Risk.40: Risk Assessment of BSE Introduction in the Russian Federation in Connection with Importation of Cattle from the European Union in 2005–2010
Sergey Rybakov† and Alexander Yegorov
FGI Federal Centre for Animal Health; Vladimir, Russia†Presenting author; Email: email@example.com
The study is aimed at quantitative assessment of risk of BSE introduction from the EU countries into Russia with breeding animals imported during 2005–2010.
Within 2005–2010 importation of cattle born in 2003–2008 from the EU into Russia totally amounted to 363,000 animals. According to the data published in the EU reports, during 2003–2008 the BSE prevalence in the EU countries reduced from 125 cases per million bovine animals above 24 months of age in 2003 to 12 cases in 2008. If the imported subpopulation had proportionally represented all age-groups of cattle from EU25 countries, according to the calculation 19.4 animals in BSE incubation period should have been imported from 2005 until 2010.
The main suppliers of breeding cattle into Russia are the following EU countries: Austria, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Hungary and The Netherlands. Since 2007 import from these countries has amounted to 67.5% of the total import. The major suppliers—not the EU member states—are Canada (12.2%), Australia (12.1%) and the US (5.8%). As for the UK, Poland and Portugal, i.e. countries having the highest BSE incidence, currently export of live cattle from there is banned. Calculations demonstrated that limitation of live cattle importation from the countries with high BSE incidence allows to reduce the risk of BSE introduction into Russia in 14.5 times.
Risk assessment in relation to BSE in animals born after 2003 was performed by EFSA in 2009. The EFSA results demonstrated that estimated number of BSE cases in EU17 countries amounted totally to 32 cases within 2003–2008 and the highest 95% confidence limit constituted 65 cases. As for seven above mentioned live cattle importing countries the estimated number of BSE cases within 2003-2008 averaged to 1.8 and upper 95% confidence limit was 3.6.
Given that share of cattle annually exported from these seven countries into Russia averages to 0.293%, according to calculations, within 2005-2010 the mean probability of importation of an animal in which BSE can be detected amounts to 0.0064 and the highest probability amounts to 0.0129.
Results of the risk assessment of BSE introduction with cattle imported into Russia from the above mentioned seven countries within 2005-2010 demonstrate that the risk of BSE introduction amounts to 0.01 case in six years and implementation of measures recommended in the OIE Code is sufficient for BSE risk reduction. More detailed information will be provided in the poster.
IN my opinion, from the following risk factors i will post below, and the fact that the OIE and the USDA systematically did away with the BSE GBR system for the BSE MRR system, for the legal trading all strains of TSE globally, and the ramifications there from (BSE MRR), MY confidence level of any TSE regulatory risk assessment is 0...that is ZERO CONFIDENCE LEVEL IN ANY REGARDS TO THE TSE PRION DISEASES AKA MAD COW DISEASE. The BSE MRR regulations were set up to fail, and make legal the trading of all strains of TSE prion disease globally. the consumers were hung out to dry around the globe, and the ramifications there from will be long and costly thanks to the OIE and the USDA et al. ...TSS
DRAFT OPINION OF THE SSC ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK (GBR) AND ITS EVOLUTION OVER TIME IN THE EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES
The question: The SSC has been requested to provide an up-to-date assessment of the geographical BSE risk of the Member States of the European Union, taking account of the latest information and data that are available, including those provided by the Member States in their application for a BSE-Status categorisation.
Background: Regulation EC/999/2001 addresses the risk management measures needed for transmissible animal spongiform encephalopathies. It links these measures to the BSE-Status of the countries concerned, including Member States. It is therefore necessary that all Member States and all other countries which desire to trade certain products with the EU are categorised with regard to their BSE-status. The regulation foresees 5 categories and specifies the conditions for each of these. One condition is that a risk assessment is carried out, forming the basis for the subsequent status categorisation. The Commission has decided that for the purpose of the Regulation the SSC’s GBR assessment provides for the necessary risk assessment. Countries may, however, provide their own risk assessment in which case the SSC will be asked to provide a scientific opinion on the validity of it.
Opinion Introduction: In the year 20001 the SSC assessed, with the exception of Greece which did not provide the needed data, the GBR of all the Member States of the European Union. It applied an innovative methodology based on an integrated evaluation of "external challenge" (i.e. imports2 of live animals and MBM from countries with notified cases of BSE) and of "stability" (i.e. ability to avoid recycling of BSE-infectivity). This method was also described in the GBR-opinion of the SSC of July 2000. Two countries (UK and PT) were classified as GBR IV; nine countries (BE, DK, FR, DE, IRL, IT, LUX, NL and SP) were classified as GBR III and three (AT, FINL and SW) as GBR II. Since then, BSE-cases have been notified in DE, IT and SP, confirming the GBR assessment, but also in AT, SF and GR. The finding of BSE in AT and SF lead the SSC, among other considerations, to update its GBR-assessment methodology. This update was adopted by the SSC in January 2002. It foresees that "external challenge" results not only from live animals and MBM imports from countries with notified
Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of AUSTRIA July 2000
5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK 5.1. THE CURRENT GBR • The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is II: it is unlikely that domestic cattle are either clinically or pre-clinically infected with the BSEagent, however, it cannot be excluded.
Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of DENMARK July 2000
5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK
5.1 The current GBR The current geographic BSE-risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. BSE is confirmed at a lower level.
On 28 February 2000 one case of BSE was diagnosed.
This case was detected by a passive surveillance system that is not able to identify all cases.
Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of FRANCE July 2000
5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK
5.1. The current GBR The current geographic BSE risk (GBR) of France is level III, i.e. BSE is confirmed in domestic cattle at a lower level.
The observed incidence of clinical cases over the last 12 months (1st February 1999 to 29 February 2000) is 2.9 per 1 million adult cattle.
This figure is generated by a passive surveillance system not able to discover all clinical BSEcases.
Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of FINLAND July 2000
5 THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK
5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is II, i.e. it is unlikely but cannot be excluded that cattle is infected (clinical or pre-clinical) with the BSE agent.
Note: This assessment is based on the assumption that the MBM imports from the Netherlands or other European Countries in 1988/89 did not pose a very high challenge. Given the uncertainty of this assumption that results from the fact that thousands of tonnes of MBM were exported at that time from the UK to other European countries, inter alia to the Netherlands, and from the practical impossibility to monitor the trade flows of that MBM, this assumption might be wrong. In that case Finland would have been exposed to a very high external challenge at a moment when the system was unstable. It therefore would have to be seen as GBR-level III.
Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of GERMANY July 2000
5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK
5.1 The current GBR The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent but it is not confirmed.
The current surveillance system is depending on notification of suspects, i.e. it is passive, and therefore not able to detect all clinical BSE cases. The probability that BSE is confirmed in Germany within the next years is significant, in particular if active surveillance would improve the performance of the surveillance system.
Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of Hungary March 2001
5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK
5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge
The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.
Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of THE NETHERLANDS July 2000
5. THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK
5.1 The current GBR The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. BSE is confirmed in domestic cattle at a lower level.
However, the observed incidence of clinical cases over the period 1/3/99 to 29/2/2000 was 0.5 per 1 Million adult cattle. This figure is generated by a passive surveillance system that is not able to identify all clinical cases.
FINAL REPORT OF AN AUDIT CARRIED OUT IN ROMANIA FROM 07 TO 18 FEBRUARY 2011 IN ORDER TO EVALUATE MEASURES CONCERNING BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE)
Executive Summary This report describes the outcome of an audit carried out by the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) in Romania, from 7 to 18 February 2011.
The objective of the audit was to evaluate the implementation of requirements concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), as laid down in Regulation (EC) No 999/2001.
In terms of scope, the audit concentrated on BSE epidemio-surveillance in bovines, measures taken after suspicion/confirmation of BSE, removal and handling of specified risk material (SRM) from bovines, and the prohibition of feeding products of animal origin to farmed animals and exceptions applicable to this ban. The evaluation included measures taken in response to the recommendations made in a previous FVO audit regarding the afore-mentioned issues.
Overall, the report concludes that very limited progress has been made in order to address the recommendations of the previous FVO audit. In particular, BSE active epidemio-surveillance and compliance with SRM rules are significantly affected by the lack of arrangements for the collection of brain samples and SRM at backyard farms, where the majority of the bovine population is kept. There are also weaknesses concerning feed-ban controls.
The report makes a number of recommendations addressed to the Romanian competent authorities, aimed at rectifying the shortcomings identified and further enhancing the implementing and control measures in place.
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of AUSTRALIA.
EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted July 2004
SUMMARY OF SCIENTIFIC REPORT
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Australia, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Australia. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Australia as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. In the case of Australia, an extremely or very unstable system was exposed to a very low or negligible challenge through the import of cattle. Under these conditions, it is highly unlikely that any internal challenge occurred. Given the negligible level of external challenge through meat and bone meal (MBM), it is highly unlikely that any internal challenge occurred. The risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Australia and were, at least partly, rendered for feed, due to imported cattle from BSE-risk countries has been very low to negligible throughout the considered period. Some imports of cattle in the early 80s from the UK and from the mid-80s onwards from USA, Canada and European countries increased the risk of BSE infectivity entering the feed chain. However, the probability that BSE contaminated material entered processing is seen as being very low. EFSA concludes that the current GBR Australia level is I, i.e., it is highly unlikely that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the possibility of cross-contamination exists and there are no serious changes in rendering, the system will continue to be very unstable. Thus, the possibility of cattle being (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent will remain at a low level.
Key words: BSE, geographical risk assessment, GBR, Australia, third countries
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of CANADA
Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083
Adopted July 2004 SUMMARY OF SCIENTIFIC REPORT
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Canada, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Canada. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Canada as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into the country middle of the eighties and could have reached domestic cattle in the early nineties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Canada reached domestic cattle and led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and were at least partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle imported from UK in the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries. EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if no additional external challenges occur.
Key words: BSE, geographical risk assessment, GBR, Canada, third countries
Thursday, February 10, 2011
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011 and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31
Friday, March 4, 2011
Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease
Wednesday, August 11, 2010
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA
Thursday, August 19, 2010
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of United States of America (USA)
Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083
Adopted July 2004
Summary of scientific report The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties. A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries. EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
Key words: BSE, geographical risk assessment, GBR, USA, third countries
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of USA - 1 - European Food Safety Authority Scientific Expert Working Group on GBR Working Group Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2004
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of USA - 7 - 2.3
Overall assessment of the external challenge
The level of the external challenge that has to be met by the BSE/cattle system is estimated according to the guidance given by the SSC in its final opinion on the GBR of July 2000 (as updated in January 2002). Live cattle imports: In total the country imported 2038 (other sources) or 1128 (CD) live cattle from BSE risk countries other than Canada, of which 327 (other sources) or 323 (CD) came from the UK. From Canada the imports were >500,000 animals per year. The numbers shown in table 1 are the raw import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted imports for the assessment of the external challenge. Broken down to 5 year periods the resulting external challenge is as given in table 3. This assessment takes into account the different aspects discussed above that allow to assume that certain imported cattle did not enter the domestic BSE-cattle system, i.e. were not rendered into feed. In the case of the USA, all the animals for which tracing information showed that they were not rendered were excluded from the external challenge.
In total the country imported 689 tons MBM (CD) or 2,230 tons MBM (other sources) from BSE risk countries other than Canada, of which 5 tons (CD) or 101 tons (other sources) were exported from the UK (UK export data). From Canada, the imports were about 30 000 tons per year. The numbers shown in table 2 are the raw import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted imports for the assessment of the external challenge. Broken down to 5 year periods the resulting external challenge is as given in table 3. This assessment takes into account the different aspects discussed above that allow to assume that certain imported MBM did not enter the domestic BSE/cattle system or did not represent an external challenge for other reasons. As it was illegal to export mammalian MBM from UK since 27/03/1996, exports indicated after that date should only have included non-mammalian MBM. In the case of the USA imported MBM from UK in 1989 and between 1997 and 1999 was not taken into account.
Feeding Use of MBM in cattle feed
• Until 1997 ruminant MBM (RMBM) could legally be included in cattle feed and was indeed commonly fed to cattle of different age and type. Prior to the feed ban the US authorities estimated that 10% of all MBM would deliberately have been fed to cattle. Feed bans
• A ban to feed (several types of) MMBM to ruminants was put in place in August 1997. Derogation from the ban was granted for pure porcine and equine protein (MBM) coming from designated (single species) rendering plants. This MMBM might still be fed to cattle. Therefore this feed ban is a ruminant to ruminant ban.
• It is planned to prohibit the use of all mammalian and poultry protein in ruminant feed and prohibiting materials from non-ambulatory disabled cattle and dead stock from use in all animal feed.
Conclusion on the ability to avoid recycling
• Before 1997, US system would not have been able to avoid recycling of the BSEagent to any measurable extent. If the BSE-agent was introduced into the feed chain, it could have reached cattle.
• After the introduction of the 1997 ban in August 1997, the ability to avoid recycling of BSE-infectivity was somewhat improved. However, the rendering of ruminant material (including SRM and fallen stock) is inadequate (non pressurized), and cross-contamination potentials of cattle feed with other feeds remain.
• Therefore, the system is still unable to avoid recycling of BSE-infectivity if already present in the system or incoming.
Until August 1997, RMBM was legally fed to cattle. Feeding was therefore "not OK". In August 1997 an RMBM-ban was introduced but feeding of non-ruminant MBM to cattle remained legal as well as feeding of RMBM to non-ruminant animals (farm animals and pets). An RMBM ban is difficult to maintain, as only labels can distinguish the various MMBMs. This makes control of the feed ban very difficult because analytical differentiation between ruminant and non-ruminant MBM is difficult if not impossible.
Due to the highly specialised production system in the USA, various mammalian MBM streams can be separated. Such a feed ban would therefore be assessed as "reasonably OK", for all regions where this highly specialised system exists. However, several areas in the USA do have mixed farming and mixed feed mills, and in such regions an RMBM ban would not suffice. Additionally, official controls for cattle feeds to control for compliance with the ban started in 2002. Thus, for the whole country, the assessment of the feeding after 1997 remains "not OK", but improving.
The rendering industry is operating with processes that are not known to reduce
infectivity. It is therefore concluded that rendering was and is "not OK".
SRM were and are still rendered for feed, as are (parts of) the fallen stock. SRMremoval
is therefore regarded as "not OK".
Before 1989, the ability of the system to identify (and eliminate) BSE-cases was
limited. Since 1990 this ability is improved, thanks to a specific (passive) BSE
surveillance. The initiated introduction of active surveillance in risk populations
should improve the system significantly.
On the basis of the available information, it has to be concluded that the country's
BSE/cattle system was extremely unstable until today, i.e., it would have recycled and
amplified BSE-infectivity very fast, should it have entered the system. The stability of
the BSE/cattle system in the USA overtime is as given in table 4.
The present assessment modifies the stability assessment of the previous GBR report
in 2000 mainly due to a different perception of the impact of BSE surveillance on
stability and of the efficiency of the RMBM feed ban.
Interaction of stability and external challenge in the USA
Period Stability External Challenge Internal challenge
Moderate Possibly present
1991 to 1995
Extremely unstable Extremely high Likely to be present and growing
5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK
5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge
• The current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not
confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the
Note1: It is also worth noting that the current GBR conclusions are not dependent on
the large exchange of imports between USA and Canada. External challenge due to
exports to the USA from European countries varied from moderate to high. These
challenges indicate that it was likely that BSE infectivity was introduced into the
North American continent.
snip...please see full text ;
UK EXPORTS OF LIVE CATTLE BY VALUE 1986-96
U.K. EXPORTS OF MEAL OF MEAT AND MEAT OFFAL; GREAVES ;
HOWEVER, my files show 44 tons of greaves for USA. ...TSS
Subject: Re: exports from the U.K. of it's MBM to U.S.???
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 14:03:16 +0000
To: firstname.lastname@example.org (Receipt Notification Requested) (Non Receipt Notification Requested)
Terry Meat and bonemeal is not specifically classified for overseas trade purposes. The nearest equivalent is listed as flours and meals of meat or offals (including tankage), unfit for human consumption; greaves.
UK exports of this to the US are listed below:
Data for exports between 1975 and 1979 are not readily available. These can be obtained (at a charge) from data retailers appointed by HM Customs and Excise: BTSL (Tel: 01372 463121) or Abacus (01245 252222).
Best wishes Simon Pearsall
Overseas trade statistics Stats (C&F)C
BANNED SUSPECT MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE 2006-2007, SOME 10 YEARS AFTER THE INFAMOUS PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY MAD COW FEED BAN or August 4, 1997, that was nothing more than ink on paper, so really, there was no BSE triple fire wall at all, and this was improving ???
*** BANNED MAD COW FEED IN THE USA IN COMMERCE TONS AND TONS
THIS is just ONE month report, of TWO recalls of prohibited banned MBM, which is illegal, mixed with 85% blood meal, which is still legal, but yet we know the TSE/BSE agent will transmit blood. we have this l-BSE in North America that is much more virulent and there is much concern with blood issue and l-BSE as there is with nvCJD in humans. some are even starting to be concerned with sporadic CJD and blood, and there are studies showing transmission there as well. ... this is one month recall page, where 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE, TO BE FED OUT. very little of the product that reaches commerce is ever returned via recall, very, very little. this was 2007, TEN YEARS AFTER THE AUGUST 4, 1997, PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY MAD COW FEED BAN IN THE USA, that was nothing but ink on paper. i have listed the tonnage of mad cow feed that was in ALABAMA in one of the links too, this is where the infamous g-h-BSEalabama case was, a genetic relation matching the new sporadic CJD in the USA. seems this saga just keeps getting better and better.......$$$
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
see Alabama banned suspect mad cow feed in commerce ;
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY
*** (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)
BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMA
Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST PRODUCT
a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;
b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;
c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;
d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.
CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons
PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes,
Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL and MS
a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;
b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;
c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;
d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;
e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6;
f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6;
g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6
CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags
DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT
a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;
b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;
c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;
d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;
e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;
f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;
g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;
h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;
i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;
j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;
k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;
l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;
m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE
Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL and FL
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE
Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 18.104.22.168
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;
b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;
c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;
d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006
Saturday, November 6, 2010
TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS
INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation
Archive Number 20101206.4364 Published Date 06-DEC-2010 Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 2010 (11)
PRION DISEASE UPDATE 2010 (11)
NOW, what about that mad cow feed from atypical BSE in commerce and SRM regulations ???
Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse Location: Virus and Prion Research Unit
Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Project Type: Specific Cooperative Agreement
Start Date: Sep 15, 2004 End Date: Sep 14, 2009
Objective: The objective of this cooperative research project with Dr. Maria Caramelli from the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory in Turin, Italy, is to conduct comparative studies with the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy. The studies will cover the following areas: 1. Evaluation of present diagnostics tools used in the U.S. for the detection of atypical BSE cases. 2. Molecular comparison of the U.S. BSE isolate and other typical BSE isolates with atypical BSE cases. 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.
Approach: This project will be done as a Specific Cooperative Agreement with the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, in Turin, Italy. It is essential for the U.S. BSE surveillance program to analyze the effectiveness of the U.S diagnostic tools for detection of atypical cases of BSE. Molecular comparisons of the U.S. BSE isolate with atypical BSE isolates will provide further characterization of the U.S. BSE isolate. Transmission studies are already underway using brain homogenates from atypical BSE cases into mice, cattle and sheep. It will be critical to see whether the atypical BSE isolates behave similarly to typical BSE isolates in terms of transmissibility and disease pathogenesis. If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate. Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.
Saturday, June 12, 2010
PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
re-Freedom of Information Act Project Number 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE UPDATE July 28, 2010
Friday, October 8, 2010
Scientific reasons for a feed ban of meat-and-bone meal, applicable to all farmed animals including cattle, pigs, poultry, farmed fish and pet food
Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada
Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada
Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.
Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres. Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.
Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.
Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada.
*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.
let's take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow.
This new prionopathy in humans? the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$
ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama
In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation.
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY
(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)
Thursday, June 23, 2011
Experimental H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy characterized by plaques and glial- and stellate-type prion protein deposits
Saturday, June 25, 2011
Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque
"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"
Sunday, June 26, 2011
Risk Analysis of Low-Dose Prion Exposures in Cynomolgus Macaque
Wednesday, June 15, 2011
Galveston, Texas - Isle port moves through thousands of heifers headed to Russia, none from Texas, Alabama, or Washington, due to BSE risk factor
Monday, June 20, 2011 2011
Annual Conference of the National Institute for Animal Agriculture ATYPICAL NOR-98 LIKE SCRAPIE UPDATE USA
Monday, June 27, 2011
Comparison of Sheep Nor98 with Human Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy and Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker Disease
Monday, June 27, 2011
Zoonotic Potential of CWD: Experimental Transmissions to Non-Human Primates
Sunday, July 03, 2011
Prion Disease Detection, PMCA Kinetics, and IgG in Urine from Naturally/Experimentally Infected Scrapie Sheep and Preclinical/Clinical CWD Deer
Saturday, June 18, 2011
Self-propagation and transmission of misfolded mutant SOD1 Prion or Prion-like phenomenon?
Wednesday, June 29, 2011
TSEAC Meeting August 1, 2011 donor deferral
Thursday, May 26, 2011
Travel History, Hunting, and Venison Consumption Related to Prion Disease Exposure, 2006-2007 FoodNet Population Survey
Journal of the American Dietetic Association Volume 111, Issue 6 , Pages 858-863, June 2011.
Monday, May 23, 2011
Atypical Prion Diseases in Humans and Animals 2011
Top Curr Chem (2011)
# Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011
Michael A. Tranulis, Sylvie L. Benestad, Thierry Baron, and Hans Kretzschmar
Saturday, March 5, 2011
MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA
Tuesday, April 26, 2011
sporadic CJD RISING Text and figures of the latest annual report of the NCJDRSU covering the period 1990-2009 (published 11th March 2011)
Monday, November 23, 2009
BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS UPDATE NOVEMBER 23, 2009 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND O.I.E. COMMISSION DECISION of 11 November 2009
----- Original Message -----
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2009 11:01 AM
Subject: OIE has recently published its proposed animal welfare guidelines for public comment
Greetings USDA/APHIS et al,
I would kindly like to comment on OIE proposed guidelines.
AS I said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. THE reason most every country around the globe came down with BSE/TSE in their cattle, were due to the failed and flawed BSE/TSE testing and surveillance policy of the O.I.E. NOW, they don't even acknowledge atypical scrapie it seems, as one for concern $
Monday, November 23, 2009
BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS UPDATE NOVEMBER 23, 2009 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND O.I.E.
Tuesday, May 24, 2011 2:24 PM
O.I.E. Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission and prion (TSE) disease reporting 2011
Sunday, June 5, 2011
PRION TSE FUNDING, WHAT ARE THE PRIORITIES of APHCA, ASEAN, OIE, Korea, and USA ?
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0006 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary Sr Views Add Comments How To Comment
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
I IMPLORE, that due to the lack of surveillance and proper BSE/TSE protocols for testing and surveillance, the fact that sporadic CJD in the USA has tripled over the last few years or so, the new findings of BASE, the fact that CWD and Scrapie are out of control in the USA, I IMPLORE that the BSE MRR policy be repealed and the BSE GBR risk assessments revised to address all TSEs i.e. TSE GBR, for the following reasons ; ----- Original Message ----- From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To: "EFSA Press" Sent: Tuesday, November 21, 2006 12:21 PM Subject: Re: re-Geographical BSE Risk: EFSA consults on revision of assessment methodology Greetings EFSA, a sad day. i think any weakening of the BSE GBR risk assessments, especially for USA, is a huge mistake. i think the BSE GBR should be revised to include all TSE i.e. TSE GBR.
your only fooling yourselves with this stupid ukbsenvcjd only theory, and the BSE methology of the OIE. most any coutnry that went by those same OIE BSE guidelines all went down with BSE. THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE. AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...
Terry S. Singeltary SR. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment
January 28, 2007
I would kindly like to submit the following to ;
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518