 TA (O48 sick at ante-mortem animals) were recorded. Further statistics are available at

http://www.defra.gov.uk/vla/science/docs/sci_tse_stats_ireland.pdf


5.2.4 (Findings, second paragraph)

8

The number 54000 in the sentence commencing “According to the CCA...” is incorrect. In the response to the evaluation plan, we advised that as of 30 September 2009, there were around 75000 cattle in GB born before 1 August 1996, of which around 54000 were born before 1 August 1995. As of 1 February 2010, the number of cattle in GB born before 1 August 1996 had reduced to 66834 of which 48275 were born before 1 August 1995.

5.2.4 8

Amend the sentence commencing “A similar situation was not

16 March 2010 3

(Findings, second paragraph) observed...” to “Although the OCDS ended on 31 December 2008, cattle keepers in NI could still avail of the free collection and disposal service for these older fallen cattle until November 2009”.

5.3 (Findings) 9

In the sentence commencing “Following the confirmation of BSE...” delete the words “all cattle on the affected farm (if necessary)” as we only have powers to kill cohorts and offspring in line with Regulation (EC) No.999/2001 5.4.1 (Findings, Bullet 4) 10

The MHS has clarified that at the time of the visit to the slaughterhouse in England, there were five vehicles on site used to transport animal by-products. Three vehicles were in use and two were empty. One vehicle was in the boning hall disposal bay and contained Category 3 material. It was labelled “Category 3” with a temporary paper label which was not strictly compliant with Regulation (EC) No.1774/2002 in that it did not contain the words “not for human consumption”. Two vehicles were in the back yard, contained SRM and were correctly labelled “Category 1 – for disposal only”. Two vehicles were in the front yard, were empty and unlabelled and were awaiting Category 3 material.

Delete the sentence “However, in one of them (England), means of transport used for the collection of SRM were not identified as required as no category nor any warning sentence were mentioned on most of the trailers used.”

5.4.1 (Findings, first paragraph on page)

11 Fat is combusted in the plant in NI at between 1200°C and 1400°C. The figure of 950°C quoted during the mission was the temperature reached in the secondary chamber where vapours from the plant are oxidised.

5.4.1

(Conclusions)

11

With reference to the clarification above (Section 5.4.1 on page 10) regarding identification of vehicles used to transport SRM, amend the sentence commencing “However, the traceability of SRM...” to “However, the traceability of SRM was affected by weaknesses in commercial documentation, which was not in line with the requirement in Art. 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002”.

5.4.2 (Findings, Bullet 2)

11

Amend the sentence commencing “In was only after several months...” to “It was only after several months”. 5.4.2 (Final sub-bullet)

12

In the paragraph commencing “Validation of Category 1 processing plants visited...” the official has clarified that although the plant was validated based on the particle size after the cooker, the official had since insisted on changes to the plant to allow the particle size to be assessed before the cooker. This historic deficiency regarding visual assessment of the particle size had been rectified by the time of the FVO mission visit. 5.5.1 (Findings, third paragraph)

13

With regards to the sentence commencing “According to DARD and DEFRA, there



To see the Competent Authority comments on the draft report, click here ( (255Kb) -

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/act_getPDFannx.cfm?ANX_ID=6221


To see the Competent Authority response to the report recommendations, click here

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/ap/ap_gb_2010-8344.pdf



FISH AND PRIONS

Evaluation of the Possible Transmission of BSE and Scrapie to Gilthead Sea Bream (Sparus aurata)

In transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), a group of fatal neurodegenerative disorders affecting many species, the key event in disease pathogenesis is the accumulation of an abnormal conformational isoform (PrPSc) of the host-encoded cellular prion protein (PrPC). While the precise mechanism of the PrPC to PrPSc conversion is not understood, it is clear that host PrPC expression is a prerequisite for effective infectious prion propagation. Although there have been many studies on TSEs in mammalian species, little is known about TSE pathogenesis in fish. Here we show that while gilthead sea bream (Sparus aurata) orally challenged with brain homogenates prepared either from a BSE infected cow or from scrapie infected sheep developed no clinical prion disease, the brains of TSE-fed fish sampled two years after challenge did show signs of neurodegeneration and accumulation of deposits that reacted positively with antibodies raised against sea bream PrP. The control groups, fed with brains from uninfected animals, showed no such signs. Remarkably, the deposits developed much more rapidly and extensively in fish inoculated with BSE-infected material than in the ones challenged with the scrapie-infected brain homogenate, with numerous deposits being proteinase K-resistant. These plaque-like aggregates exhibited congophilia and birefringence in polarized light, consistent with an amyloid-like component. The neurodegeneration and abnormal deposition in the brains of fish challenged with prion, especially BSE, raises concerns about the potential risk to public health. As fish aquaculture is an economically important industry providing high protein nutrition for humans and other mammalian species, the prospect of farmed fish being contaminated with infectious mammalian PrPSc, or of a prion disease developing in farmed fish is alarming and requires further evaluation.

Article Metrics Related Content Comments: 1 To add a note, highlight some text. Hide notes Make a general comment Jump to

Acknowledgments Author Contributions References Evgenia Salta1#, Cynthia Panagiotidis2#, Konstantinos Teliousis3, Spyros Petrakis1,4, Eleftherios Eleftheriadis5, Fotis Arapoglou5, Nikolaos Grigoriadis6, Anna Nicolaou7, Eleni Kaldrymidou3, Grigorios Krey5, Theodoros Sklaviadis2*

1 Department of Pharmacology, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece, 2 Centre for Research and Technology-Hellas, Institute of Agrobiotechnology, Thessaloniki, Greece, 3 Laboratory of Pathology, School of Veterinary Medicine, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece, 4 Max Delbruck Center for Molecular Medicine, Department of Neuroproteomics, Berlin-Buch, Germany, 5 National Agricultural Research Foundation, Fisheries Research Institute, Nea Peramos, Greece, 6 B' Department of Neurology, AHEPA University Hospital, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece, 7 Department of Business Administration, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece

http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0006175


WONDER where all this fish feed that is not supposed to be fed to ruminants is going ?

PRODUCT a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6; Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6; c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6; d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6; e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6; f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6; g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6 CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags

DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html


Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST

PRODUCT a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6; Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6; c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6; d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6; e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6; f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6; g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6; h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6; i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6; j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6; k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6; l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6; m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons DISTRIBUTION AL and FL

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html


CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD TSS MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II ______________________________ PRODUCT a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6; b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6; c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6; d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing. REASON Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons DISTRIBUTION Nationwide

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html


see ;

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html



STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL 25, AUGUST 1995

snip...

To minimise the risk of farmers' claims for compensation from feed compounders.

To minimise the potential damage to compound feed markets through adverse publicity.

To maximise freedom of action for feed compounders, notably by maintaining the availability of meat and bone meal as a raw material in animal feeds, and ensuring time is available to make any changes which may be required.

snip...

THE FUTURE

4..........

MAFF remains under pressure in Brussels and is not skilled at handling potentially explosive issues.

5. Tests _may_ show that ruminant feeds have been sold which contain illegal traces of ruminant protein. More likely, a few positive test results will turn up but proof that a particular feed mill knowingly supplied it to a particular farm will be difficult if not impossible.

6. The threat remains real and it will be some years before feed compounders are free of it. The longer we can avoid any direct linkage between feed milling _practices_ and actual BSE cases, the more likely it is that serious damage can be avoided. ...

SEE full text ;

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/08/24002001.pdf



greetings,

Confucius is confused yet again. how can you be a consultant of something that has not happened yet ???

is this a typo, or what ??? what is R Bradley speaking of in 1983 ??? what is this BSE CONSULTANT in 1983??? i am confused, i thought the first cow documented was 1985, first discovered in 1984, and the diagnosis was rabies or something else besides BSE at first, then later discovered to be BSE, a new strain of TSE in the bovine. ...

BSE CONSULTANT

APPROVAL OF MATERIAL FOR PUBLICATION

All material for publication including written works to be published in scientific journals, books, proceedings of scientific meetings, abstracts of verbally delivered papers and the like should be scrutinized for risk to the Ministry before dispatch to the publisher. ...

snip...

R Bradly Pathology 12 October 1983

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1983/10/12001001.pdf


http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1984/12/28001001.pdf


1981 nervous disease in a Hereford calf (calves aged 7-14 days shoring progressive nervous signs of the hind limb weakness progressing to paraplegia. ...

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1984/01/30001001.pdf


Pathologist: Carol Richardson

DIAGNOSIS: 1. Moderat spongiform encephalopathy- acute. 2. Mild renal nephrosis - peracute

REMARKS: These acute changes suggest a toxicity of some description. The non-suppurative reactions are far more chronic, mild and non-specific.

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1985/09/19001001.pdf


http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1985/09/19003001.pdf


Owner of animal, Mr. Stent

snip...

FINAL REPORT

Attempts at virus isolation have proved negative.

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1985/09/23001001.pdf


Cases reviewed and discussed, ...No conclusion drawn....

GAH Wells

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1985/09/26001001.pdf


Subject: Carol Richardson $ BSE
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Date: Wed, 1 Nov 2000 09:51:39 -0800 Content-Type: text/plain Parts/Attachments: text/plain (345 lines)

######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

Greetings List,

dont know if this will help calm nerves a bit, but you might find what you want here, in one of those reference YB numbers. her hand-written notes on the case would be; YB85/9.10/3.1-3.2

It was not, therefore, immediately apparent from the post-mortem histopathological examination of the brain of one animal in this herd that it was the first and unprecedented case of a new disease. Even though it can now be seen, with hindsight, that such was the case.

kind regards, Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA

=============================================

The Stent farm cases

12. On 10th September, 1985 specimens (brain, kidney and spinal cord) from a cow owned by a Mr Stent of Pitsham Farm was referred to the CVL by the Winchester VI Centre (Mr J. Watkin-Jones, Veterinary Officer (VO)) for histopathological examination. Referrals from the VI Centres were dealt with on a rota system by the Consultative Pathology Unit (see paragraph 9 above). The veterinary pathologist on duty when the case came in to the Pathology Department was Ms Carol Richardson. At the time both Carol Richardson and I held the position of Senior Research Officer Grade II (SROII), both of us reporting directly to Ray Bradley. Carol Richardson worked in a section of the Department called Ruminant Reproductive Pathology and I believe that she had been working mainly on reproductive disorders in cattle and sheep, with a particular interest in research into infections producing foetal damage. She would, however, have dealt with scrapie cases through some of her previous work with Dr Stanley Terlecki, a former pathologist in the Department.

13. When such diagnostic cases came into CVL from a VI Centre the technician on duty at the time completed a VL99 card summarising the clinical history of the cow and the herd it originated from (based on information provided in the referral letter from the relevant VI Centre). The duty veterinary pathologist prepared the necessary pathological material for histological processing. Sections were then produced from the animal tissues for subsequent examination. The VL99 card for this particular case from Mr Stent's farm is found at YB85/9.10/3.1-3.2. This card and the prepared sections would then have been passed back to the duty veterinary pathologist for examination, which in this instance was Carol Richardson.

14. Carol Richardson conducted the histopathological examination and reported her findings on 19th September, 1985 (YB85/9.10/3.1-3.2). Her hand-written notes on the examination are on the VL99 card (see YB85/9.10/3.1-3.2). The final pathology report prepared by Carol Richardson, which was sent to Mr Watkin-Jones at Winchester VI Centre, is found at YB85/9.19/3.2. It should be noted that the purpose of the pathology reports prepared by the veterinary pathologists for such referrals from VI Centres is to make morphological diagnoses based on an examination of specimens provided. As far as is possible the pathologist then tries to place the diagnosis in the context of the clinical history of the particular animal and its herd or flock to reach conclusions or speculations on an aetiological diagnosis (the cause of the observed changes). This is the purpose of the "Remarks" section of the pathology report. Carol Richardson's examination reported "moderate spongiform encephalopathy" and "mild renal nephrosis" (the morphological diagnoses) and she attributed these observed changes to "a toxicity of some description" (the possible aetiological diagnosis). This was what was reported to the VI Centre. It is notable that nowhere in her report does she mention scrapie or indicate that her observations lead her to suspect any "scrapie-like" disease. The fact that the report mentions "moderate spongiform encephalopathy" is not conclusive in that respect. As highlighted by my short paper on vacuolation previously referred to in paragraph 8, spongiform conditions of the brain can arise from several different causes, including as a reaction to the ingestion of toxic substances, so this observation was consistent with her suggested aetiological diagnosis.

15. At the time this case came in from Mr Stent's farm, I was attending a meeting of the Charles Davis DVM Foundation for Veterinary Pathology in Cheshire. As is often the practice between pathologists in the event of encountering unusual or unexplained findings, Carol Richardson left the specimens and her pathology report for me to examine immediately on my return. A copy of Carol Richardson's report of 19th September, 1985 as annotated in manuscript by myself, is found at YB85/9.19/3.1. When sections are left for colleagues to examine it is not expected that any particular action would be taken by the colleague on his or her own initiative in respect of those sections. The purpose would be simply to offer a view on the material and then return the sections and report to the original examining pathologist, as was the case in this instance. Carol Richardson was absent from the Department on sick leave from 29th December, 1986, and this subsequently became maternity leave on 31st May, 1987. She returned to the Department on 29th December, 1987. Had Carol Richardson felt strongly thatabout the observations she had originally made were those of scrapie in cattle, and my subsequent opinion on her report, I would have expected that she would have come back to me to discuss the matter subsequently or take the matter further herself. in the period between seeing my annotations on her original report on the Stent case in September 1985 and her absence at the end of December 1985.

16. My re-examination of the sections "reinforcedwas consistent with" her original diagnosis in so far as I agreed with her overall observations and that such observations were not artefactual i.e. caused as a result of post-mortem changes or in the preparation of sections. My conclusion was that the brain lesions observed in this case could not in my experience be attributed to a specific disease, but a speculative comment was made that they could possibly be the result of chronic bacteraemia or an endotoxaemia (the production of poisons in the blood due to infection). Whilst the clinical history as described by the referring VI Centre (see YB85/9.10/3.1) describes that seven out of 130 cows were "nervous", this does not equate necessarily to the occurrence of a specific neurological disorder. The history indicated the occurrence of complex metabolic problems within the Stent herd (see paragraph 17 below).

17. Samples from three other cows in the Stent herd which had died or were killed on the farm had been referred to CVL for examination earlier in March, April and May of 1985 (CVL references VLO11453/85/0286, VLO11453/85/0640 and VLO12473/85/0831 respectively). Following, as far as I can recall, a telephone call from Mr J. Watkin-Jones, on 26th September, 1985 I reviewed the history of the submissions from the Stent herd and discussed them with him. This again, was standard practice where the VIS were investigating a persistent herd problem. A copy of my note of this event, together with the VI Centre referral letters and pathology reports for each case from the Stent farm (with manuscript comments made by myself at the time of this review) are found at YB85/9.26/1.1; YB85/9.10/3.1; YB85/9.19/3.1; YB85/4.31/1.1; YB85/5.9/1.1; YB85/4.6/1.1; YB85/4.16/1.1; YB85/2.13/1.1 and YB85/3.1/1.1 respectively. None of the samples for the three earlier cases included brain tissue and the main post-mortem finding in these cases was internal bleeding. Taken in isolation and in the light of these factors, the case in September 1985 did not at that time suggest that a new disease had been identified. Vacuolar changes in the brain of that particular animal were not severe and there was previous, and current, evidence of other disease problems. The herd from which these animals came had clearly experienced a lot of other health problems including haemorrhagic disorder (internal bleeding), hypocalcaemia (lack of calcium), septic arthritis (pus in joints), renal damage, bovine viral diarrhoea and peritonitis (inflammation of the abdominal cavity) associated with foetal death. This was a complex pattern in a dairy herd indicating that a variety of different diseases might be occurring. It was not, therefore, immediately apparent from the post-mortem histopathological examination of the brain of one animal in this herd that it was the first and unprecedented case of a new disease. Even though it can now be seen, with hindsight, that such was the case.

18. Further samples of nervous system tissues and other organs were received at CVL from a cow in the Stent herd on 10th September, 1986 (YB86/9.22/1.1-1.2). These were examined by Dr S. Done, a veterinary pathologist who joined the Pathology Department in 1983. A copy of the VL99 card for this case is found at YB86/9.22/1.1-1.2. Histopathogical examination of the central nervous system (CNS) tissues submitted from this case showed mild spongiform change in the medulla (hind brain). Other brain regions are described as having either no visible lesions or mild focal haemorrhage. See paragraph 31 for further discussion of this case.

http://www.bse.org.uk/witness/htm/stat065.htm


4.The single case of BSE that I examined in September 1985 was the one and only case that I have seen.

5.The first officially reported case of BSE

Memory recalls a sequence of events the importance of which can only be made by informed judgement. The following account of an interesting and exciting event is taken largely from my memory. I have used copies of the original letter,case card, diagnostic report, accession books and my 1985 organiser diary to make this account as accurate as possible.

6.I had returned from annual leave and was on rota as duty pathologist. The senior technician of the diagnostic unit asked me to examine an adult bovine brain; the vet wanted a diagnosis a.s.a.p.

7.The history was of 7/130 cows showing nervous symptoms over the previous 5 months; most had gone for casualty slaughter and no gross abnormality had been seen in the viscera. (YB85/9.10/1.1).The Pathology Department had examined pieces of liver, kidney, heart and lung from three previous cases from this farm (YB85/2.15/1.1; YB85/4.9/1.1; YB85/5.3/1.1) (2 adults and 1 calf)and had found chronic mild hepatitis(1),acute hepatic necrosis (1) moderate pulmonary oedema (1) and chronic mild interstitial nephritis (2).

8.The history of these earlier cases was one of internal haemorrhage and samples had been sent for organic mercurial poisoning assay. There had been metabolic problems in this herd and active BVD infection in the calves. The case card numbers of these three cases can be seen in the cross-reference column on the case card of the September specimen- MS1509/85 (YB85/9.10/2.1). In addition to the nervous signs seen in this cow, abscessation of the stifle was also present. On gross examination, the brain was well fixed and relatively undamaged; pieces of spinal cord and a piece of kidney were included and were grossly unremarkable. The meninges appeared thickened but this was probably normal for an adult cow.

9.In the absence of gross abnormality, I made multiple incisions and took standard blocks (13) for histological processing and the production of H&E (see procedures) sections. Blocks of spinal cord and kidney were also sent for processing (11/9/85).

10.I have a set sequence for examining brain sections; when these sections were returned to me (13/9/85) I examined the frontal cerebrum first and progressed caudally scanning each section from dorsal to ventral surface. In this case there seemed to be a mild vacuolation of the cerebral neuropil. At this time Gerald Wells had been investigating the possibility that prolonged exposure of nervous tissue to 70% alcohol could produce neuropil vacuolation. Such prolonged exposure would occur over the week-end but I checked with the technician to ensure that such exposure had not occurred in this case before resuming my examination. I noted finding a mild multifocal non-suppurative peri-vascular infiltration with some eosinophils and in the caudal cerebrum mild focal gliosis. No abnormality was found in the thalamus (cranial midbrain) but mild neuropil vacuolation of the reticular formation in the colliculi. The medulla (a pathogonomic site for Scrapie in sheep) showed moderate neuronal and neuropil vacuolation. I found no abnormality in the cerebellum but the section of lumbar spinal cord showed mild neuropil vacuolation of the dorsal horns. There were two types of lesion in the section of kidney;a chronic mild /moderate non-suppurative interstitial reaction with tubular regeneration and fibrosis; a peracute reaction of a mild multifocal tubular necrosis with hydropic change (protein reabsorption).

11.These sections were reviewed by Gerald Wells in 1987 with essentially similar findings but more refined. (See case card at YB85/9.10/2.1).

12.Although I had never seen this type of lesion before in a cow I had frequently seen the combination of neuronal and neuropil vacuolation with this distribution in Scrapie. To me,this was Scrapie in a cow.

13.Before writing the report I sought a second opinion; I needed the opinion of a ruminant neuropathologist and therefore placed the sections, my findings and a request for re-examination on Martin Jeffrey’s bench. I was eager to hear his opinion and immediately after lunch went to collect the slides. Martin had left a note on which was written "Bovine scrapie". As I left his room I met him in the doorway. Apparently this was the first case he had seen but he informed me that Gerald had examined two cases and was expecting another two cases.

14.Interestingly, we apparently had more than one case here from different farms but obviously Gerald was dealing with it. In all my experience, there has not been a case of a novel disease in cattle affecting more than one farm initially: this should have caused alarm bells to ring. If there are several cases at different farms, it is important to cross-reference for the purposes of disease surveillance. A site visit to the Pitsham farm would have resulted in further well-preserved specimens, and more background information.

15.On the 17th-18th Sept. I drafted a batch of diagnostic reports including my report to Winchester VIC (YB85/9.19/1.1).

16.The report is a reiteration of my findings except that the histo-anatomical term `reticular formation’ should have been typed in the sentence above and not under the findings in the medulla. When it came to stating a diagnosis I decided that since the pathological term used for the clinical disease Scrapie of sheep is ovine spongiform encephalopathy then this "new" entity must also be classified as a "spongiform encephalopathy". I called it mild because again projecting onto the sheep situation with only a few sites affected the inclusion of mild as a descriptive term seemed correct. Although there was a chronic interstitial nephritis , I decided to highlight the peracute nephrosis which was probably related to a bacterial toxaemia associated with the stifle abcess.

17.From the history of the case on the Stent farm, it seemed as if the clinical course of the disease was fairly rapid in that metabolic disorders of short duration and heavy metal toxicities were being considered on the farm. Therefore, it seemed likely that the cause(s) of the spongiform changes were a result of an acute clinical disease (rather than a chronic illness) and in the absence of a more likely aetiology, toxicity seemed to be the most appropriate catagory that fitted both symptoms and findings.

18.I dismissed the possibility that a bacterial toxaemia had caused the spongiform change; in my limited experience of ruminant neuropathology, toxaemia was likely to produce frank neuronal necrosis rather than degenerative vacuolation (cf. Clostridial toxaemia).

19.The report was sent for typing; returned and despatched on the 19th September. The second copy and the original letter was filed on VlO 12467, the diagnostic file for cattle diseases. I asked the technician, Dorothy Wells (no relation to Gerald) to cross-reference with similar cases. I always asked the technician to do this, to enter the case numbers of similar cases on the pathology card. In this case I asked Dorothy to cross-reference for the two cases that Gerald had appaerntly already seen.

20.I heard nothing further about my 1985 case.

21.I left the CVL at Christmas 1986, on maternity leave.

http://www.bse.org.uk/witness/htm/stat069.htm



############ http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ############



see full discussion here ;



https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?S2=BSE-L&X=4B20CF095582362D95&Y=flounder9@verizon.net&q=&s=Carol+Richardson&f=&a=&b=




TSS




even the late great Dr. Gibbs once told me personally that even if the Chicken did not contract a TSE, IF the chicken had been fed the TSE tainted feed and then slaughtered, the agent survives the digestinal tract to pass on to other species through feed. The same would hold true with marine fish feed. ..tss


http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2009/11/american-crows-corvus-brachyrhynchos.html



Tuesday, August 18, 2009

BSE-The Untold Story - joe gibbs and singeltary 1999 - 2009

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2009/08/bse-untold-story-joe-gibbs-and.html



Monday, April 5, 2010

Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE April 5, 2010

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/04/update-on-feed-enforcement-activities.html


Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America 14th

ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html


TSE

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html


Sunday, April 4, 2010

USDA AND OIE OUT OF TOUCH WITH RISK FACTOR ON ATYPICAL TSE

position: Post Doctoral Fellow Atypical BSE in Cattle

Closing date: December 24, 2009

Anticipated start date: January/February 2010

Employer: Canadian and OIE Reference Laboratories for BSE CFIA Lethbridge Laboratory, Lethbridge/Alberta

snip...

To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

snip...

http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2


http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/04/usda-and-oie-out-of-touch-with-risk.html


Monday, March 29, 2010

Irma Linda Andablo CJD Victim, she died at 38 years old on February 6, 2010 in Mesquite Texas


http://www.recordandoalinda.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19:cjd-english-info&catid=9:cjd-ingles&Itemid=8




>>>Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would euthanize the cattle. <<<


http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/03/irma-linda-andablo-cjd-victim-she-died.html




http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/2010/03/cjd-texas-38-year-old-female-worked.html




2008 - 2010

The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.

http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html


CJD USA RISING, with UNKNOWN PHENOTYPE ;

5 Includes 41 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 17 inconclusive cases; 6 Includes 46 cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.

http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf


Saturday, January 2, 2010

Human Prion Diseases in the United States January 1, 2010 ***FINAL***

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/01/human-prion-diseases-in-united-states.html


my comments to PLosone here ;

http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?inReplyTo=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd&root=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd




Friday, February 05, 2010

New Variant Creutzfelt Jakob Disease case reports United States 2010 A Review

http://vcjd.blogspot.com/2010/02/new-variant-creutzfelt-jakob-disease.html





Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518