EFSA opinion on the BSE related public health risk

Mad cow disease: EU must maintain strict controls, says Parliament

2011-07-06T07:47:00.000-07:00

Mad cow disease: EU must maintain strict controls, says Parliament

Food safety - 06-07-2011 - 15:00 Plenary sessions

The sharp fall in bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) cases in the EU must not lead to a slackening of surveillance, say MEPs in a resolution passed on Wednesday. Any change to BSE safety rules must maintain high animal and public health standards, but the ban on feeding animal protein to non-ruminants, such as pigs, could gradually be lifted if further safeguards are put in place, they add.

Changes to current EU laws, which the Commission is about to review, could include new rules on removing specific risk materials from animal feed, a gradual relaxation of the animal protein feed ban, changes to cohort culling policy and a higher age limit for BSE testing, says the non-legislative resolution, drafted by Dagmar Roth Behrendt (S&D, DE).

MEPs reject a Commission proposal to reduce EU funding on research into transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), including BSE.

Strict conditions for any feed ban review

The Commission's TSE Roadmap 2 moots a possible gradual lifting of the prohibition on the feeding of processed animal proteins to non-ruminants. Given the EU's "protein deficit", MEPs back this idea, subject to strict conditions and safeguards. These include stipulating that the processed animal proteins must come from species not linked to TSE, and may be fed only to non-herbivores. Prohibitions on cannibalism must remain and only processed animal proteins fit for human consumption should be used, MEPs add.

Food and feed contamination

Commenting on wider food and feed safety, MEPs express concern about recent contamination cases, e.g. with dioxin, and call on EU Member States to enforce existing rules and strengthen them, if necessary.

TSEs

TSEs cause degeneration of brain tissue leading to death in man and animals. They include Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and Kuru in humans, bovine spongiform encephalopathy in cattle and scrapie in sheep and goats.

Procedure: Non-legislative resolution

REF. : 20110705IPR23380

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom/content/20110705IPR23380/html/Mad-cow-disease-EU-must-maintain-strict-controls-says-Parliament

Saturday, November 6, 2010

TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS

INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html

Archive Number 20101206.4364 Published Date 06-DEC-2010 Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 2010 (11)

PRION DISEASE UPDATE 2010 (11)

http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:5492868805159684::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,86129

Wednesday, July 06, 2011

Swine Are Susceptible to Chronic Wasting Disease by Intracerebral Inoculation

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2011/07/swine-are-susceptible-to-chronic.html

Tuesday, July 5, 2011

Risk Assessment of BSE Introduction in the Russian Federation in Connection with Importation of Cattle from the European Union in 2005–2010

http://efsaopinionbseanimalprotein.blogspot.com/2011/07/risk-assessment-of-bse-introduction-in.html

TSS

Risk Assessment of BSE Introduction in the Russian Federation in Connection with Importation of Cattle from the European Union in 2005–2010

2011-07-05T14:40:00.000-07:00

Risk.40: Risk Assessment of BSE Introduction in the Russian Federation in Connection with Importation of Cattle from the European Union in 2005–2010

Sergey Rybakov† and Alexander Yegorov

FGI Federal Centre for Animal Health; Vladimir, Russia†Presenting author; Email: s.s.rybakov@mail.ru

The study is aimed at quantitative assessment of risk of BSE introduction from the EU countries into Russia with breeding animals imported during 2005–2010.

Within 2005–2010 importation of cattle born in 2003–2008 from the EU into Russia totally amounted to 363,000 animals. According to the data published in the EU reports, during 2003–2008 the BSE prevalence in the EU countries reduced from 125 cases per million bovine animals above 24 months of age in 2003 to 12 cases in 2008. If the imported subpopulation had proportionally represented all age-groups of cattle from EU25 countries, according to the calculation 19.4 animals in BSE incubation period should have been imported from 2005 until 2010.

The main suppliers of breeding cattle into Russia are the following EU countries: Austria, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Hungary and The Netherlands. Since 2007 import from these countries has amounted to 67.5% of the total import. The major suppliers—not the EU member states—are Canada (12.2%), Australia (12.1%) and the US (5.8%). As for the UK, Poland and Portugal, i.e. countries having the highest BSE incidence, currently export of live cattle from there is banned. Calculations demonstrated that limitation of live cattle importation from the countries with high BSE incidence allows to reduce the risk of BSE introduction into Russia in 14.5 times.

Risk assessment in relation to BSE in animals born after 2003 was performed by EFSA in 2009. The EFSA results demonstrated that estimated number of BSE cases in EU17 countries amounted totally to 32 cases within 2003–2008 and the highest 95% confidence limit constituted 65 cases. As for seven above mentioned live cattle importing countries the estimated number of BSE cases within 2003-2008 averaged to 1.8 and upper 95% confidence limit was 3.6.

Given that share of cattle annually exported from these seven countries into Russia averages to 0.293%, according to calculations, within 2005-2010 the mean probability of importation of an animal in which BSE can be detected amounts to 0.0064 and the highest probability amounts to 0.0129.

Results of the risk assessment of BSE introduction with cattle imported into Russia from the above mentioned seven countries within 2005-2010 demonstrate that the risk of BSE introduction amounts to 0.01 case in six years and implementation of measures recommended in the OIE Code is sufficient for BSE risk reduction. More detailed information will be provided in the poster.

http://www.prion2011.ca/files/PRION_2011_-_Posters_(May_5-11).pdf

Greetings,

IN my opinion, from the following risk factors i will post below, and the fact that the OIE and the USDA systematically did away with the BSE GBR system for the BSE MRR system, for the legal trading all strains of TSE globally, and the ramifications there from (BSE MRR), MY confidence level of any TSE regulatory risk assessment is 0...that is ZERO CONFIDENCE LEVEL IN ANY REGARDS TO THE TSE PRION DISEASES AKA MAD COW DISEASE. The BSE MRR regulations were set up to fail, and make legal the trading of all strains of TSE prion disease globally. the consumers were hung out to dry around the globe, and the ramifications there from will be long and costly thanks to the OIE and the USDA et al. ...TSS

================================

DRAFT OPINION OF THE SSC ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK (GBR) AND ITS EVOLUTION OVER TIME IN THE EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES

The question: The SSC has been requested to provide an up-to-date assessment of the geographical BSE risk of the Member States of the European Union, taking account of the latest information and data that are available, including those provided by the Member States in their application for a BSE-Status categorisation.

Background: Regulation EC/999/2001 addresses the risk management measures needed for transmissible animal spongiform encephalopathies. It links these measures to the BSE-Status of the countries concerned, including Member States. It is therefore necessary that all Member States and all other countries which desire to trade certain products with the EU are categorised with regard to their BSE-status. The regulation foresees 5 categories and specifies the conditions for each of these. One condition is that a risk assessment is carried out, forming the basis for the subsequent status categorisation. The Commission has decided that for the purpose of the Regulation the SSC’s GBR assessment provides for the necessary risk assessment. Countries may, however, provide their own risk assessment in which case the SSC will be asked to provide a scientific opinion on the validity of it.

Opinion Introduction: In the year 20001 the SSC assessed, with the exception of Greece which did not provide the needed data, the GBR of all the Member States of the European Union. It applied an innovative methodology based on an integrated evaluation of "external challenge" (i.e. imports2 of live animals and MBM from countries with notified cases of BSE) and of "stability" (i.e. ability to avoid recycling of BSE-infectivity). This method was also described in the GBR-opinion of the SSC of July 2000. Two countries (UK and PT) were classified as GBR IV; nine countries (BE, DK, FR, DE, IRL, IT, LUX, NL and SP) were classified as GBR III and three (AT, FINL and SW) as GBR II. Since then, BSE-cases have been notified in DE, IT and SP, confirming the GBR assessment, but also in AT, SF and GR. The finding of BSE in AT and SF lead the SSC, among other considerations, to update its GBR-assessment methodology. This update was adopted by the SSC in January 2002. It foresees that "external challenge" results not only from live animals and MBM imports from countries with notified

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out249_en.pdf

Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of AUSTRIA July 2000

5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK 5.1. THE CURRENT GBR • The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is II: it is unlikely that domestic cattle are either clinically or pre-clinically infected with the BSEagent, however, it cannot be excluded.

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out115_en.pdf

Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of DENMARK July 2000

5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK

5.1 The current GBR The current geographic BSE-risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. BSE is confirmed at a lower level.

On 28 February 2000 one case of BSE was diagnosed.

This case was detected by a passive surveillance system that is not able to identify all cases.

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out117_en.pdf

Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of FRANCE July 2000

5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK

5.1. The current GBR The current geographic BSE risk (GBR) of France is level III, i.e. BSE is confirmed in domestic cattle at a lower level.

The observed incidence of clinical cases over the last 12 months (1st February 1999 to 29 February 2000) is 2.9 per 1 million adult cattle.

This figure is generated by a passive surveillance system not able to discover all clinical BSEcases.

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out119_en.pdf

Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of FINLAND July 2000

5 THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK

5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is II, i.e. it is unlikely but cannot be excluded that cattle is infected (clinical or pre-clinical) with the BSE agent.

Note: This assessment is based on the assumption that the MBM imports from the Netherlands or other European Countries in 1988/89 did not pose a very high challenge. Given the uncertainty of this assumption that results from the fact that thousands of tonnes of MBM were exported at that time from the UK to other European countries, inter alia to the Netherlands, and from the practical impossibility to monitor the trade flows of that MBM, this assumption might be wrong. In that case Finland would have been exposed to a very high external challenge at a moment when the system was unstable. It therefore would have to be seen as GBR-level III.

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out118_en.pdf

Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of GERMANY July 2000

5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK

5.1 The current GBR The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent but it is not confirmed.

The current surveillance system is depending on notification of suspects, i.e. it is passive, and therefore not able to detect all clinical BSE cases. The probability that BSE is confirmed in Germany within the next years is significant, in particular if active surveillance would improve the performance of the surveillance system.

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out120_en.pdf

Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of Hungary March 2001

5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK

5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge

The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out196_en.pdf

Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of THE NETHERLANDS July 2000

5. THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK

5.1 The current GBR The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. BSE is confirmed in domestic cattle at a lower level.

However, the observed incidence of clinical cases over the period 1/3/99 to 29/2/2000 was 0.5 per 1 Million adult cattle. This figure is generated by a passive surveillance system that is not able to identify all clinical cases.

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out124_en.pdf

FINAL REPORT OF AN AUDIT CARRIED OUT IN ROMANIA FROM 07 TO 18 FEBRUARY 2011 IN ORDER TO EVALUATE MEASURES CONCERNING BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE)

Executive Summary This report describes the outcome of an audit carried out by the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) in Romania, from 7 to 18 February 2011.

The objective of the audit was to evaluate the implementation of requirements concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), as laid down in Regulation (EC) No 999/2001.

In terms of scope, the audit concentrated on BSE epidemio-surveillance in bovines, measures taken after suspicion/confirmation of BSE, removal and handling of specified risk material (SRM) from bovines, and the prohibition of feeding products of animal origin to farmed animals and exceptions applicable to this ban. The evaluation included measures taken in response to the recommendations made in a previous FVO audit regarding the afore-mentioned issues.

Overall, the report concludes that very limited progress has been made in order to address the recommendations of the previous FVO audit. In particular, BSE active epidemio-surveillance and compliance with SRM rules are significantly affected by the lack of arrangements for the collection of brain samples and SRM at backyard farms, where the majority of the bovine population is kept. There are also weaknesses concerning feed-ban controls.

The report makes a number of recommendations addressed to the Romanian competent authorities, aimed at rectifying the shortcomings identified and further enhancing the implementing and control measures in place.

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/act_getPDF.cfm?PDF_ID=8947

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/act_getPDFannx.cfm?ANX_ID=6451

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/ap/ap_ro_2011-8950.pdf

Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of AUSTRALIA.

Question N°

EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted July 2004

SUMMARY OF SCIENTIFIC REPORT

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Australia, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Australia. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Australia as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. In the case of Australia, an extremely or very unstable system was exposed to a very low or negligible challenge through the import of cattle. Under these conditions, it is highly unlikely that any internal challenge occurred. Given the negligible level of external challenge through meat and bone meal (MBM), it is highly unlikely that any internal challenge occurred. The risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Australia and were, at least partly, rendered for feed, due to imported cattle from BSE-risk countries has been very low to negligible throughout the considered period. Some imports of cattle in the early 80s from the UK and from the mid-80s onwards from USA, Canada and European countries increased the risk of BSE infectivity entering the feed chain. However, the probability that BSE contaminated material entered processing is seen as being very low. EFSA concludes that the current GBR Australia level is I, i.e., it is highly unlikely that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the possibility of cross-contamination exists and there are no serious changes in rendering, the system will continue to be very unstable. Thus, the possibility of cattle being (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent will remain at a low level.

Key words: BSE, geographical risk assessment, GBR, Australia, third countries

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/it/scdocs/doc/s6r.pdf

Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of CANADA

Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083

Adopted July 2004 SUMMARY OF SCIENTIFIC REPORT

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Canada, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Canada. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Canada as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into the country middle of the eighties and could have reached domestic cattle in the early nineties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Canada reached domestic cattle and led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and were at least partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle imported from UK in the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries. EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if no additional external challenges occur.

Key words: BSE, geographical risk assessment, GBR, Canada, third countries

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/s2r.pdf

Thursday, February 10, 2011

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011 and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html

Friday, March 4, 2011

Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html

Wednesday, August 11, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-sixteenth.html

Thursday, August 19, 2010

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/08/report-on-investigation-of-seventeenth.html

Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of United States of America (USA)

Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083

Adopted July 2004

Summary of scientific report The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties. A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries. EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.

Key words: BSE, geographical risk assessment, GBR, USA, third countries

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/s3r.pdf

Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of USA - 1 - European Food Safety Authority Scientific Expert Working Group on GBR Working Group Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2004

Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of USA - 7 - 2.3

Overall assessment of the external challenge

The level of the external challenge that has to be met by the BSE/cattle system is estimated according to the guidance given by the SSC in its final opinion on the GBR of July 2000 (as updated in January 2002). Live cattle imports: In total the country imported 2038 (other sources) or 1128 (CD) live cattle from BSE risk countries other than Canada, of which 327 (other sources) or 323 (CD) came from the UK. From Canada the imports were >500,000 animals per year. The numbers shown in table 1 are the raw import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted imports for the assessment of the external challenge. Broken down to 5 year periods the resulting external challenge is as given in table 3. This assessment takes into account the different aspects discussed above that allow to assume that certain imported cattle did not enter the domestic BSE-cattle system, i.e. were not rendered into feed. In the case of the USA, all the animals for which tracing information showed that they were not rendered were excluded from the external challenge.

MBM imports:

In total the country imported 689 tons MBM (CD) or 2,230 tons MBM (other sources) from BSE risk countries other than Canada, of which 5 tons (CD) or 101 tons (other sources) were exported from the UK (UK export data). From Canada, the imports were about 30 000 tons per year. The numbers shown in table 2 are the raw import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted imports for the assessment of the external challenge. Broken down to 5 year periods the resulting external challenge is as given in table 3. This assessment takes into account the different aspects discussed above that allow to assume that certain imported MBM did not enter the domestic BSE/cattle system or did not represent an external challenge for other reasons. As it was illegal to export mammalian MBM from UK since 27/03/1996, exports indicated after that date should only have included non-mammalian MBM. In the case of the USA imported MBM from UK in 1989 and between 1997 and 1999 was not taken into account.

Feeding Use of MBM in cattle feed

• Until 1997 ruminant MBM (RMBM) could legally be included in cattle feed and was indeed commonly fed to cattle of different age and type. Prior to the feed ban the US authorities estimated that 10% of all MBM would deliberately have been fed to cattle. Feed bans

• A ban to feed (several types of) MMBM to ruminants was put in place in August 1997. Derogation from the ban was granted for pure porcine and equine protein (MBM) coming from designated (single species) rendering plants. This MMBM might still be fed to cattle. Therefore this feed ban is a ruminant to ruminant ban.

• It is planned to prohibit the use of all mammalian and poultry protein in ruminant feed and prohibiting materials from non-ambulatory disabled cattle and dead stock from use in all animal feed.

Conclusion on the ability to avoid recycling

• Before 1997, US system would not have been able to avoid recycling of the BSEagent to any measurable extent. If the BSE-agent was introduced into the feed chain, it could have reached cattle.

• After the introduction of the 1997 ban in August 1997, the ability to avoid recycling of BSE-infectivity was somewhat improved. However, the rendering of ruminant material (including SRM and fallen stock) is inadequate (non pressurized), and cross-contamination potentials of cattle feed with other feeds remain.

• Therefore, the system is still unable to avoid recycling of BSE-infectivity if already present in the system or incoming.

Feeding

Until August 1997, RMBM was legally fed to cattle. Feeding was therefore "not OK". In August 1997 an RMBM-ban was introduced but feeding of non-ruminant MBM to cattle remained legal as well as feeding of RMBM to non-ruminant animals (farm animals and pets). An RMBM ban is difficult to maintain, as only labels can distinguish the various MMBMs. This makes control of the feed ban very difficult because analytical differentiation between ruminant and non-ruminant MBM is difficult if not impossible.

Due to the highly specialised production system in the USA, various mammalian MBM streams can be separated. Such a feed ban would therefore be assessed as "reasonably OK", for all regions where this highly specialised system exists. However, several areas in the USA do have mixed farming and mixed feed mills, and in such regions an RMBM ban would not suffice. Additionally, official controls for cattle feeds to control for compliance with the ban started in 2002. Thus, for the whole country, the assessment of the feeding after 1997 remains "not OK", but improving.

Rendering

The rendering industry is operating with processes that are not known to reduce

infectivity. It is therefore concluded that rendering was and is "not OK".

SRM-removal

SRM were and are still rendered for feed, as are (parts of) the fallen stock. SRMremoval

is therefore regarded as "not OK".

BSE-surveillance

Before 1989, the ability of the system to identify (and eliminate) BSE-cases was

limited. Since 1990 this ability is improved, thanks to a specific (passive) BSE

surveillance. The initiated introduction of active surveillance in risk populations

should improve the system significantly.

On the basis of the available information, it has to be concluded that the country's

BSE/cattle system was extremely unstable until today, i.e., it would have recycled and

amplified BSE-infectivity very fast, should it have entered the system. The stability of

the BSE/cattle system in the USA overtime is as given in table 4.

The present assessment modifies the stability assessment of the previous GBR report

in 2000 mainly due to a different perception of the impact of BSE surveillance on

stability and of the efficiency of the RMBM feed ban.

Interaction of stability and external challenge in the USA

Period Stability External Challenge Internal challenge

1980 to

1985

1986 to

1990

Moderate Possibly present

1991 to 1995

Very high

1996 to

2000

2001 to

2003

Extremely unstable Extremely high Likely to be present and growing

5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK

5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge

• The current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not

confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the

BSE-agent.

Note1: It is also worth noting that the current GBR conclusions are not dependent on

the large exchange of imports between USA and Canada. External challenge due to

exports to the USA from European countries varied from moderate to high. These

challenges indicate that it was likely that BSE infectivity was introduced into the

North American continent.

snip...please see full text ;

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/3rax1.pdf

UK EXPORTS OF LIVE CATTLE BY VALUE 1986-96

http://web.archive.org/web/20060517075059/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab11.pdf

U.K. EXPORTS OF MEAL OF MEAT AND MEAT OFFAL; GREAVES ;

http://web.archive.org/web/20060517075122/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m12/tab12.pdf

HOWEVER, my files show 44 tons of greaves for USA. ...TSS

Subject: Re: exports from the U.K. of it's MBM to U.S.???

From: S.J.Pearsall@esg.maff.gsi.gov.uk

Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 14:03:16 +0000

To: flounder@wt.net (Receipt Notification Requested) (Non Receipt Notification Requested)

Terry Meat and bonemeal is not specifically classified for overseas trade purposes. The nearest equivalent is listed as flours and meals of meat or offals (including tankage), unfit for human consumption; greaves.

UK exports of this to the US are listed below:

Country Tonnes

1980

1981 12

1982

1983

1984 10

1985 2

1986

1987

1988

1989 20

1990

Data for exports between 1975 and 1979 are not readily available. These can be obtained (at a charge) from data retailers appointed by HM Customs and Excise: BTSL (Tel: 01372 463121) or Abacus (01245 252222).

Best wishes Simon Pearsall

Overseas trade statistics Stats (C&F)C

====================================== END...TSS

BANNED SUSPECT MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE 2006-2007, SOME 10 YEARS AFTER THE INFAMOUS PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY MAD COW FEED BAN or August 4, 1997, that was nothing more than ink on paper, so really, there was no BSE triple fire wall at all, and this was improving ???

*** BANNED MAD COW FEED IN THE USA IN COMMERCE TONS AND TONS

THIS is just ONE month report, of TWO recalls of prohibited banned MBM, which is illegal, mixed with 85% blood meal, which is still legal, but yet we know the TSE/BSE agent will transmit blood. we have this l-BSE in North America that is much more virulent and there is much concern with blood issue and l-BSE as there is with nvCJD in humans. some are even starting to be concerned with sporadic CJD and blood, and there are studies showing transmission there as well. ... this is one month recall page, where 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE, TO BE FED OUT. very little of the product that reaches commerce is ever returned via recall, very, very little. this was 2007, TEN YEARS AFTER THE AUGUST 4, 1997, PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY MAD COW FEED BAN IN THE USA, that was nothing but ink on paper. i have listed the tonnage of mad cow feed that was in ALABAMA in one of the links too, this is where the infamous g-h-BSEalabama case was, a genetic relation matching the new sporadic CJD in the USA. seems this saga just keeps getting better and better.......$$$

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm

see Alabama banned suspect mad cow feed in commerce ;

Saturday, August 14, 2010

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY

*** (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)

BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMA

Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST PRODUCT

a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;

b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;

c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;

d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.

CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons

DISTRIBUTION AL

______________________________

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html

PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes,

Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons

DISTRIBUTION AL and MS

______________________________

PRODUCT

a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;

b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;

c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;

d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;

e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6;

f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6;

g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6

CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags

DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT

a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;

b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;

c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;

d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;

e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;

f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;

g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;

h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;

i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;

j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;

k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;

l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;

m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE

Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons

DISTRIBUTION AL and FL

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html

MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE

Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II

______________________________

PRODUCT

a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;

b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;

c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;

d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE

a) Bulk

b) None

c) Bulk

d) Bulk

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons

DISTRIBUTION Nationwide

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html

Saturday, November 6, 2010

TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS

INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html

Archive Number 20101206.4364 Published Date 06-DEC-2010 Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 2010 (11)

PRION DISEASE UPDATE 2010 (11)

http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:5492868805159684::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,86129

NOW, what about that mad cow feed from atypical BSE in commerce and SRM regulations ???

Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse Location: Virus and Prion Research Unit

Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Project Type: Specific Cooperative Agreement

Start Date: Sep 15, 2004 End Date: Sep 14, 2009

Objective: The objective of this cooperative research project with Dr. Maria Caramelli from the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory in Turin, Italy, is to conduct comparative studies with the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy. The studies will cover the following areas: 1. Evaluation of present diagnostics tools used in the U.S. for the detection of atypical BSE cases. 2. Molecular comparison of the U.S. BSE isolate and other typical BSE isolates with atypical BSE cases. 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.

Approach: This project will be done as a Specific Cooperative Agreement with the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, in Turin, Italy. It is essential for the U.S. BSE surveillance program to analyze the effectiveness of the U.S diagnostic tools for detection of atypical cases of BSE. Molecular comparisons of the U.S. BSE isolate with atypical BSE isolates will provide further characterization of the U.S. BSE isolate. Transmission studies are already underway using brain homogenates from atypical BSE cases into mice, cattle and sheep. It will be critical to see whether the atypical BSE isolates behave similarly to typical BSE isolates in terms of transmissibility and disease pathogenesis. If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate. Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.

http://www.ushrl.saa.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?accn_no=408490

Saturday, June 12, 2010

PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/publication-request-and-foia-request.html

Wednesday, July 28, 2010

re-Freedom of Information Act Project Number 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE UPDATE July 28, 2010

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/re-freedom-of-information-act-project.html

Friday, October 8, 2010

Scientific reasons for a feed ban of meat-and-bone meal, applicable to all farmed animals including cattle, pigs, poultry, farmed fish and pet food

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/10/scientific-reasons-for-feed-ban-of-meat.html

P.9.21

Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada

Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada

Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.

Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres. Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.

Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada.

*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.

http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf

let's take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow.

This new prionopathy in humans? the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$

ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama

In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation.

http://www.plospathogens.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156

http://www.plospathogens.org/article/fetchObjectAttachment.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156&representation=PDF

Saturday, August 14, 2010

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY

(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html

Thursday, June 23, 2011

Experimental H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy characterized by plaques and glial- and stellate-type prion protein deposits

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/experimental-h-type-bovine-spongiform.html

Saturday, June 25, 2011

Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque

"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/transmissibility-of-bse-l-and-cattle.html

Sunday, June 26, 2011

Risk Analysis of Low-Dose Prion Exposures in Cynomolgus Macaque

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/risk-analysis-of-low-dose-prion.html

Wednesday, June 15, 2011

Galveston, Texas - Isle port moves through thousands of heifers headed to Russia, none from Texas, Alabama, or Washington, due to BSE risk factor

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/galveston-texas-isle-port-moves-through.html

Monday, June 20, 2011 2011

Annual Conference of the National Institute for Animal Agriculture ATYPICAL NOR-98 LIKE SCRAPIE UPDATE USA

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2011/06/2011-annual-conference-of-national.html

Monday, June 27, 2011

Comparison of Sheep Nor98 with Human Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy and Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker Disease

http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/comparison-of-sheep-nor98-with-human.html

Monday, June 27, 2011

Zoonotic Potential of CWD: Experimental Transmissions to Non-Human Primates

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2011/06/zoonotic-potential-of-cwd-experimental.html

Sunday, July 03, 2011

Prion Disease Detection, PMCA Kinetics, and IgG in Urine from Naturally/Experimentally Infected Scrapie Sheep and Preclinical/Clinical CWD Deer

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2011/07/prion-disease-detection-pmca-kinetics.html

Saturday, June 18, 2011

Self-propagation and transmission of misfolded mutant SOD1 Prion or Prion-like phenomenon?

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/self-propagation-and-transmission-of.html

Wednesday, June 29, 2011

TSEAC Meeting August 1, 2011 donor deferral

http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/06/tseac-meeting-august-1-2011-donor.html

Thursday, May 26, 2011

Travel History, Hunting, and Venison Consumption Related to Prion Disease Exposure, 2006-2007 FoodNet Population Survey

Journal of the American Dietetic Association Volume 111, Issue 6 , Pages 858-863, June 2011.

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/05/travel-history-hunting-and-venison.html

Monday, May 23, 2011

Atypical Prion Diseases in Humans and Animals 2011

Top Curr Chem (2011)

DOI: 10.1007/128_2011_161

# Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Michael A. Tranulis, Sylvie L. Benestad, Thierry Baron, and Hans Kretzschmar

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/05/atypical-prion-diseases-in-humans-and.html

Saturday, March 5, 2011

MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html

Tuesday, April 26, 2011

sporadic CJD RISING Text and figures of the latest annual report of the NCJDRSU covering the period 1990-2009 (published 11th March 2011)

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/04/sporadic-cjd-rising-text-and-figures-of.html

Monday, November 23, 2009

BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS UPDATE NOVEMBER 23, 2009 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND O.I.E. COMMISSION DECISION of 11 November 2009

http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-gbr-risk-assessments-update.html

----- Original Message -----

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

To: Debra.Beasley@aphis.usda.gov

Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2009 11:01 AM

Subject: OIE has recently published its proposed animal welfare guidelines for public comment

Greetings USDA/APHIS et al,

I would kindly like to comment on OIE proposed guidelines.

AS I said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. THE reason most every country around the globe came down with BSE/TSE in their cattle, were due to the failed and flawed BSE/TSE testing and surveillance policy of the O.I.E. NOW, they don't even acknowledge atypical scrapie it seems, as one for concern $

Monday, November 23, 2009

BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS UPDATE NOVEMBER 23, 2009 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND O.I.E.

http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-gbr-risk-assessments-update.html

Tuesday, May 24, 2011 2:24 PM

O.I.E. Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission and prion (TSE) disease reporting 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/05/oie-terrestrial-animal-health-standards.html

Sunday, June 5, 2011

PRION TSE FUNDING, WHAT ARE THE PRIORITIES of APHCA, ASEAN, OIE, Korea, and USA ?

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/prion-tse-funding-what-are-priorities.html

Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0006 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary Sr Views Add Comments How To Comment

snip...

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure....

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=APHIS-2006-0041-0006

I IMPLORE, that due to the lack of surveillance and proper BSE/TSE protocols for testing and surveillance, the fact that sporadic CJD in the USA has tripled over the last few years or so, the new findings of BASE, the fact that CWD and Scrapie are out of control in the USA, I IMPLORE that the BSE MRR policy be repealed and the BSE GBR risk assessments revised to address all TSEs i.e. TSE GBR, for the following reasons ; ----- Original Message ----- From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To: "EFSA Press" Sent: Tuesday, November 21, 2006 12:21 PM Subject: Re: re-Geographical BSE Risk: EFSA consults on revision of assessment methodology Greetings EFSA, a sad day. i think any weakening of the BSE GBR risk assessments, especially for USA, is a huge mistake. i think the BSE GBR should be revised to include all TSE i.e. TSE GBR.

snip...

your only fooling yourselves with this stupid ukbsenvcjd only theory, and the BSE methology of the OIE. most any coutnry that went by those same OIE BSE guidelines all went down with BSE. THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE. AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf

Terry S. Singeltary SR. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=APHIS-2006-0026-0012;oldLink=false

Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment

January 28, 2007

Greetings APHIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to ;

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8

layperson...tss

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
flounder9@verizon.net

Scientific Opinion on the capacity of oleochemical processes to minimise possible risks linked to TSE in Category 1 animal by-products EFSA

2011-02-08T12:27:00.000-08:00

Scientific Opinion on the capacity of oleochemical processes to minimise possible risks linked to TSE in Category 1 animal by-products

EFSA Journal

2011;9(2):1976 [26 pp.]. doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2011.1976

EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ)

Panel Members Olivier Andreoletti, Herbert Budka, Sava Buncic, John D. Collins, John Griffin, Arie Havelaar, James Hope, Günter Klein, Tine Hald, James McLauchlin, Christine Mueller-Graf, Christophe Nguyen-Thé, Birgit Noerrung, Miguel Prieto Maradona, Luisa Peixe, Antonia Ricci, John Sofos, John Threlfall, Ivar Vågsholm and Emmanuel Vanopdenbosch.

Acknowledgment

The Panel wishes to thank the members of the Working Group on the capacity of oleochemical processes to minimise possible risks linked to TSE in Category 1 animal by-products: Emmanuel Vanopdenbosch, Christophe Nguyen-The, John Griffin, James Hope and Reinhard Boehm for the preparatory work on this scientific opinion and EFSA staff: Alessandro Broglia for the support provided to this scientific opinion. Contact biohaz@efsa.europa.eu Type:

Opinion of the Scientific Committee/Scientific Panel On request from: European Commission Question number: EFSA-Q-2010-00969

Adopted: 20 January 2011 Published: 07 February 2011 Affiliation: European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), Parma, Italy Article Full article (0.2 Mb) send print cite

Abstract

The capacity of specific oleochemical processes including several steps (i.e. bleaching, fat splitting, hydrogenation, concentration, distillation and refinement) in order to minimise possible risks linked to TSE infectivity in tallow including Category 1 animal by-products (ABP) was assessed. Under the new ABP Regulation (Reg. EC No 1069/2009), the use of Category 1 tallow for oleochemical products may be also authorised, if the processes are proved to be capable of sufficiently inactivating any potential risks linked to TSEs. The processes considered in this opinion are based on different treatment steps in different combination, but with respect to infectivity reduction the major contribution derives from hydrolytic fat splitting and hydrogenation, so to obtain fatty acids and glycerol. It is concluded that if the parameters are fully met as declared by the applicant, certain processes can be considered effective in significantly reducing the TSE infectivity in the end products using Category 1 tallow. However, considering the uncertainties on the TSE infectivity reduction in oleochemical products derived from Cat. 1 material, these products cannot be reliably regarded to be free of infectivity and therefore could pose a risk if they entered the food and feed chain.

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/1976.htm?WT.mc_id=EFSAHL01&emt=1

Summary (0.1 Mb) Following a request from the European Commission, the EFSA Scientific Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) was asked to provide scientific advice on the capacity of a specific oleochemical processes to minimise possible risks linked to TSE infectivity in tallow including category 1 material.

The current Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002 on animal by-products foresees that rendered fats obtained from Category 2 and Category 3 materials may be used for the manufacture of oleochemical products.

Under the new ABP Regulation (Reg. EC No 1069/2009), the use of Category 1 material in the production of oleochemical products may be also authorised, provided that the manufacturing processes which are applied by the oleochemical industry are capable of sufficiently inactivating any potential risks linked to TSE. This would allow the use of such products in various applications, such as in soaps, cosmetic products and plastics, regardless of the category of animal by-products that are used as starting materials.

The European Oleochemicals and Allied Products Group (APAG), a sector group of the European Chemical Industry Council (Cefic), has submitted scientific evidence to the Commission regarding the capacity of oleochemical processes to inactivate possible risks linked to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) in animal by-products not intended for human consumption (ABPs).

The oleochemical processes considered consist mainly of hydrolytic fat splitting of tallow to obtain fatty acids and glycerol, under the conditions of 200°C, 16 bar of pressure for 20 minutes. The processes can be carried out in a unitower or multitower plant. If saturated fatty acids or hydrogenated tallow are to be obtained, hydrogenation under conditions of 160°C, 12 bar of H2 pressure for 20 minutes is applied in batch or continuous reactors. Eight different processes, consisting of a combination of different steps, can be used according to the different end products and type of reactors used.

The parameters considered are mainly temperature, time and pressure. In the opinion the reduction effects of the different steps that characterise the processes are assessed and, when possible, quantified. The two steps with experimental evidence that contribute to the TSE risk reduction are the hydrolytic fat splitting and the hydrogenation.

It is concluded that if the critical limits of the specific method considered are met, the reduction of TSE infectivity of certain processes is significant. However, considering the uncertainties on the TSE infectivity reduction in oleochemical products derived from Cat. 1 material, these products cannot be reliably regarded to be free of infectivity and therefore could pose a risk if they entered the food and feed chain.

As for efficacy of hydrogenation step, only batch processes can be compared to validated experiments, continuous processes could not be considered effective due to the lack of critical data (i.e. minimum retention time). As for the splitting step carried out in continuous reactors, the processing time represents a sufficient safety margin compared to the minimum requirement, and therefore it is considered effective.

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/s1976.pdf

Full Text ;

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/1976.pdf

Thursday, July 22, 2010

BSE INQUIRY DFA 18 COSMETICS

From: TSS

Subject: Use of Materials Derived From Cattle in Human Food and Cosmetics [Docket No. 2004N-0081] RIN 0910-AF47

Date: April 17, 2008 at 2:41 pm PST

http://bseinquiry.blogspot.com/2010/07/bse-inquiry-dfa-18-cosmetics.html

http://bseinquiry.blogspot.com/

Saturday, January 29, 2011

Atypical L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (L-BSE) Transmission to Cynomolgus Macaques, a Non-Human Primate

Jpn. J. Infect. Dis., 64 (1), 81-84, 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/atypical-l-type-bovine-spongiform.html

Tuesday, February 8, 2011

U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/02/usa-50-state-bse-mad-cow-conference.html

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/

TSS

Meat from three cows aged over 48 months not tested for BSE exported to France, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark and the Republic of Ireland

2010-11-17T08:16:00.000-08:00

Meat from three cows aged over 48 months not tested for BSE

Wednesday 17 November 2010

The Agency has been notified that meat from three cattle over 48 months of age has entered the food chain without being tested for BSE.

It is very unlikely that the animals were infected with BSE and, as specified risk material (SRM) was removed, any risk to human health is now extremely low. However, testing is mandatory for cattle slaughtered for human consumption at over 48 months of age.*

The cows were slaughtered at the Cig Calon Cymru abattoir at Crosshands, Carmarthenshire and were 64 months of age, 71 months of age and 87 months of age. The failure was discovered on 3 November during routine checks of slaughter and BSE test data. All of the affected carcasses and offal had left the premises at the time of discovery and subsequent checks indicated that all meat and edible co-product is no longer in the food supply chain.

Inspections have indicated that some of the affected product has been exported to France, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark and the Republic of Ireland. The authorities in these countries have been informed.

*SRM is that part of the animal most likely to contain BSE infectivity.

http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2010/nov/bse117nov

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

The NeuroPrion network has identified seven main threats for the future linked to prions.

First threat

The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed. *** Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Second threat

In small ruminants, a new atypical form of scrapie currently represents up to 50% of detected cases and even involves sheep selected for resistance to classical scrapie. The consequences for animal and human health are still unknown and there may be a potential connection with atypical BSE. These atypical scrapie cases constitute a second threat not envisioned previously which could deeply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Third threat

The species barrier between human and cattle might be weaker than previously expected and the risk of transmission of prion diseases between different species has been notoriously unpredictable. The emergence of new atypical strains in cattle and sheep together with the spread of chronic wasting disease in cervids renders the understanding of the species barrier critical. This constitutes a third threat not properly envisioned previously that could deeply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Fourth threat

Prion infectivity has now been detected in blood, urine and milk and this has potential consequences on risk assessments for the environment and food as well as for contamination of surfaces including medical instruments. Furthermore the procedures recommended for decontamination of MBM (Meat and Bone Meal), which are based on older methodologies not designed for this purpose, have turned out to be of very limited efficacy and compromise current policies concerning the reuse of these high value protein supplements (cross-contamination of feed circuits are difficult to control). It should be noted that the destruction or very limited use of MBM is estimated to still cost 1 billion euros per year to the European economy,

whereas other countries, including the US,

Brazil, and Argentine do not have these constraints.

However, many uncertainties remain concerning the guarantees that can be reasonably provided for food and feed safety and scientific knowledge about the causative agents (prions) will continue to evolve. This decontamination and environmental issue is a fourth threat that could modify deeply the European approach to prion diseases.

Fifth threat The precise nature of prions remains elusive. Very recent data indicate that abnormal prion protein (PrPTSE) can be generated from the brains of normal animals, and under some conditions (including contaminated waste water) PrPTSE can be destroyed whereas the BSE infectious titre remains almost unchanged, a finding that underlines the possibility of having BSE without any detectable diagnostic marker. These are just two areas of our incomplete knowledge of the fundamental biology of prions which constitute a fifth threat to the European approach to prion diseases.

Sixth threat The absence of common methods and standardisation in the evaluation of multiple in vivo models with different prion strains and different transgenic mice expressing PrP from different species (different genotypes of cattle, sheep, cervids, etc) renders a complete and comprehensive analysis of all the data generated by the different scientific groups almost impossible. This deeply impairs risk assessment. Moreover, the possibility of generating PrPTSE de novo with new powerful techniques has raised serious questions about their appropriateness for use as blood screening tests. The confusion about an incorrect interpretation of positive results obtained by these methods constitutes a sixth threat to European approach to prion diseases.

Seventh Threat The detection of new or re-emerging prion diseases in animals or humans which could lead to a new crisis in consumer confidence over the relaxation of precautionary measures and surveillance programmes constitutes a seventh threat that could modify the European approach to prion diseases.

http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html

Thursday, August 12, 2010

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/

Tuesday, November 02, 2010

BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html

Saturday, November 6, 2010

TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS

INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html

TSS

FINAL REPORT OF A MISSION CARRIED OUT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM 19 TO 29 JANUARY 2010 IN ORDER TO EVALUATE MEASURES CONCERNING BSE

2010-04-08T12:37:00.000-07:00

DG(SANCO) 2010-8344 - MR FINAL

FINAL REPORT OF A MISSION CARRIED OUT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

FROM 19 TO 29 JANUARY 2010

IN ORDER TO EVALUATE MEASURES CONCERNING BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE)

In response to information provided by the Competent Authority, any factual error noted in the draft report has been corrected; any clarification appears in the form of a footnote.

Executive Summary

This report describes the outcome of a Food and Veterinary Office specific audit carried out between 19 to 29 January 2010, which formed part of the general audit 2009 of the United Kingdom conducted under the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004.

As part of the general audit, the objective of this specific audit was to evaluate that official controls are carried out in conformity with the multi-annual national control plan drawn up in accordance within Article 41 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004. The specific audit evaluated the implementation of certain protective measures against Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE).

Overall, the report concludes that active surveillance was satisfactory and that some progress has been made as regards the quality of samples for BSE testing. Passive surveillance was appropriately carried out and measures related to suspect animals and following confirmation of BSE were implemented in line with Community requirements.

The arrangements in place for collection and handling of specified risk material were mainly satisfactory, although there were some weaknesses in commercial documentation.

In Great Britain, the identification of users of fish meal and feed containing fish meal has significantly progressed but the registration and authorisation process of such users was far from being completed. Some important steps have been taken to improve the risk prioritisation of inspections, but it remains affected by an incomplete knowledge of some key feed operators. In Northern Ireland, the identification of users of feed containing fish meal was still on-going. The priorities set for inspections in the national control programme were not complied with, resulting in very few visits to on-farm mixers and mixed species farms, including those using fish meal or feed containing fish meal; moreover, the prioritisation of feed ban controls did not take account of the significant use of bulk feather meal as organic fertilisers on farms. The large majority of the said farms were therefore not visited despite several incidents concerning cross-contamination of feed with feather meal that occurred in the recent past. In addition, limited enforcement actions and sanctions had been taken following a number of breaches of feed ban rules.

The report makes a number of recommendations addressed to the United Kingdom competent authorities aimed at rectifying the shortcoming identified and further enhancing the implementing and control measures in place.

snip...

5.5 FEED BAN

5.5.1 Requirements along the chain

Legal requirements

Art. 7 of Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 prohibits the feeding to farmed animals of products derived from animals in accordance with the conditions laid down in its Annex IV, which establishes a number of derogations from the said prohibition and specific conditions for the application of such derogations.

Findings

The relevant recommendation of report 8316/2006 concerned the authorisation of establishments using fish meal for the production of feed, the use of feed containing fish meal on mixed species farms and the labelling of feed containing fish meal. In response to this recommendation, the CCA undertook to take all necessary actions in the following National Feed Audit (NFA) programmes. Since the last mission, the procedure in place for authorising and registering users of fish meal or other derogated products derived from animals, which is described in detail in report 8316/2006, has been simplified. In Great Britain, authorisations to produce feed containing derogated products derived from animals have replaced registrations as in both cases the requirements to comply with were deemed very similar. Official permission to store or use complete feed containing derogated products derived from animals on premises with ruminants present is granted following a satisfactory official inspection.

According to DARD and DEFRA, there is no evidence of use of dicalcium or tricalcium phosphate of animal origin in the United Kingdom. Concerning the use of blood and blood products, both the CCAs declared their use is very limited, and one industry assurance scheme in the UK includes a voluntary ban on the feeding of blood products to pigs.

Commission Regulation (EC) No 956/2008 has not yet been transposed into BSE domestic legislation, which therefore does not provide for a derogation in relation to the use of fish meal to unweaned farmed animals of the ruminant species. Consultations are on-going or about to be launched by the different CCA in order to amend the different domestic legislations. A few samples on milk replacers have been taken in Great Britain but were tested negative for the presence of fish meal. According to DEFRA, little interest has been expressed by the feed industry and farmers associations as regards the use of fish meal in milk replacers.

The mission team noted that:

• Lists of authorised users of fish meal were being kept by AH and DARD. However, in Northern Ireland, the activities indicated on the list of users did not always reflect the actual activities carried out by the operators.

• In Great Britain, important progress has been made in the identification, authorisation and permitting process of users of fish meal and feed containing fish meal. AH achieved such progress by requesting feed mills to provide the lists of purchasers of fish meal and feed containing fish meal. As a result of this exercise, around 10,000 purchasers were identified. The central operations delivery team of AH, which has taken over the authorisation and permissions database, had already contacted around 5,200 of these premises and 393 had been sent to AHROs and AHDOs for inspections, resulting in 329 of them being authorised or permitted. However, the identification process is still incomplete as one half of the purchasers identified (around 5,000) has still to be contacted.

• The tracing exercise carried out centrally by AH focused on farms purchasing fish meal and feed containing fish meal. According to AH, intermediaries or feed stores present on the lists obtained and possibly supplying such feed to other farms or feed operators have not yet been contacted. In some of the AHOs and AHDOs visited, AH staff requested updates of lists of purchasers of feed containing fish meal from local feed business operators. In some cases, such lists (which contained significant proportions of new purchasers) have been sent to AH central operations delivery team (further delaying their authorisation or permission) while in other cases they have been dealt with at local level.

• AH staff inspecting ABP plants, in particular those handling fish meal, have been requested to forward to the NFA lead veterinary officer any relevant information allowing the identification of users. However, importers, brokers or storage plants have not yet been requested to provide list of purchasers of fish meal and it could be confirmed that a limited feed back has been received from AH staff performing ABP inspections; for instance, not all plants involved in bulk storage of fish meal were known by the NFA lead veterinary officer.

• In Northern Ireland, DARD had recently obtained lists of purchasers of feed containing fish meal from feed mills. Around 70 farms keeping ruminants and non-ruminants and buying such feed have been identified and are in the process of being registered.

• All authorised users of fish meal visited were also producing ruminant feed. Adequate arrangements, including physical separation and dedication of equipments or means of transports, were in place to avoid cross-contamination of ruminant feed except in one onfarm mixer visited, where there was an incomplete physical separation between the storage of bulk feed material used for ruminant feed and the area where feed containing fish meal was manufactured.

• Labelling requirements for fish meal and feed containing fish meal were complied with and in most cases a warning sentence was printed on the bags. In one on-farm mixer visited, bags of fish meal were not properly labelled but this had been identified by AH which had taken immediate corrective actions.

• On a number of consignments of imported fish meal checked during the mission, it was verified that microscopy testing had been carried before they were released for free circulation.

Conclusions

Legal and administrative arrangements are in place in order to ensure that the use of products derived from animals is subject to the requirements of Art. 7 of Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 and there is a good level of compliance amongst the feed operators using derogated products derived from animals. However, even if the authorisation and permission process of such users has made important progress since the last FVO mission, it is still far from being completed. As a consequence, it can not be yet ensured that the use of derogated products derived from animals is always carried out in accordance with the conditions established in Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 999/2001.

snip...

6 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

Active surveillance was satisfactory and that some progress has been made as regards the quality of samples for BSE testing. Passive surveillance was appropriately carried out and measures related to suspect animals and following confirmation of BSE were implemented in line with Community requirements.

The arrangements in place for collection and handling of specified risk material were mainly satisfactory, although there were some weaknesses in commercial documentation.

In Great Britain, the identification of users of fish meal and feed containing fish meal has significantly progressed but the registration and authorisation process of such users was far from being completed. Some important steps have been taken to improve the risk prioritisation of inspections, but it remains affected by an incomplete knowledge of some key feed operators.

In Northern Ireland, the identification of users of feed containing fish meal was still on-going. The priorities set for inspections in the national control programme were not complied with, resulting in very few visits to on-farm mixers and mixed species farms, including those using fish meal or feed containing fish meal; moreover, the prioritisation of feed ban controls did not take account of the significant use of bulk feather meal as organic fertilisers on farms. The large majority of the said farms were therefore not visited despite several incidents concerning cross-contamination of feed with feather meal that occurred in the recent past. In addition, limited enforcement actions and sanctions had been taken following a number of breaches of feed ban rules.

5.1 BSE SITUATION

The number of BSE positive cases in Great Britain and Northern Ireland is shown in the table below (data as of 31 December 2009; information provided by the DEFRA).

The last BSE positive case identified by passive surveillance in a herd without previous BSE cases occurred in 2007. In 2009, six BSE positive cases were animals born before 1 August 1996.

Great Britain Northern Ireland

Passive surveillance Active surveillance Passive surveillance Active surveillance

2007 7 46 0 14

2008 2 31 0 4

2009 1 8 0 3

snip...please see full text here ;

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/act_getPDF.cfm?PDF_ID=8070

16 March 2010

Annex 1 – Comments on DG(SANCO) 2010-8344 – MR DRAFT

BSE Measures

Section Reference Page UK Comment Abbreviations III

Amend “Department for Agriculture and Rural Development” to “Department of Agriculture and Rural Development”

1

With regards to the sentence commencing “Representatives of the Food Standard Agency and of the Meat Hygiene Service”, note that there were no representatives of the Food Standards Agency present at the slaughterhouse in England.

5.1 3

The sentence “Since then [2007], BSE cases were notified either in sub-populations of fallen stock or animals slaughtered for human consumption” is incorrect as there were cases detected as clinical suspects, by passive surveillance in 2008 and 2009.

5.1 3

The sentence commencing “In 2009, the last...” should be amended as follows “In 2009, six BSE positive cases were animals born before 1 August 1996”

5.2.1 (Bullet 1) 4

Amend “Cattle Cohort and Offspring System” to “Offspring and Cohort Cull (OCC) System”.

5.2.2 (Bullet 2) 5

Amend “In one of the slaughterhouse visited...” to “In one of the slaughterhouses visited...”

5.2.3 (Findings)

5

In sentence commencing “The relevant recommendations of report...” amend “from being slaughter” to “from being slaughtered”.

5.2.3 (First full paragraph on page) 6

Replace paragraph beginning “According to DARD...” with “According to DARD, several changes have been introduced in procedures concerning the extraction and entry of data from and onto APHIS. The Required Method of Operations (RMOPs) in all slaughterhouses were reviewed and amended to require post slaughter identification checks. These are designed to ensure the correct identification of all animals prior to BSE sampling."

5.2.3 (Fourth full paragraph on page) 6

The facility to check the cattle ID database (i.e. CTS) at slaughterhouses does not apply in GB. GB operates the policy of passport seizure. NI does not use passports.

? Amend the sentence commencing “DEFRA continued the policy which had been implemented...” to “The CCAs in Great Britain continued the policy which had been implemented...”

? Amend the sentence commencing “In addition restricted animals received special status in CTS and APHIS, which allows their identification at slaughterhouses...” to “In Northern Ireland, restricted animals received special status

16 March 2010

2

in APHIS, which allows their identification at slaughterhouses...”

5.2.3 (Bullet 3) 7

Amend the paragraph commencing “According to the OV met in the slaughterhouse...” to “According to the OV met in the slaughterhouse visited in Northern Ireland, animals with clinical signs consistent with BSE would be rejected at ante-mortem inspection, and animals with localized lesions such as distal limb lameness were not recorded as sick at ante-mortem and therefore considered as healthy slaughtered. On the spot checks detected one animal which should have been recorded as sick at ante-mortem but which was recorded as healthy slaughtered. All ante-mortem information was recorded on APHIS and this triggered the BSE testing category on the sample label, however timing of data entry could result in the default printing of the label as healthy slaughtered”.

5.2.3 (Bullet 6) 7

Amend the paragraph commencing “In Northern Ireland, there was...” to “In Northern Ireland, there was one case in 2009 where a bovine animal eligible for testing was slaughtered for human consumption and not tested. According to the CCA, this was due to a human error by the manufacturer of a replacement tag. When this error was identified, the meat from this animal had already been placed on the market. Following that case, an additional document verification procedure was put in place in the lairage for animals of all ages as an obligatory check.” 5.2.3 (Conclusions)

8

DARD considers that the conclusions reached are overstated based on the evidence identified. Further evidence of subpopulation recording can be provided. For example:

? in 2008 in NI, 426 UA (24-30 month sick at ante-mortem animals) category animals were recorded. 101 of these were identified in the slaughterhouse visited;

? in 2009 in NI, 71 TC (O48 emergency slaughter) category animals were recorded. 18 of these were identified in the slaughterhouse visited; and

? in 2009 in NI, 218 TA (O48 sick at ante-mortem animals) were recorded. Further statistics are available at

http://www.defra.gov.uk/vla/science/docs/sci_tse_stats_ireland.pdf

5.2.4 (Findings, second paragraph)

8

The number 54000 in the sentence commencing “According to the CCA...” is incorrect. In the response to the evaluation plan, we advised that as of 30 September 2009, there were around 75000 cattle in GB born before 1 August 1996, of which around 54000 were born before 1 August 1995. As of 1 February 2010, the number of cattle in GB born before 1 August 1996 had reduced to 66834 of which 48275 were born before 1 August 1995.

5.2.4 8

Amend the sentence commencing “A similar situation was not

16 March 2010 3

(Findings, second paragraph) observed...” to “Although the OCDS ended on 31 December 2008, cattle keepers in NI could still avail of the free collection and disposal service for these older fallen cattle until November 2009”.

5.3 (Findings) 9

In the sentence commencing “Following the confirmation of BSE...” delete the words “all cattle on the affected farm (if necessary)” as we only have powers to kill cohorts and offspring in line with Regulation (EC) No.999/2001 5.4.1 (Findings, Bullet 4) 10

The MHS has clarified that at the time of the visit to the slaughterhouse in England, there were five vehicles on site used to transport animal by-products. Three vehicles were in use and two were empty. One vehicle was in the boning hall disposal bay and contained Category 3 material. It was labelled “Category 3” with a temporary paper label which was not strictly compliant with Regulation (EC) No.1774/2002 in that it did not contain the words “not for human consumption”. Two vehicles were in the back yard, contained SRM and were correctly labelled “Category 1 – for disposal only”. Two vehicles were in the front yard, were empty and unlabelled and were awaiting Category 3 material.

Delete the sentence “However, in one of them (England), means of transport used for the collection of SRM were not identified as required as no category nor any warning sentence were mentioned on most of the trailers used.”

5.4.1 (Findings, first paragraph on page)

11 Fat is combusted in the plant in NI at between 1200°C and 1400°C. The figure of 950°C quoted during the mission was the temperature reached in the secondary chamber where vapours from the plant are oxidised.

5.4.1

(Conclusions)

11

With reference to the clarification above (Section 5.4.1 on page 10) regarding identification of vehicles used to transport SRM, amend the sentence commencing “However, the traceability of SRM...” to “However, the traceability of SRM was affected by weaknesses in commercial documentation, which was not in line with the requirement in Art. 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002”.

5.4.2 (Findings, Bullet 2)

11

Amend the sentence commencing “In was only after several months...” to “It was only after several months”. 5.4.2 (Final sub-bullet)

12

In the paragraph commencing “Validation of Category 1 processing plants visited...” the official has clarified that although the plant was validated based on the particle size after the cooker, the official had since insisted on changes to the plant to allow the particle size to be assessed before the cooker. This historic deficiency regarding visual assessment of the particle size had been rectified by the time of the FVO mission visit. 5.5.1 (Findings, third paragraph)

13

With regards to the sentence commencing “According to DARD and DEFRA, there

To see the Competent Authority comments on the draft report, click here ( (255Kb) -

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/act_getPDFannx.cfm?ANX_ID=6221

To see the Competent Authority response to the report recommendations, click here

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/ap/ap_gb_2010-8344.pdf

FISH AND PRIONS

Evaluation of the Possible Transmission of BSE and Scrapie to Gilthead Sea Bream (Sparus aurata)

In transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), a group of fatal neurodegenerative disorders affecting many species, the key event in disease pathogenesis is the accumulation of an abnormal conformational isoform (PrPSc) of the host-encoded cellular prion protein (PrPC). While the precise mechanism of the PrPC to PrPSc conversion is not understood, it is clear that host PrPC expression is a prerequisite for effective infectious prion propagation. Although there have been many studies on TSEs in mammalian species, little is known about TSE pathogenesis in fish. Here we show that while gilthead sea bream (Sparus aurata) orally challenged with brain homogenates prepared either from a BSE infected cow or from scrapie infected sheep developed no clinical prion disease, the brains of TSE-fed fish sampled two years after challenge did show signs of neurodegeneration and accumulation of deposits that reacted positively with antibodies raised against sea bream PrP. The control groups, fed with brains from uninfected animals, showed no such signs. Remarkably, the deposits developed much more rapidly and extensively in fish inoculated with BSE-infected material than in the ones challenged with the scrapie-infected brain homogenate, with numerous deposits being proteinase K-resistant. These plaque-like aggregates exhibited congophilia and birefringence in polarized light, consistent with an amyloid-like component. The neurodegeneration and abnormal deposition in the brains of fish challenged with prion, especially BSE, raises concerns about the potential risk to public health. As fish aquaculture is an economically important industry providing high protein nutrition for humans and other mammalian species, the prospect of farmed fish being contaminated with infectious mammalian PrPSc, or of a prion disease developing in farmed fish is alarming and requires further evaluation.

Article Metrics Related Content Comments: 1 To add a note, highlight some text. Hide notes Make a general comment Jump to

Acknowledgments Author Contributions References Evgenia Salta1#, Cynthia Panagiotidis2#, Konstantinos Teliousis3, Spyros Petrakis1,4, Eleftherios Eleftheriadis5, Fotis Arapoglou5, Nikolaos Grigoriadis6, Anna Nicolaou7, Eleni Kaldrymidou3, Grigorios Krey5, Theodoros Sklaviadis2*

1 Department of Pharmacology, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece, 2 Centre for Research and Technology-Hellas, Institute of Agrobiotechnology, Thessaloniki, Greece, 3 Laboratory of Pathology, School of Veterinary Medicine, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece, 4 Max Delbruck Center for Molecular Medicine, Department of Neuroproteomics, Berlin-Buch, Germany, 5 National Agricultural Research Foundation, Fisheries Research Institute, Nea Peramos, Greece, 6 B' Department of Neurology, AHEPA University Hospital, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece, 7 Department of Business Administration, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece

http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0006175

WONDER where all this fish feed that is not supposed to be fed to ruminants is going ?

PRODUCT a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6; Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6; c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6; d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6; e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6; f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6; g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6 CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags

DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST

PRODUCT a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6; Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6; c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6; d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6; e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6; f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6; g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6; h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6; i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6; j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6; k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6; l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6; m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons DISTRIBUTION AL and FL

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html

CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD TSS MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II ______________________________ PRODUCT a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6; b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6; c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6; d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing. REASON Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons DISTRIBUTION Nationwide

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html

see ;

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html

STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL 25, AUGUST 1995

snip...

To minimise the risk of farmers' claims for compensation from feed compounders.

To minimise the potential damage to compound feed markets through adverse publicity.

To maximise freedom of action for feed compounders, notably by maintaining the availability of meat and bone meal as a raw material in animal feeds, and ensuring time is available to make any changes which may be required.

snip...

THE FUTURE

4..........

MAFF remains under pressure in Brussels and is not skilled at handling potentially explosive issues.

5. Tests _may_ show that ruminant feeds have been sold which contain illegal traces of ruminant protein. More likely, a few positive test results will turn up but proof that a particular feed mill knowingly supplied it to a particular farm will be difficult if not impossible.

6. The threat remains real and it will be some years before feed compounders are free of it. The longer we can avoid any direct linkage between feed milling _practices_ and actual BSE cases, the more likely it is that serious damage can be avoided. ...

SEE full text ;

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/08/24002001.pdf

greetings,

Confucius is confused yet again. how can you be a consultant of something that has not happened yet ???

is this a typo, or what ??? what is R Bradley speaking of in 1983 ??? what is this BSE CONSULTANT in 1983??? i am confused, i thought the first cow documented was 1985, first discovered in 1984, and the diagnosis was rabies or something else besides BSE at first, then later discovered to be BSE, a new strain of TSE in the bovine. ...

BSE CONSULTANT

APPROVAL OF MATERIAL FOR PUBLICATION

All material for publication including written works to be published in scientific journals, books, proceedings of scientific meetings, abstracts of verbally delivered papers and the like should be scrutinized for risk to the Ministry before dispatch to the publisher. ...

snip...

R Bradly Pathology 12 October 1983

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1983/10/12001001.pdf

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1984/12/28001001.pdf

1981 nervous disease in a Hereford calf (calves aged 7-14 days shoring progressive nervous signs of the hind limb weakness progressing to paraplegia. ...

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1984/01/30001001.pdf

Pathologist: Carol Richardson

DIAGNOSIS: 1. Moderat spongiform encephalopathy- acute. 2. Mild renal nephrosis - peracute

REMARKS: These acute changes suggest a toxicity of some description. The non-suppurative reactions are far more chronic, mild and non-specific.

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1985/09/19001001.pdf

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1985/09/19003001.pdf

Owner of animal, Mr. Stent

snip...

FINAL REPORT

Attempts at virus isolation have proved negative.

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1985/09/23001001.pdf

Cases reviewed and discussed, ...No conclusion drawn....

GAH Wells

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1985/09/26001001.pdf

Subject: Carol Richardson $ BSE
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Date: Wed, 1 Nov 2000 09:51:39 -0800 Content-Type: text/plain Parts/Attachments: text/plain (345 lines)

######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

Greetings List,

dont know if this will help calm nerves a bit, but you might find what you want here, in one of those reference YB numbers. her hand-written notes on the case would be; YB85/9.10/3.1-3.2

It was not, therefore, immediately apparent from the post-mortem histopathological examination of the brain of one animal in this herd that it was the first and unprecedented case of a new disease. Even though it can now be seen, with hindsight, that such was the case.

kind regards, Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA

=============================================

The Stent farm cases

12. On 10th September, 1985 specimens (brain, kidney and spinal cord) from a cow owned by a Mr Stent of Pitsham Farm was referred to the CVL by the Winchester VI Centre (Mr J. Watkin-Jones, Veterinary Officer (VO)) for histopathological examination. Referrals from the VI Centres were dealt with on a rota system by the Consultative Pathology Unit (see paragraph 9 above). The veterinary pathologist on duty when the case came in to the Pathology Department was Ms Carol Richardson. At the time both Carol Richardson and I held the position of Senior Research Officer Grade II (SROII), both of us reporting directly to Ray Bradley. Carol Richardson worked in a section of the Department called Ruminant Reproductive Pathology and I believe that she had been working mainly on reproductive disorders in cattle and sheep, with a particular interest in research into infections producing foetal damage. She would, however, have dealt with scrapie cases through some of her previous work with Dr Stanley Terlecki, a former pathologist in the Department.

13. When such diagnostic cases came into CVL from a VI Centre the technician on duty at the time completed a VL99 card summarising the clinical history of the cow and the herd it originated from (based on information provided in the referral letter from the relevant VI Centre). The duty veterinary pathologist prepared the necessary pathological material for histological processing. Sections were then produced from the animal tissues for subsequent examination. The VL99 card for this particular case from Mr Stent's farm is found at YB85/9.10/3.1-3.2. This card and the prepared sections would then have been passed back to the duty veterinary pathologist for examination, which in this instance was Carol Richardson.

14. Carol Richardson conducted the histopathological examination and reported her findings on 19th September, 1985 (YB85/9.10/3.1-3.2). Her hand-written notes on the examination are on the VL99 card (see YB85/9.10/3.1-3.2). The final pathology report prepared by Carol Richardson, which was sent to Mr Watkin-Jones at Winchester VI Centre, is found at YB85/9.19/3.2. It should be noted that the purpose of the pathology reports prepared by the veterinary pathologists for such referrals from VI Centres is to make morphological diagnoses based on an examination of specimens provided. As far as is possible the pathologist then tries to place the diagnosis in the context of the clinical history of the particular animal and its herd or flock to reach conclusions or speculations on an aetiological diagnosis (the cause of the observed changes). This is the purpose of the "Remarks" section of the pathology report. Carol Richardson's examination reported "moderate spongiform encephalopathy" and "mild renal nephrosis" (the morphological diagnoses) and she attributed these observed changes to "a toxicity of some description" (the possible aetiological diagnosis). This was what was reported to the VI Centre. It is notable that nowhere in her report does she mention scrapie or indicate that her observations lead her to suspect any "scrapie-like" disease. The fact that the report mentions "moderate spongiform encephalopathy" is not conclusive in that respect. As highlighted by my short paper on vacuolation previously referred to in paragraph 8, spongiform conditions of the brain can arise from several different causes, including as a reaction to the ingestion of toxic substances, so this observation was consistent with her suggested aetiological diagnosis.

15. At the time this case came in from Mr Stent's farm, I was attending a meeting of the Charles Davis DVM Foundation for Veterinary Pathology in Cheshire. As is often the practice between pathologists in the event of encountering unusual or unexplained findings, Carol Richardson left the specimens and her pathology report for me to examine immediately on my return. A copy of Carol Richardson's report of 19th September, 1985 as annotated in manuscript by myself, is found at YB85/9.19/3.1. When sections are left for colleagues to examine it is not expected that any particular action would be taken by the colleague on his or her own initiative in respect of those sections. The purpose would be simply to offer a view on the material and then return the sections and report to the original examining pathologist, as was the case in this instance. Carol Richardson was absent from the Department on sick leave from 29th December, 1986, and this subsequently became maternity leave on 31st May, 1987. She returned to the Department on 29th December, 1987. Had Carol Richardson felt strongly thatabout the observations she had originally made were those of scrapie in cattle, and my subsequent opinion on her report, I would have expected that she would have come back to me to discuss the matter subsequently or take the matter further herself. in the period between seeing my annotations on her original report on the Stent case in September 1985 and her absence at the end of December 1985.

16. My re-examination of the sections "reinforcedwas consistent with" her original diagnosis in so far as I agreed with her overall observations and that such observations were not artefactual i.e. caused as a result of post-mortem changes or in the preparation of sections. My conclusion was that the brain lesions observed in this case could not in my experience be attributed to a specific disease, but a speculative comment was made that they could possibly be the result of chronic bacteraemia or an endotoxaemia (the production of poisons in the blood due to infection). Whilst the clinical history as described by the referring VI Centre (see YB85/9.10/3.1) describes that seven out of 130 cows were "nervous", this does not equate necessarily to the occurrence of a specific neurological disorder. The history indicated the occurrence of complex metabolic problems within the Stent herd (see paragraph 17 below).

17. Samples from three other cows in the Stent herd which had died or were killed on the farm had been referred to CVL for examination earlier in March, April and May of 1985 (CVL references VLO11453/85/0286, VLO11453/85/0640 and VLO12473/85/0831 respectively). Following, as far as I can recall, a telephone call from Mr J. Watkin-Jones, on 26th September, 1985 I reviewed the history of the submissions from the Stent herd and discussed them with him. This again, was standard practice where the VIS were investigating a persistent herd problem. A copy of my note of this event, together with the VI Centre referral letters and pathology reports for each case from the Stent farm (with manuscript comments made by myself at the time of this review) are found at YB85/9.26/1.1; YB85/9.10/3.1; YB85/9.19/3.1; YB85/4.31/1.1; YB85/5.9/1.1; YB85/4.6/1.1; YB85/4.16/1.1; YB85/2.13/1.1 and YB85/3.1/1.1 respectively. None of the samples for the three earlier cases included brain tissue and the main post-mortem finding in these cases was internal bleeding. Taken in isolation and in the light of these factors, the case in September 1985 did not at that time suggest that a new disease had been identified. Vacuolar changes in the brain of that particular animal were not severe and there was previous, and current, evidence of other disease problems. The herd from which these animals came had clearly experienced a lot of other health problems including haemorrhagic disorder (internal bleeding), hypocalcaemia (lack of calcium), septic arthritis (pus in joints), renal damage, bovine viral diarrhoea and peritonitis (inflammation of the abdominal cavity) associated with foetal death. This was a complex pattern in a dairy herd indicating that a variety of different diseases might be occurring. It was not, therefore, immediately apparent from the post-mortem histopathological examination of the brain of one animal in this herd that it was the first and unprecedented case of a new disease. Even though it can now be seen, with hindsight, that such was the case.

18. Further samples of nervous system tissues and other organs were received at CVL from a cow in the Stent herd on 10th September, 1986 (YB86/9.22/1.1-1.2). These were examined by Dr S. Done, a veterinary pathologist who joined the Pathology Department in 1983. A copy of the VL99 card for this case is found at YB86/9.22/1.1-1.2. Histopathogical examination of the central nervous system (CNS) tissues submitted from this case showed mild spongiform change in the medulla (hind brain). Other brain regions are described as having either no visible lesions or mild focal haemorrhage. See paragraph 31 for further discussion of this case.

http://www.bse.org.uk/witness/htm/stat065.htm

4.The single case of BSE that I examined in September 1985 was the one and only case that I have seen.

5.The first officially reported case of BSE

Memory recalls a sequence of events the importance of which can only be made by informed judgement. The following account of an interesting and exciting event is taken largely from my memory. I have used copies of the original letter,case card, diagnostic report, accession books and my 1985 organiser diary to make this account as accurate as possible.

6.I had returned from annual leave and was on rota as duty pathologist. The senior technician of the diagnostic unit asked me to examine an adult bovine brain; the vet wanted a diagnosis a.s.a.p.

7.The history was of 7/130 cows showing nervous symptoms over the previous 5 months; most had gone for casualty slaughter and no gross abnormality had been seen in the viscera. (YB85/9.10/1.1).The Pathology Department had examined pieces of liver, kidney, heart and lung from three previous cases from this farm (YB85/2.15/1.1; YB85/4.9/1.1; YB85/5.3/1.1) (2 adults and 1 calf)and had found chronic mild hepatitis(1),acute hepatic necrosis (1) moderate pulmonary oedema (1) and chronic mild interstitial nephritis (2).

8.The history of these earlier cases was one of internal haemorrhage and samples had been sent for organic mercurial poisoning assay. There had been metabolic problems in this herd and active BVD infection in the calves. The case card numbers of these three cases can be seen in the cross-reference column on the case card of the September specimen- MS1509/85 (YB85/9.10/2.1). In addition to the nervous signs seen in this cow, abscessation of the stifle was also present. On gross examination, the brain was well fixed and relatively undamaged; pieces of spinal cord and a piece of kidney were included and were grossly unremarkable. The meninges appeared thickened but this was probably normal for an adult cow.

9.In the absence of gross abnormality, I made multiple incisions and took standard blocks (13) for histological processing and the production of H&E (see procedures) sections. Blocks of spinal cord and kidney were also sent for processing (11/9/85).

10.I have a set sequence for examining brain sections; when these sections were returned to me (13/9/85) I examined the frontal cerebrum first and progressed caudally scanning each section from dorsal to ventral surface. In this case there seemed to be a mild vacuolation of the cerebral neuropil. At this time Gerald Wells had been investigating the possibility that prolonged exposure of nervous tissue to 70% alcohol could produce neuropil vacuolation. Such prolonged exposure would occur over the week-end but I checked with the technician to ensure that such exposure had not occurred in this case before resuming my examination. I noted finding a mild multifocal non-suppurative peri-vascular infiltration with some eosinophils and in the caudal cerebrum mild focal gliosis. No abnormality was found in the thalamus (cranial midbrain) but mild neuropil vacuolation of the reticular formation in the colliculi. The medulla (a pathogonomic site for Scrapie in sheep) showed moderate neuronal and neuropil vacuolation. I found no abnormality in the cerebellum but the section of lumbar spinal cord showed mild neuropil vacuolation of the dorsal horns. There were two types of lesion in the section of kidney;a chronic mild /moderate non-suppurative interstitial reaction with tubular regeneration and fibrosis; a peracute reaction of a mild multifocal tubular necrosis with hydropic change (protein reabsorption).

11.These sections were reviewed by Gerald Wells in 1987 with essentially similar findings but more refined. (See case card at YB85/9.10/2.1).

12.Although I had never seen this type of lesion before in a cow I had frequently seen the combination of neuronal and neuropil vacuolation with this distribution in Scrapie. To me,this was Scrapie in a cow.

13.Before writing the report I sought a second opinion; I needed the opinion of a ruminant neuropathologist and therefore placed the sections, my findings and a request for re-examination on Martin Jeffrey’s bench. I was eager to hear his opinion and immediately after lunch went to collect the slides. Martin had left a note on which was written "Bovine scrapie". As I left his room I met him in the doorway. Apparently this was the first case he had seen but he informed me that Gerald had examined two cases and was expecting another two cases.

14.Interestingly, we apparently had more than one case here from different farms but obviously Gerald was dealing with it. In all my experience, there has not been a case of a novel disease in cattle affecting more than one farm initially: this should have caused alarm bells to ring. If there are several cases at different farms, it is important to cross-reference for the purposes of disease surveillance. A site visit to the Pitsham farm would have resulted in further well-preserved specimens, and more background information.

15.On the 17th-18th Sept. I drafted a batch of diagnostic reports including my report to Winchester VIC (YB85/9.19/1.1).

16.The report is a reiteration of my findings except that the histo-anatomical term `reticular formation’ should have been typed in the sentence above and not under the findings in the medulla. When it came to stating a diagnosis I decided that since the pathological term used for the clinical disease Scrapie of sheep is ovine spongiform encephalopathy then this "new" entity must also be classified as a "spongiform encephalopathy". I called it mild because again projecting onto the sheep situation with only a few sites affected the inclusion of mild as a descriptive term seemed correct. Although there was a chronic interstitial nephritis , I decided to highlight the peracute nephrosis which was probably related to a bacterial toxaemia associated with the stifle abcess.

17.From the history of the case on the Stent farm, it seemed as if the clinical course of the disease was fairly rapid in that metabolic disorders of short duration and heavy metal toxicities were being considered on the farm. Therefore, it seemed likely that the cause(s) of the spongiform changes were a result of an acute clinical disease (rather than a chronic illness) and in the absence of a more likely aetiology, toxicity seemed to be the most appropriate catagory that fitted both symptoms and findings.

18.I dismissed the possibility that a bacterial toxaemia had caused the spongiform change; in my limited experience of ruminant neuropathology, toxaemia was likely to produce frank neuronal necrosis rather than degenerative vacuolation (cf. Clostridial toxaemia).

19.The report was sent for typing; returned and despatched on the 19th September. The second copy and the original letter was filed on VlO 12467, the diagnostic file for cattle diseases. I asked the technician, Dorothy Wells (no relation to Gerald) to cross-reference with similar cases. I always asked the technician to do this, to enter the case numbers of similar cases on the pathology card. In this case I asked Dorothy to cross-reference for the two cases that Gerald had appaerntly already seen.

20.I heard nothing further about my 1985 case.

21.I left the CVL at Christmas 1986, on maternity leave.

http://www.bse.org.uk/witness/htm/stat069.htm

############ http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ############

see full discussion here ;

https://lists.aegee.org/cgi-bin/wa?S2=BSE-L&X=4B20CF095582362D95&Y=flounder9@verizon.net&q=&s=Carol+Richardson&f=&a=&b=

TSS

even the late great Dr. Gibbs once told me personally that even if the Chicken did not contract a TSE, IF the chicken had been fed the TSE tainted feed and then slaughtered, the agent survives the digestinal tract to pass on to other species through feed. The same would hold true with marine fish feed. ..tss

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2009/11/american-crows-corvus-brachyrhynchos.html

Tuesday, August 18, 2009

BSE-The Untold Story - joe gibbs and singeltary 1999 - 2009

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2009/08/bse-untold-story-joe-gibbs-and.html

Monday, April 5, 2010

Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE April 5, 2010

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/04/update-on-feed-enforcement-activities.html

Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America 14th

ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html

TSE

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html

Sunday, April 4, 2010

USDA AND OIE OUT OF TOUCH WITH RISK FACTOR ON ATYPICAL TSE

position: Post Doctoral Fellow Atypical BSE in Cattle

Closing date: December 24, 2009

Anticipated start date: January/February 2010

Employer: Canadian and OIE Reference Laboratories for BSE CFIA Lethbridge Laboratory, Lethbridge/Alberta

snip...

To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

snip...

http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/04/usda-and-oie-out-of-touch-with-risk.html

Monday, March 29, 2010

Irma Linda Andablo CJD Victim, she died at 38 years old on February 6, 2010 in Mesquite Texas

http://www.recordandoalinda.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19:cjd-english-info&catid=9:cjd-ingles&Itemid=8

>>>Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would euthanize the cattle. <<<

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/03/irma-linda-andablo-cjd-victim-she-died.html

http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/2010/03/cjd-texas-38-year-old-female-worked.html

2008 - 2010

The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.

http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html

CJD USA RISING, with UNKNOWN PHENOTYPE ;

5 Includes 41 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 17 inconclusive cases; 6 Includes 46 cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.

http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf

Saturday, January 2, 2010

Human Prion Diseases in the United States January 1, 2010 ***FINAL***

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/01/human-prion-diseases-in-united-states.html

my comments to PLosone here ;

http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?inReplyTo=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd&root=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd

Friday, February 05, 2010

New Variant Creutzfelt Jakob Disease case reports United States 2010 A Review

http://vcjd.blogspot.com/2010/02/new-variant-creutzfelt-jakob-disease.html

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of AUSTRALIA

2010-04-08T09:10:00.000-07:00

Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of Australia Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083

Adopted: 1 July 2004

Summary (0.1 Mb)

Report (0.2 Mb)

Annex (0.3 Mb)

Summary

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Australia, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Australia. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Australia as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.

In the case of Australia, an extremely or very unstable system was exposed to a very low or negligible challenge through the import of cattle. Under these conditions, it is highly unlikely that any internal challenge occurred. Given the negligible level of external challenge through meat and bone meal (MBM), it is highly unlikely that any internal challenge occurred.

The risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Australia and were, at least partly, rendered for feed, due to imported cattle from BSE-risk countries has been very low to negligible throughout the considered period. Some imports of cattle in the early 80s from the UK and from the mid-80s onwards from USA, Canada and European countries increased the risk of BSE infectivity entering the feed chain. However, the probability that BSE contaminated material entered processing is seen as being very low.

EFSA concludes that the current GBR Australia level is I, i.e., it is highly unlikely that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the possibility of cross-contamination exists and there are no serious changes in rendering, the system will continue to be very unstable. Thus, the possibility of cattle being (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent will remain at a low level.

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/scdoc/6r.htm

Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of AUSTRALIA.

Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted July 2004

snip...

EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 6, 1-5 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of Australia.

http://www.efsa.eu.int

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External Challenge

Australia was exposed to a very low external challenge for the period 1980-1985, a negligible external challenge for the period 1986-1995, a very low external challenge for period 1996-2000, and a negligible external challenge for the period 2001-2003.

Stability

For the overall assessment of the stability, the impact of the three main stability factors, (i.e. feeding, rendering and SRM-removal) and of the additional stability factor surveillance has to be estimated. Again, the guidance provided by the SSC in its opinion on the GBR of July 2000 (as updated in 2002) is applied. Taking the above-summarised discussion of the most relevant stability factors into account, it is concluded that the BSE/cattle system of the Australia was extremely unstable at least until 2001, and slightly improved since then, to very unstable.

Feeding

Until October 1997, ruminant Meat and Bone Meal (ruminant-MBM) was legally fed to cattle. Feeding was therefore "not OK". In October 1997, a ruminant MBM-ban was introduced but feeding of non-ruminant mammalian MBM to cattle remained legal as well as feeding of ruminant-MBM to non-ruminant animals (farm animals and pets). This made control of the feed ban very difficult because analytical differentiation between ruminant and non-ruminant MBM is difficult if not impossible. The ban was further strengthened in 1999 and a comprehensive ban on the feeding of vertebrate MBM to ruminants was put in place in 2001. Given that procedures for auditing and enforcing the ban were also in place by that time, it is assumed that the stability of the system in relation to feeding has been “reasonably OK” since 2001, i.e., voluntary feeding is unlikely but cross contamination cannot be excluded.

Rendering

The rendering industry is operating processes that are not tested with regard to their capacity to reduce BSE-infectivity. It is therefore concluded that rendering was and is "not OK".

SRM-removal

SRM were and are still rendered for feed, as are (parts of) the fallen stock. SRM-removal is therefore regarded as "not OK".

BSE surveillance

• From 1990 to 1997 BSE surveillance remained insufficient, even if a TSE-surveillance program was introduced.

• In 1998, the surveillance system became able to detect BSE to the level set out in the OIE code as a result of the introduction of the NTSESP.

Conclusions

The European Food Safety Authority concludes:

1. In the case of Australia, an extremely or very unstable system was exposed to a very low or negligible challenge through the import of cattle. Under these conditions, it is highly unlikely that any internal challenge occurred. Given the negligible level of EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 6, 1-5 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of Australia.

http://www.efsa.eu.int

4 of 6

external challenge through MBM, it is highly unlikely that any internal challenge occurred.

2. The risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Australia, and were at least partly rendered for feed, due to imported cattle from BSE-risk countries has been very low to negligible throughout the considered period. Some imports of cattle in the early 80s from the UK and from the mid-80s onwards from USA, Canada and European countries increased the risk of BSE infectivity entering the feed chain. However, the probability that BSE contaminated material entered processing is seen as being very low.

3. The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is I, i.e., it is highly unlikely that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.

snip... see full text ;

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/6r.pdf

FOR IMPORTS OF LIVE CATTLE, MBM, GREAVES, ETC INTO AUSTRALIA PLEASE SEE ANNEX !

ANNEX

snip...

2. EXTERNAL CHALLENGES

2.1 Import of cattle from BSE-Risk2 countries

An overview of the data on live cattle imports is presented in table 1 and is based on data as provided in the country dossier (CD) and corresponding data on relevant exports as available from BSE risk countries that exported to Australia. Only data from risk periods are indicated, i.e. those periods when exports from a BSE risk country already represented an external challenge, according to the SSC opinion on the GBR (SSC July 2000 and updated January 2002).

• According to the CD, the import of live cattle has been prohibited from the UK and Ireland since 1988 and from all other countries other than New Zealand, New Caledonia, Canada and the USA since 1991. However, consignments of 42

1 For the purpose of the GBR assessment the abbreviation “MBM” refers to rendering products, in particular the commodities Meat and Bone Meal as such; Meat Meal; Bone Meal; and Greaves. With regard to imports it refers to the customs code 230110 “flours, meals and pellets, made from meat or offal, not fit for human consumption; greaves”.

2 BSE-Risk countries are all countries already assessed as GBR III or IV or with at least one confirmed domestic BSE case. Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 6, 1-18 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of Australia

- 3 -

buffalo and 24 buffalo from Denmark were recorded in Australia’s import statistics for 1995 and 1996, respectively. The Australian authorities stated that the animals imported in 1995 originated in Italy and that the animals imported in 1996 originated in Bulgaria. Imports from New Caledonia were suspended in 1995.

• The CD states that 204 live cattle were imported for breeding purposes from the UK between 1980 and 1988. According to EUROSTAT, however, 194 cattle were imported during the same period.

• A detailed risk assessment was carried out by the Australian authorities on the cattle that were imported from the United Kingdom. Sixty-two of the imported animals were dairy cattle and nine were dual-purpose animals. Details were provided in the CD in relation to the fate of the imported animals. According to the Australian authorities, 127 of these died and were not rendered. Seven animals remain alive. The remaining seventy animals were slaughtered and presumably entered the food and feed chains.

• In addition to cattle imported from the UK, Australia also imported cattle from other BSE risk countries. According to the CD, Australia imported cattle from Canada (31), Denmark (128), France (185), Ireland (1), Japan (24), and the USA (675). Most of these imports occurred between 1988 and 2003.

• The Eurostat figures are reasonably consistent with those of the CD for Denmark, France and Ireland. However, they indicate that cattle were also imported from Austria (33), Cyprus (1), Germany (86), Hungary (35), Netherlands (124) and Switzerland (9) between 1986 and 2002.

• A detailed risk assessment was carried out by Australian authorities on the imports from European countries other than the UK. This assessment indicates lower numbers of imports from European countries than indicated in the Eurostat data, which are currently being cross-checked by the Australian authorities.

• Information from the Austrian authorities indicated that the export of 33 cattle to Australia from Austria did not, in fact, occur; the country of destination was wrongly coded as AU (Australia) rather than UA (Ukraine), the actual destination of the cattle.

• According to the CD, imports from the Netherlands and Hungary did not occur. However, evidence could not be provided.

• The official USA export figures indicate that a total of 1,441 cattle were exported to Australia from the USA during the period 1993 and 2001. However, information subsequently provided by the only pre-USA export quarantine station that was approved during the time period in question indicated that only 493 cattle were exported to the Australia from the USA during that period. According to the Australian authorities, 190 of the animals imported into Australia between 1996 and 2003 were still alive in early 2004. A further 11 of these animals had died but did not enter the rendering system.

• Official export data were not available for Canada. According to the Australian authorities, 16 of the 21 animals imported from Canada between 1996 and 2003 were still alive in early 2004.

• Official export data were not available for Japan. According to the Australian authorities, 22 of the 24 animals imported from Japan in 1988 were still alive in early 2001 and placed in lifetime quarantine and 2 died on farm and did not enter the rendering system.

snip...

2.2 Import of MBM or MBM-containing feedstuffs from BSE-Risk countries

An overview of the data on MBM imports is presented in table 2 and is based on data provided in the country dossier (CD) and corresponding data on relevant exports as available from BSE risk countries that exported to Australia. Only data from risk periods are indicated, i.e. those periods when exports from a BSE risk country already represented an external challenge, according to the SSC opinion on the GBR (SSC, July 2000 and updated January 2002).

• According to the CD, Australia has imported no MBM from any BSE risk country between 1980 to 2001, as the import of MBM from all countries except New Zealand has been prohibited since 1966. The official import records show that 18 tons of MBM material was imported into Australia from the UK in 1988 and 3 tons in 1994 under the customs code 230110. An investigation by the Australian authorities showed that these imports were fishmeal and packaged dog food. The official import records also show that 7 tons of MBM material was imported into Australia from the USA in 1999 and 9 tons in 2001 under the customs code 230110. An investigation by the Australian authorities showed that the figure for 1999 referred to dried bio-flavour and that the figure for 2001 referred to prepared and packaged dog food for market testing.

• According to Eurostat and other data, Australia has imported no MBM from the UK but has imported 1,824 tons of similar material from other BSE risk countries in Europe. Of these, 43 tons were imported from Denmark in 1996 and 1997, 1,615 tons were imported from France between 1983 and 1985, 22 tons were imported from Germany in 2002, 143 tons were imported from Ireland in 1994 and 1 ton was imported from Italy in 1995.

• The official export figures from the USA showed that 857 tons of MBM was exported to Australia between 1996 and 2001. The official export figures from Canada showed that 163 tons of MBM was exported to Australia in 1998.

• According to the CD, the imports of MBM from Denmark did not take place; however, conclusive evidence was not provided.

• The Australian authorities indicated that coding errors were the most likely reason for these discrepancies. This conclusion was supported by information received from the countries of origin. Such coding errors could include misrepresenting Austria (AUT) as Australia (AUS) or misrepresenting fishmeal and pet food flavourings as meat and bone meal. They pointed out that custom code 230110 may also have been mistakenly used instead of custom code 230910; the latter refers to “dog/cat food put up for retail sale”. Another possibility is that the consignments were refused entry into Australia and were therefore diverted to other markets.

snip...

2.3 Overall assessment of the external challenge

The level of the external challenge that has to be met by the BSE/cattle system is estimated according to the guidance given by the SSC in its final opinion on the GBR of July 2000 (as updated in January 2002).

Live cattle imports:

In total, the country imported over the period 1980 to 2003, 1,248 live cattle from BSE-risk countries, of which 204 came from the UK according to the CD or 2,238 live cattle from BSE-risk countries, of which 194 came from the UK according to other sources. The numbers shown in table 1 are the raw import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted imports for the assessment of the external challenge. Broken down to 5-years periods the resulting external challenge is as given in table 3. This assessment takes into account the different aspects discussed above that allow us to assume that certain imported cattle did not enter the domestic BSE/cattle system, i.e. were not rendered into feed. Following a review of the Australian data, it was decided to exclude all animals imported from the UK that were born before June 1976 or were still alive. Imported animals that died on farm were also excluded on the basis of an assurance from the Australian authorities that these animals were placed in lifetime quarantine and, consequently, did not enter the feed chain. A trace back by the Australian authorities showed that some of the animals that were imported from the UK were over 10 years of age at the time of slaughter or death. The Australians considered that the likelihood of these animals contaminating the feed chain with the BSE agent was very low. However, such animals were not excluded from the current assessment because of the fact that many BSE cases have been confirmed in animals over ten years of age in Europe. The Australian risk analysis also took into account the history of the UK farm of origin. Animals from herds of origin in which no cases of BSE were recorded were considered to present no risk. For many of the animals from farms in the UK that did subsequently disclose cases of BSE, the Australian authorities considered that the risk was low because there was a long interval between the data of birth of the imported animals and the date of birth of the cases in the herds of origin. However, such animals were not excluded from the current risk assessment, as per the general procedure of this process, because of the possibility of unreported cases in the herds of origin and the fact that the imported animals could have been the only animals infected with the BSE agent in the herd of origin.

The level of the external challenge as a result of animals imported to Australia from the USA was changed from 1,441 to 493 on the basis of data received from the pre- US export quarantine station. In addition, animals that were still alive or that had been slaughtered but not rendered were removed from the external challenge. Sixteen of the twenty-one animals imported from Canada in 1996 to 2001 were excluded from the external challenge on the basis of information received from the Australian authorities that they were still alive in early 2004. Likewise, the animals imported from Austria in 2001 were excluded from the external challenge on the basis of the explanation from the Austrian authorities that these animals were, in fact, exported to the Ukraine rather than Australia.

snip...

MBM imports:

In total the country imported, over the period 1980-2003, 37 tons under the import code 230110 from BSE-risk countries, of which 21 tons came from the UK according to the CD. Other sources, such as EUROSTAT, indicate that the total import of MBM was 2,844 tons none of which came from the UK. The numbers shown in table 2 are the raw import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted imports for the assessment of the external challenge. Broken down to 5-year periods the resulting external challenge is as given in table 3. This assessment takes into account the different aspects discussed above that allow us to assume that certain imported MBM did not enter the domestic BSE/cattle system or did not represent an external challenge for other reasons. Following a review of the Australian data, the 22 tons said to have been exported from Germany in 2002 was excluded from the external challenge because the export of processed animal proteins was prohibited from European Union countries from 2001 unless a letter agreement was signed by both countries and the Australians claim (letter dated 21 April 2004) that this was not the case. The 21 tons said to have been exported from the UK in 1988 and 1994 were excluded from the external challenge on the basis of evidence from the Australian authorities that these consignments consisted of fishmeal or dog food. The 143 tons said to have been exported from Ireland in 1994 were excluded from the external challenge on the basis of an assurance from the Irish Chief Veterinary Officer that there was no trade of MBM between Ireland and Australia during the relevant period. All of the imports from Canada, France and the USA were also excluded on the basis of similar assurances from the Chief Veterinary Officer from those countries.

snip...please see full text ;

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/37rax1.pdf

AUSTRALIA

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Proof Committee Hansard

SENATE RURAL AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRANSPORT REFERENCES COMMITTEE Reference: Import restrictions on beef

FRIDAY, 5 FEBRUARY 2010 CANBERRA CONDITIONS OF DISTRIBUTION

This is an uncorrected proof of evidence taken before the committee. It is made available under the condition that it is recognised as such. BY AUTHORITY OF THE SENATE [PROOF COPY] TO EXPEDITE DELIVERY, THIS TRANSCRIPT HAS NOT BEEN SUBEDITED

SNIP...

Friday, 5 February 2010 Senate RRA&T 1

RURAL AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRANSPORT

Committee met at 9.01 am

CHAIR (Senator Nash)—I declare open this public hearing of the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee. The committee is hearing evidence on the committee’s inquiry into the impact and consequences of the government’s decision to relax import restrictions on beef. Before the committee starts taking evidence I remind all witnesses that, in giving evidence to the committee, they are protected by parliamentary privilege. It is unlawful for anyone to threaten or disadvantage a witness on account of evidence given to a committee and such action may be treated by the Senate as a contempt. It is also a contempt to give false or misleading evidence to a committee. The committee prefers all evidence to be given in public but, under the Senate’s resolutions, witnesses have the right to request to be heard in private session. It is important that witnesses give the committee notice if they intend to ask to give evidence in camera. If a witness objects to answering a question, the witness should state the ground upon which the objection is taken and the committee will determine whether it will insist on an answer, having regard to the ground which is claimed. If the committee determines to insist on an answer, a witness may request that the answer be given in camera. Such a request may, of course, also been made at any other time. On behalf of the committee, I thank all those who have made submissions and sent representatives here today for their cooperation in this inquiry.

RRA&T 2 Senate Friday, 5 February 2010

RURAL AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRANSPORT

[9.03 am]

BELLINGER, Mr Brad, Chairman, Australian Beef Association

CARTER, Mr John Edward, Director, Australian Beef Association

CHAIR—Welcome. Would you like to make an opening statement?

Mr Bellinger—Thank you. The ABA stands by its submission, which we made on 14 December last year, that the decision made by the government to allow the importation of beef from BSE affected countries is politically based, not science based. During this hearing we will bring forward compelling new evidence to back up this statement. When I returned to my property after the December hearing I received a note from an American citizen. I will read a small excerpt from the mail he sent me in order to reinforce the dangers of allowing the importation of beef from BSE affected countries. I have done a number of press releases on this topic, and this fellow has obviously picked my details up from the internet. His name is Terry Singeltary and he is from Bacliff, Texas. He states, and rightfully so:

You should be worried. Please let me explain. I’ve kept up with the mad cow saga for 12 years today, on December 14th 1997, some four months post voluntary and partial mad cow feed ban in the USA, I lost my mother to the Heinemann variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). I know this is just another phenotype of the infamous sporadic CJDs. Here in the USA, when USA sheep scrapie was transmitted to USA bovine, the agent was not UK BSE—it was a different strain. So why then would human TSE from USA cattle look like UK CJD from UK BSE? It would not. So this accentuates that the science is inconclusive still on this devastating disease. He goes on to state:

The OIE— the International Organisation of Epizootics, the arm of the WTO— is a failed global agent that in my opinion is bought off via bogus regulations for global trade and industry reps. I have done this all these years for nothing but the truth. I am a consumer, I eat meat, but I do not have to sit idly by and see the ignorance and greed of it all while countless numbers of humans and animals are being exposed to the TSE agents. All the USA is interested in is trade, nothing else matters.

Even Dr Stanley Prusiner, who incidentally won the Nobel Health Prize in 1997 for his work on the prion—he invented the word ‘prion’, or it came from him—states:

The BSC policy was set up for one purpose only, trade—the illegal trading of all strains of TSE globally throughout North America, which is home to CBSC, IBSC and HBSC, many scrapie strains and two strains of CJD to date. (please note typo error, those should have read cBSE, lBSE, and hBSE...tss)

I would also like, while I have the opportunity, to explain the beef-off-the-shelves myth. At the first Senate hearing on 14 December, it was explained that the reason why they allowed BSC beef into Australia was the beef-off-the-shelves policy, whereby if we found a case of BSC in Australia they would have to recall all—

Friday, 5 February 2010 Senate RRA&T 3

RURAL AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRANSPORT

Senator HEFFERNAN—Which of course is total BS.

Mr Bellinger—Correct. This is written in the FSANZ document—Food Standards Australia New Zealand. Why isn’t this same policy in New Zealand? It is not—it is only in Australia. We are the only country in the world to have this idiotic policy. So we again call for the tabling of the WTO obligations paperwork. We do not believe that exists.

Mr Carter—We have an additional concern about human health. We are not scientists, but on 18 December, four days after the last hearing here, the BBC reported a new wave of deaths due to variant CJD linked to eating BSE infected beef could be underway. This is based on the work of Professor John Collinge of the National Prion Clinic, who reported that a 2009 death in Scotland was from a different genetic pool to that of the 166 deaths already reported in the UK. Those are all thought to share one gene, but Professor Collinge and his colleagues estimate that up to 350 people in this new group, represented by the person who died in Scotland, could get CJD. He thinks that CJD has moved into a new phase, and the incubation period is a long one. We tender the Australian Red Cross donor policy sheet, which bears out what Senator Back brought up last time, questioning the Chief Medical Officer, and we say that blood from people who were in the UK between 1980 and 1996 is not acceptable. That is the current ruling. We believe this now should be extended to anyone who has visited the UK, and this new evidence should ensure that Australia revisits the science of CJD.

CHAIR—Thank you, Mr Carter. Before we kick off, can I just remind colleagues that we are short of time today, so I ask that we do not traverse ground the we have previously covered and make sure that we stick to new information that is required. Mr Bellinger, when you started you referred to your view that this decision to allow the importation was politically based. I know you are going to go into this in the course of the next 20 minutes or so, but could you just give us a quick outline of what your definition of politically based is and why you think the decision was politically based?

Mr Bellinger—On the lowering of BSE standards: if you go back to 2006, for example, there were five categories for describing countries that had BSE and Australia was in the category for BSE free. Suddenly, by the time the United States got their third instance of BSE, through the influence of Robert Zoellick—who was the trade minister that signed the BSE corresponding side letter in 2004 and was George Bush’s appointment to the WTO—they suddenly changed the five categories to three categories and, instead of being BSE free, Australia became BSE negligible risk. At the time I put out a press release alerting the media to the dangers of this happening, and we are coming to the stage here when suddenly our government is saying, ‘Now let’s allow the importation of beef from BSE affected countries.’ I believe that the WTO has been influenced by large multinational meat processors and retailers to change and allow the trading of BSE beef throughout the world.

CHAIR—Thanks, Mr Bellinger.

Mr Carter—Of course, the side letter that Minister Vaile signed was at the request of Mr Zoellick, who is now in the position that Mr Bellinger has explained.

Senator HEFFERNAN—I just want to put the committee on notice that, if we do not get through what we have got to get through today, I suggest we have another hearing, because this

RRA&T 4 Senate Friday, 5 February 2010

RURAL AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRANSPORT

is the greatest ambush of Australia’s farmers of all time by a government. The evidence given at the last meeting was deadset lies. The proposition that this whole change of government policy was led by the industry is a deadset lie. While Simon Crean might want to change his mind because of the WTO and his lack of knowledge, the Australian beef industry, as you know, is under great challenge, not only from the currency but also from the undermining of our markets. This is a disgrace.

SNIP...PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT ;

*************

Tuesday, March 16, 2010

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Hansard Import restrictions on beef FRIDAY, 5 FEBRUARY 2010 AUSTRALIA

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Proof Committee Hansard

snip...see full text 110 pages ;

http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S12742.pdf

for those interested, please see much more here ;

http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2010/03/commonwealth-of-australia-hansard.html

The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.

http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf

USA MAD COW FEED AND SRM IN COMMERCE UPDATE

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/04/update-on-feed-enforcement-activities.html

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/

To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/

Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009

snip...

I ask Professor Kong ;

Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment

''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''

Professor Kong reply ;

.....snip

''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete.

Thanks for your interest.''

Best regards,

Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA

END...TSS

I look forward to further transmission studies, and a true ENHANCED BSE/atypical BSE surveillance program put forth testing all cattle for human and animal consumption for 5 years. a surveillance program that uses the most sensitive TSE testing, and has the personnel that knows how to use them, and can be trusted. I look forward to a stringent mad cow feed ban being put forth, and then strictly enforced. we need a forced, not voluntary feed ban, an enhanced feed ban at that, especially excluding blood. we need some sort of animal traceability. no more excuses about privacy. if somebody is putting out a product that is killing folks and or has the potential to kill you, then everybody needs to know who they are, and where that product came from. same with hospitals, i think medical incidents in all states should be recorded, and made public, when it comes to something like a potential accidental transmission exposure event. so if someone is out there looking at a place to go have surgery done, if you have several hospitals having these type 'accidental exposure events', than you can go some place else. it only makes sense. somewhere along the road, the consumer lost control, and just had to take whatever they were given, and then charged these astronomical prices. some where along the line the consumer just lost interest, especially on a long incubating disease such as mad cow disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy. like i said before, there is much more to the mad cow story than bovines and eating a hamburger, we must start focusing on all TSE in all species. ...TSS

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html

Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Atypical BSE in Cattle

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/03/atypical-bse-in-cattle-position-post.html

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

Imported cow aged over 30 months not tested for BSE imported from the Czech Republic (UK)

2009-10-29T09:30:00.000-07:00

Imported cow aged over 30 months not tested for BSE Thursday 29 October 2009

The Agency has been notified that a cow aged over 30 months and imported from the Czech Republic has not been tested for BSE.

The cow was slaughtered on 1 October at Alec Jarrett Ltd’s abattoir in Oldland Common, Bristol, aged one day short of 33 months.

The cow was born in the Czech Republic and was imported earlier this year. BSE testing is mandatory for cattle born there if slaughtered for human consumption at over 30 months of age.

On 8 October, Alec Jarrett Ltd realised there had been an error and acted quickly, preventing the carcass leaving the premises and recalling all associated material that had left the premises. All the recalled product and material still on site has since been disposed of under official supervision.

None of the affected product has reached the UK food supply. A small amount of product has been exported to France and the authorities there have been informed. Background to BSE testingCattle aged over 48 months must be BSE tested before entering the food supply if born in one of the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.

Cattle aged over 30 months and born in any other country, including the Czech Republic, are only allowed to enter the food supply if they have first tested negative for BSE. If there is no BSE test, all parts of the carcass must be condemned.

http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2009/oct/cowover30

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, Czech Republic

Impact Worksheet, June 14, 2001

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/taf/iw_2001_files/foreign/bse_cz0601.htm

EU-25 Sanitary/Phytosanitary/Food Safety EU Mid-Year 2005 BSE update 2005

http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200509/146130887.pdf

SEE BSE GBR

http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out243_en.pdf

Archive Number 20021006.5480 Published Date 06-OCT-2002 Subject PRO/AH> BSE, fourth case - Czech Republic: suspected

http://www.promedmail.org/pls/otn/f?p=2400:1202:393649::NO::F2400_P1202_CHECK_DISPLAY,F2400_P1202_PUB_MAIL_ID:X,19481

2009

P.9.5

Monitoring of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the Russian Federation using a kit TeSeE (Bio-Rad) and immunohistochemical method

Sergey Rybakov, Aleksander Yegorov, Andrey Pavlov, Asya Alyokhina, Anton Zhirkov FGI “Federal Centre for Animal Health”, Russian Federation

Background: A problem of prevention of bovine spongiform encephalopathy and other prion diseases of farm and wild animals is of current interest for the Russian Federation (RF). Since 2005 the Ministry of Agriculture of Russia put into practice the programs aimed at the increase of high-productive bovine animal population on the basis of an increase of a portion of pedigree cattle up to 13%. A rapid increase of pedigree cattle population can be achieved owing to the import of high-productive cattle breeds from other countries. Unfortunately, the Russian cattle-breeding enterprises are compelled to import animals from countries with indigenous BSE. For example, the import of pedigree cattle in 2007 has made 76385 animals; from them 95 % are imported from the counties of BSE controlled risk, mainly Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria, and 5% from a country of BSE negligible risk – Australia.

Objectives: From 2005 the main surveillance object is the cattle from risk groups (non-ambulatory, emergently slaughtered or dead cattle), imported from countries of BSE controlled risk.

Methods: Diagnostic investigations are conducted predominantly by ELISA using kits TeSeE (Bio-Rad). For the purpose of verification, fragments of brainstem of some samples are additionally tested following formalin fixation by an immunohistochemical method using polyclonal antibodies to synthetic peptides-fragments of bovine prion protein.

Results: The number of monitoring investigations among cattle of risk groups increased in 2006-2008; 634 samples were tested in 2006, 1187 samples – in 2007 and 3081 samples – in 2008. Previously, polyclonal antibodies to peptides-fragments of bovine prion protein from regions PrP(106-126), (108-126), (111-126) and PrP(206-230), (216-230), (214-233) have been received and tested with positive results. At present antigenic and immunogenic properties of peptide PrP(154-169) and constructs on its basis are studied.

http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf

Saturday, April 25, 2009 Prague BSE Confirmed in a Cow in the Region of Liberec in the Czech Republic Voluntary - Public Clearance Office: Office of Scientific and Technical Affairs (OSTA) Date: 4/6/2009 GAIN Report Number: EZ9003

Czech Republic Post:

http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009_04_01_archive.html

Mad cow disease could hit Russia, experts warn Thu, 2002-06-20 21:00 — admin Issue Number: 166 Author: By MARCIA VINHA / The Russia Journal Published: 2002-06-21 Source: The Russia Journal

The arrival of mad cow disease in Poland has led to warnings from Russian producers that shoddy controls at customs and in local meat production are putting Russian livestock at risk as well.

The Russian Agriculture Ministry banned bone-in meat and livestock imports from Poland in early May. While the ministry suggested checking Polish veterinary controls on meat producers, it was not a condition for continuing trade, said Aleksander Milota, consul for commercial issues at the Polish Embassy.

Russia's restrictions on Polish meat are less harsh than those used recently on American poultry, when Russian veterinarians spent a month checking American factories for additives and salmonella. Even so, Milota believes Russian authorities overreacted in responding to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Poland: "All our cattle are tested before being exported," he said. "There is a psychological factor, which is the fear of the disease, that makes the government make unnecessary decisions such as banning cattle imports." Russia used to import 8,000 tons of Polish beef per year.

Poland, expecting to become a EU member in 2004, follows European safety requirements, which demand parental records for all animals to allow genealogical tracing. Cows 30 months old must undergo veterinary testing for BSE, and feeding meat and bone meal to cattle, a practice believed to spread the disease, is also forbidden.

The Polish BSE case has not affected meat prices in Russia, according to the Institute for Studies of the Agrarian Market (IKAR). IKAR analyst Larisa Torogova said she believes that neither meat dealers nor consumers have become concerned about mad cow disease, since Russia has several supplying countries for the 2 million tons of red meat imported each year.

Torogova said Germany and Ukraine are the largest beef exporters to Russia. No mad cow disease has yet been detected in Ukraine, and Germany's controls are now stricter than those in the rest of Europe after struggling with 125 cases of BSE in 2001. Its last BSE case was detected in May, though it has had no reports of the human variant of the disease, Creutzfeld-Jacob, one form of which is believed transmitted by eating contaminated beef.

A State Customs Committee document shows imports of boneless beef are allowed from Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Finland, France, the Czech Republic and Japan, as well as Poland. Beef from England, Greece, Portugal, Switzerland and South Korea is entirely prohibited.

Yury Kostenko, chief of the microbiology department at the V.M. Gorbatov Meat Research Institute of All Russia, said those restrictions are enough to decrease contamination risks. "Few remember it, but Russia was the first European country to ban British beef and cow imports in 1986," he said.

But official barriers aren't effective in practice, according to some meat-business insiders. Alexander Spiridonov, president of the St. Petersburg-based Northwestern Association of Meat Producers, accused the government of favoring a small protectorate of meat importers that, with the unofficial support of the customs and clearance control inspectors, could bring meat infected with mad cow or other diseases to Russia.

Spiridonov said previous agreements or bribes to veterinary inspectors allow goods to move freely across borders. And customs and clearance doesn't have the resources to test the safety of imported meat.

"The strict European control on meat production, which is in accordance with Russian veterinary requirements, should be enough to avoid another veterinary inspection at the ports. At the end, officials don't check the cargo," he said, adding that trade barriers against mad cow disease are a government attempt to soften relations with local farmers, many of whom are close to bankruptcy.

The association believes the licensing and import process, among other activities associated with veterinary controls, is unconstitutional and is organizing a lobby of parliament for change. It says a formal charge against the veterinary department of the Agriculture Ministry through the Antimonopoly Ministry and the General Procurator of Russia for their conduct is also on the way, though the Agriculture Ministry couldn't be reached for comment.

Private meat companies have also created a fund to assist farmers facing difficulties trying to supplying local demand.

Russia has not had any reported cases of BSE. But cattle producers complain there aren't enough veterinary inspections of their operations. And some say they doubt the enforcement of legislation regulating the use of animal and bone meal in feed. Its use in cattle feed has been prohibited in Russia since 1996 and even longer in Europe. But there is little to no supervision by veterinary inspectors, who are supposed to check feeding procedures and reasons for animals' deaths.

Meat and bone meal is still used for poultry and hogs, which are not believed to carry BSE.

That there is only one laboratory to analyze Russia's 27 million cows adds to suspicions of internal safety controls. That laboratory, the Russian Research Institute for the Protection of Animals, has tested the meat of 1,200 animals since its beginning in 1999, 15 years after the disease was first diagnosed in England. The laboratory, in the city of Vladimir, is supported by Moscow meat-processing factories interested in checking the quality of their raw product. But the lab doesn't have equipment to test live cows or track the disease's path of infection.

"We took cows from the majority of the regions in the country, and not a single case was discovered," said Alexander Yegorov, deputy chief of the Department of Rare Diseases. He said those tests should be sufficient to show that Russian livestock are free of BSE. But the analysis, at $20 per test, is not affordable for many farmers and so has a limited reach.

"It is impossible to exclude this possibility [of BSE] because it might have reached our territory from cows and meat and bone meal exported to Russia," he said.

The EU, which monitors the potential spread of the disease, warned in 2000 that Poland was likely to have a BSE case. The Brussels-based Press Service of the European Commission has reported that scientists are now evaluating countries' risks of exposure to BSE.

They said definitive conclusions about Russia have not yet been reached, but "certainly the risk of spreading [the disease to Russia] is not excluded."

http://www.russiajournal.com/node/6321

SEE BSE POLAND ;

http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200509/146130887.pdf

Docket APHIS-2007-0033 Docket Title Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2007-0033-0001 Document Title Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List Public Submission APHIS-2007-0033-0002.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singeltary comment

http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=090000648027c28d&disposition=attachment&contentType=xml

TSS

EFSA opinion on the BSE related public health risks of certain animal proteins in animal feed

2007-11-15T18:52:00.000-08:00

EFSA opinion on the BSE related public health risks of certain animal proteins in animal feed15/11/2007

It is widely accepted that BSE[1] was most likely spread in cattle because they were given feed that contained BSE-contaminated animal proteins. With limited exceptions, the practice of feeding animal protein to cattle or any other farmed livestock used for food has been banned since 2001 [2]. At the request of the European Parliament, EFSA has issued an opinion on the BSE related public health risks of certain animal proteins in animal feed, which will help inform any future consideration of amendments to the existing feed ban. EFSA’s BIOHAZ[3] Panel’s opinion particularly addressed feed containing pig protein being fed to poultry and feed containing poultry protein being fed to pigs. The concern relates to the risk of transmission of the BSE agent through animal feed and hence the risk of causing BSE related exposure in humans. The Panel has concluded, with certain qualifications, that the risks to public health would be negligible: up to now, BSE has not been identified in pigs or poultry under natural conditions, therefore the risk of transmitting BSE to pigs through feeding poultry processed proteins and vice-versa is considered negligible. Hence the Panel conclusion in relation to public health.Certain important qualifications are attached to this opinion. The Panel’s conclusions take into account the decline in the BSE epidemic and the current control measures in place. The Panel stressed that their opinion only remains valid in the context of the continued effective implementation of the other current BSE control measures. Whilst BSE has so far not been found to occur under natural conditions in either pigs or poultry, if a TSE were ever found to occur naturally there would be a need to reassess the risk. It is also noted that it is not yet possible, with the currently approved method, to distinguish the species origin of proteins in a feed product. The Panel also considered a further request from the Parliament on the public health risks in relation to introducing possible tolerance levels for small quantities of any animal protein in animal feed. The Panel concluded that it is not currently possible to define the parameters that would enable risk managers to establish such tolerance levels, due to the lack of internationally agreed scientific methodology. The Panel also noted that introducing any tolerance level would lead to an increase in the risk of transmission of BSE compared to the current EU situation. Given that it is not currently possible to quantify amounts of animal proteins in feed, it is not possible to determine whether the amounts would be above or below what may be considered as the tolerance level. The Panel recommended further studies on detection limits and techniques to quantify animal proteins in feed. Under the current protective measures, if a tolerance level for animal protein in feed was to be introduced, the risk of transmitting BSE to cattle or other ruminants cannot be excluded. The few infected animals that could arise would probably not be able to maintain the presence of BSE in the cattle population but would increase the potential risk of human exposure to BSE. However, the risk of transmitting BSE to non-ruminants, if a tolerance level was to be introduced, is lower than to ruminants, as long as intra-species recycling is avoided and so in this scenario the Panel concluded that any increase in the exposure risk of BSE for humans would be negligible.

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[1] Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), which affects cattle, is the most well known Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE). TSE’s are a family of transmissible progressive diseases that mainly affect the central nervous system. Other examples of TSEs include Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in humans and scrapie in sheep[2] Regulation EC No 999/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council lays down rules for the prevention., control and eradication of certain TSEs[3] EFSA’s Scientific Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ)

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1178659674461.htm

EFSA holds discussions with the US FDA, 12 November in Parma12/11/2007

On 12 November, EFSA and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) met in Parma in order to reinforce information exchange on scientific work of mutual interest.

This follows up the agreement signed on 2 July between EFSA and the FDA to facilitate scientific co-operation in the area of food safety risk assessment. At the meeting EFSA and the FDA will exchange information and discuss a number of current topics including animal cloning, food additives and nanoscience. EFSA is looking to develop similar working arrangements with other authorities world wide in coming years

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1178659213795.htm

(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriatedeclarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries.The OIE is notresponsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based oninaccurate information orchanges in epidemiological status or other significant events that were notpromptlyreported to then Central Bureau............

http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf

USA MAD COW PROTEIN IN COMMERCE 2007 October 2007 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSEPosted by flounder on Friday October 5, 2007 at 10:02 am MDT October 3, 2007

October 2007 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE

To help prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalophathy (BSE) through feed in the United States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) implemented a final rule that prohibits the use of most mammalian protein in feeds for ruminant animals. This rule, Title 21 Part 589.2000 of the Code of Federal Regulations, here called the Ruminant Feed Ban, became effective on August 4, 1997.

The following is an update on FDA enforcement activities regarding the ruminant feed ban. FDA's Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) has assembled data from the inspections that have been conducted AND whose final inspection report has been recorded in the FDA's inspection database as of September 29, 2007. As of September 29, 2007, FDA had received over 57,000 inspection reports. The majority of these inspections (around 69%) were conducted by State feed safety officials, with the remainder conducted by FDA officials.

Inspections conducted by FDA or State investigators are classified to reflect the compliance status at the time of the inspection based upon the objectionable conditions documented. These inspection conclusions are reported as Official Action Indicated (OAI), Voluntary Action Indicated (VAI), or No Action Indicated (NAI).

An OAI inspection classification occurs when significant objectionable conditions or practices were found and regulatory sanctions are warranted in order to address the establishment's lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI inspection classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspections classified with OAI violations will be promptly re-inspected following the regulatory sanctions to determine whether adequate corrective actions have been implemented.

A VAI inspection classification occurs when objectionable conditions or practices were found that do not meet the threshold of regulatory significance, but do warrant advisory actions to inform the establishment of findings that should be voluntarily corrected. Inspections classified with VAI violations are more technical violations of the Ruminant Feed Ban. These include provisions such as minor recordkeeping lapses and conditions involving non-ruminant feeds.

An NAI inspection classification occurs when no objectionable conditions or practices were found during the inspection or the significance of the documented objectionable conditions found does not justify further actions. The results to date are reported here both by “segment of industry” and “in total”. NOTE – A single firm can operate as more than one firm type. As a result, the categories of the different industry segments are not mutually exclusive.

RENDERERS

These firms are the first to handle and process (i.e., render) animal proteins and to send these processed materials to feed mills and/or protein blenders for use as a feed ingredient.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 266

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 155 (58% of those active firms inspected)

Of the 155 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI

6 firms (3.9%) were classified as VAI

LICENSED FEED MILLS

FDA licenses these feed mills to produce medicated feed products. The license is required to manufacture and distribute feed using certain potent drug products, usually those requiring some pre-slaughter withdrawal time. This licensing has nothing to do with handling prohibited materials under the feed ban regulation. A medicated feed license from FDA is not required to handle materials prohibited under the Ruminant Feed Ban.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 1,071

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 466 (44% of those active firms inspected)

Of the 466 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI

8 firms (1.7%) were classified as VAI

FEED MILLS NOT LICENSED BY FDA

These feed mills are not licensed by the FDA to produce medicated feeds.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 5,163

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 2,481 (48% of those active firms inspected)

Of the 2481 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI

46 firms (1.9%) were classified as VAI

PROTEIN BLENDERS

These firms blend rendered animal protein for the purpose of producing quality feed ingredients that will be used by feed mills.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 392

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 191 (49% of those active firms inspected)

Of the 191 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firm (0%) was classified as OAI

5 firms (2.6%) were classified as VAI

RENDERERS, FEED MILLS, AND PROTEIN BLENDERS MANUFACTURING WITH PROHIBITED MATERIAL

This category includes only those firms that actually use prohibited material to manufacture, process, or blend animal feed or feed ingredients.

Total number of active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 6,577

Number of active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders processing with prohibited materials – 493 (7.5%)

Of the 493 active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders processing with prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI

24 firms (4.9%) were classified as VAI

OTHER FIRMS INSPECTED

Examples of such firms include ruminant feeders, on-farm mixers, pet food manufacturers, animal feed salvagers, distributors, retailers, and animal feed transporters.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 18,358

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 5,911 (32% of those active firms inspected)

Of the 5911 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI

177 firms (3.0%) were classified as VAI

TOTAL FIRMS

Note that a single firm can be reported under more than one firm category; therefore, the summation of the individual OAI/VAI firm categories will be more than the actual total number of OAI/VAI firms, as presented below.

Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 20,807

Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 6,602 (32% of those active firms inspected)

Of the 6602 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:

0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI

190 firms (2.9%) were classified as VAI

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Issued by: FDA, Center for Veterinary Medicine, Communications Staff, HFV-12 7519 Standish Place, Rockville, MD 20855 Telephone: (240) 276-9300 FAX: (240) 276-9115 Internet Web Site: http://www.fda.gov/cvm

http://www.fda.gov/cvm/BSE1007.htm

What Do We Feed to Food-Production Animals? A Review of Animal Feed Ingredients and Their Potential Impacts on Human Health

Amy R. Sapkota,1,2 Lisa Y. Lefferts,1,3 Shawn McKenzie,1 and Polly Walker1 1Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland, USA; 2Maryland Institute for Applied Environmental Health, College of Health and Human Performance, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, USA; 3Lisa Y. Lefferts Consulting, Nellysford, Virginia, USA

snip...

Table 1. Animal feed ingredients that are legally used in U.S. animal feeds

Animal

Rendered animal protein from Meat meal, meat meal tankage, meat and bone meal, poultry meal, animal the slaughter of food by-product meal, dried animal blood, blood meal, feather meal, egg-shell production animals and other meal, hydrolyzed whole poultry, hydrolyzed hair, bone marrow, and animal animals digest from dead, dying, diseased, or disabled animals including deer and elk Animal waste Dried ruminant waste, dried swine waste, dried poultry litter, and undried processed animal waste products

snip...

Sapkota et al. 668 VOLUME 115 NUMBER 5 May 2007 • Environmental Health Perspectives

http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=1867957&blobtype=pdf

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II ___________________________________ PRODUCT Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling’s 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007 CODE Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007. Firm initiated recall is ongoing. REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI

___________________________________ PRODUCT Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot-Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI – 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J – PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A-BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007 CODE The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified. RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html

USA MAD COW PROTEIN IN COMMERCE 2006

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL,TN, AND WVDate: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST

PRODUCTa) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.CODENoneRECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERDonaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephoneon June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall iscomplete.REASONDairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant basedprotein.VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE477.72 tonsDISTRIBUTIONAL______________________________PRODUCTa) Dairy feed, custom, Recall # V-134-6;b) Custom Dairy Feed with Monensin, Recall # V-135-6.CODENone. Bulk productRECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERRecalling Firm: Burkmann Feed, Greeneville, TN, by Telephone beginning onJune 28, 2006.Manufacturer: H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL. Firm initiatedrecall is complete.REASONPossible contamination of dairy feeds with ruminant derived meat and bonemeal.VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE1,484 tonsDISTRIBUTIONTN and WV

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY, LA,MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONSDate: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II______________________________PRODUCTBulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-115-6CODENoneRECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERHiseville Feed & Seed Co., Hiseville, KY, by telephone and letter on orabout July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.REASONCustom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may containruminant derived meat and bone meal.VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCEApproximately 2,223 tonsDISTRIBUTIONKY

______________________________PRODUCTBulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-116-6CODENoneRECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERRips Farm Center, Tollesboro, KY, by telephone and letter on July 14, 2006.FDA initiated recall is ongoing.REASONCustom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may containruminant derived meat and bone meal.VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE1,220 tonsDISTRIBUTIONKY

______________________________PRODUCTBulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-117-6CODENoneRECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERKentwood Co-op, Kentwood, LA, by telephone on June 27, 2006. FDA initiatedrecall is completed.REASONPossible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredientsthat are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bonemeal.VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE40 tonsDISTRIBUTIONLA and MS

______________________________PRODUCTBulk Dairy Feed, Recall V-118-6CODENoneRECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERCal Maine Foods, Inc., Edwards, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. FDAinitiated recall is complete.REASONPossible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredientsthat are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bonemeal.VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE7,150 tonsDISTRIBUTIONMS

______________________________PRODUCTBulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-119-6CODENoneRECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERWalthall County Co-op, Tylertown, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. Firminitiated recall is complete.REASONPossible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat andbone meal.VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE87 tonsDISTRIBUTIONMS

______________________________PRODUCTBulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6CODENoneRECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERWare Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firminitiated recall is complete.REASONPossible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat andbone meal.VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE350 tonsDISTRIBUTIONAL and MS

______________________________PRODUCTa) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet,50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet,50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower,50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMDMedicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags,Recall # V-125-6;f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags,Recall # V-126-6;g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher,50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6CODEAll products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERRecalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visiton June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006.Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiatedrecall is ongoing.REASONPoultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant basedprotein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE7,541-50 lb bagsDISTRIBUTIONAL, GA, MS, and TN

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006

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http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL MI MAMMALIAN PROTEIN VOLUME OF PRODUCT INCOMMERCE 27,694,240 lbsDate: August 6, 2006 at 6:14 pm PSTPRODUCTBulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall # V-113-6CODEAll dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H. J.Baker recalled feed products.RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERVita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006. Firminitiated recall is complete.REASONThe feed was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminatedwith mammalian protein.VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE27,694,240 lbsDISTRIBUTIONMI

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PSTPRODUCTa) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated,net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated,Recall # V-103-6;e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend,Recall # V-104-6;f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted,Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020,Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, CompleteFeed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated,Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs,Recall # V-107-6;i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for LayingChickens, Recall # 108-6;j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED,net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs,Recall # V-111-6;m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs,Recall # V-112-6CODEProduct manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERAlabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email andvisit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.REASONAnimal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant basedprotein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE125 tonsDISTRIBUTIONAL and FL

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

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http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL KY VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ?????Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PSTPRODUCTBulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6CODENoneRECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERBurkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm initiatedrecall is ongoing.REASONCustom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may containruminant derived meat and bone meal.VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE?????tss

DISTRIBUTION

ND OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

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http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html

CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARDTSSMAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDESun Jul 16, 2006 09:2271.248.128.67

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II______________________________PRODUCTa) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals,Recall # V-079-6;b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg),Recall # V-080-6;c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMALFEED, Recall # V-081-6;d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6CODEa) Bulkb) Nonec) Bulkd) BulkRECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERH. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 andby press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.REASONPossible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bonemeal.VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE10,878.06 tonsDISTRIBUTIONNationwide

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

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http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html

Subject: MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTER ISSUED MAY 17, 2006Date: June 27, 2006 at 7:42 am PSTPublic Health ServiceFood and Drug Administration

New Orleans District297 Plus Park Blvd.Nashville, TN 37217

Telephone: 615-781-5380Fax: 615-781-5391

May 17, 2006

WARNING LETTER NO. 2006-NOL-06

FEDERAL EXPRESSOVERNIGHT DELIVERY

Mr. William Shirley, Jr., OwnerLouisiana.DBA Riegel By-Products2621 State StreetDallas, Texas 75204

Dear Mr. Shirley:

On February 12, 17, 21, and 22, 2006, a U.S. Food & Drug Administration(FDA) investigator inspected your rendering plant, located at 509 FortsonStreet, Shreveport, Louisiana. The inspection revealed significantdeviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of FederalRegulations, Part 589.2000 [21 CFR 589.2000], Animal Proteins Prohibited inRuminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment andamplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed tofollow the requirements of this regulation; products being manufactured anddistributed by your facility are misbranded within the meaning of Section403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act(the Act).

Our investigation found you failed to provide measures, including sufficientwritten procedures, to prevent commingling or cross-contamination and tomaintain sufficient written procedures [21 CFR 589.2000(e)] because:

You failed to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to preventcarryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein orfeeds which may be used for ruminants. For example, your facility uses thesame equipment to process mammalian and poultry tissues. However, you useonly hot water to clean the cookers between processing tissues from eachspecies. You do not clean the auger, hammer mill, grinder, and spouts afterprocessing mammalian tissues.

You failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-outprocedures or other means to prevent carryover of protein derived frommammalian tissues into feeds which may be used for ruminants.

As a result . the poultry meal you manufacture may contain protein derivedfrom mammalian tissues prohibited in ruminant feed. Pursuant to 21 CFR589.2000(e)(1)(i), any products containing or may contain protein derivedfrom mammalian tissues must be labeled, "Do not feed to cattle or otherruminants." Since you failed to label a product which may contain proteinderived from mammalian tissues with the required cautionary statement. thepoultry meal is misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of theAct.

This letter is not intended as an all-inclusive list of violations at yourfacility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, youare responsible for ensuring your overall operation and the products youmanufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should takeprompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a systemwhereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct theseviolations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/orinjunction, without further notice.

You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of receivingthis letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your firminto compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation ofeach step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. Ifcorrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state thereason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will becompleted. Include copies of any available documentation demonstratingcorrections have been made.

Your reply should be directed to Mark W. Rivero, Compliance Officer, U.S.Food and Drug Administration, 2424 Edenborn Avenue, Suite 410, Metairie,Louisiana 70001. If you have questions regarding any issue in this letter,please contact Mr. Rivero at (504) 219-8818, extension 103.

Sincerely,

/S

Carol S. SanchezActing District DirectorNew Orleans District

http://www.fda.gov/foi/warning_letters/g5883d.htm

Subject: USDA FSIS SRM TSE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT UPDATEDate: February 17, 2007 at 7:03 pm PST Greetings,

I thought I might update you on the USDA FSIS QUARTERLY REPORTS ON THE TOPIC OF SRMs and MAD COW DISEASE I.E. BSE/BASE ETC.

REMEMBER WHAT OLD RON SAID;

Johanns stressed that the testing program is not a food safety program but rather a way to assess the prevalence of BSE. The key to protecting food safety is removing the specified risk materials (SRM)—cattle parts such as the brain and spinal cord, which are likely to carry the BSE agent if an animal is infected, he said. Removal of SRM from carcasses of cattle older than 30 months has been required since early 2004. ...

http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/other/bse/news/jul2006bse.html

SINCE THE LAST TIME I REPORTED :

Subject: USDA FSIS QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT (BSE) July 1, 2005 through September 30, 2005 Date: March 20, 2006 at 12:58 pm PST

YOU can see that report at the bottom of this update.

UPDATEs AS FOLLOWS ;

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT July 1, 2006 through September 30, 2006

snip...

Table 5. Administrative Actions: Large HACCP Plants (7/01/06 to 9/30/06)

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Large HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS 00086K M DODGE CITY, KS

On 6/15/06, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

snip...

EXCEL CORP 00086R M FORT MORGAN, CO

On 8/11/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8. On 12/22/04, plant appealed the withholding action. Appeal was denied on 1/25/05.

snip...

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 09268 M PASCO, WA X X On 7/28/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245D M EMPORIA, KS X X On 12/23/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245L M LEXINGTON, NE X X On 3/10/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

snip...

Table 6. Administrative Actions: Small HACCP Plants (7/01/06 to 9/30/06)

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

SSOP HACCP SPS INH INT Other LOI LOW

BOOKER PACKING COMPANY 07162 M BOOKER, TX 6/2/06 6/5/06 X X 9/19/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

SSOP HACCP SPS INH INT Other LOI LOW

GULF PACKING COMPANY 00696 M00696 P SAN BENITO, TX 2/25/06 2/26/06 X X 8/31/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

HI COUNTRY BEEF JERKY 01248 M01248 P LINCOLN, MT 3/24/06 4/14/06 X X X X 8/31/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

NORTHERN PACKING COMPANY INC. 00571 M BRIAR HILL, NY 12/9/05 12/23/05 X X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

WEST MISSOURI BEEF 05821 M ROCKVILLE, MO 3/2/06 3/16/06 4/13/06 4/17/06 X X X 8/15/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

GIBSON PACKING COMPANY 05843 M05843 P SEYMOUR, MO 9/21/06 X X X X Plant failed to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli). The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

SSOP HACCP SPS INH INT Other LOI LOW

HORMANN MEAT COMPANY 05544 M05544 P FAIR GROVE, MO 6/15/06 6/22/06 X X X 9/26/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

ROCK CREEK SLAUGHTER CO. 09150 M09150 P LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, GA 3/16/06 4/14/06 6/30/06 7/5/06 X X X X 8/11/06 On 3/16/06, an enforcement action concerning failure to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E.coli) was issued. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, INC. 31647 M31647 P LEWISTON, UT 7/25/05 7/29/05 X X 7/25/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q4_FY2006.pdf

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT April 1, 2006 through June 30, 2006

Table 5. Administrative Actions: Large HACCP Plants (4/01/06 to 6/30/06)

CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS 00086K M DODGE CITY, KS X X On 6/15/06, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

snip...

EXCEL CORP 00086R M FORT MORGAN, CO 2/22/05 X X On 8/11/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8. On

12/22/04, plant appealed the withholding action. Appeal was denied on 1/25/05.

snip...

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC 00245L M LEXINGTON, NE X X On 3/10/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

snip...

SSOP HACCP SPS INH INT Other LOI LOW

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 09268 M PASCO, WA X X On 7/28/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245D M EMPORIA, KS X X On 12/23/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

snip...

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

BOOKER PACKING COMPANY 07162 M BOOKER, TX 4/13/06 4/19/06 X X Plant failed to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli).

6/2/06 6/5/06 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

GULF PACKING COMPANY 00696 M00696 P SAN BENITO, TX 2/25/06 2/26/06 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

???

3/24/06 4/14/06

X X X

The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

NORTHERN PACKING COMPANY INC. 00571 M BRIAR HILL, NY 12/9/05 12/23/05 X X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

WEST MISSOURI BEEF 05821 M ROCKVILLE, MO 3/2/06 3/16/06 4/13/06 4/17/06 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

C & C MEAT SALES, INC., 18494 M18494 P, DURHAM, NC ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL.

snip...

FRESH FARMS BEEF 18579 M RUTLAND, VT 12/16/05 12/28/05 X X X 4/13/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

FRONTIER FOODS & COLD STORAGE, INC 20741 M20741 P EL PASO, TX 5/31/06 X X On 6/8/06, DM closed case by firm’s requested voluntary withdrawal. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

HORMANN MEAT COMPANY 05544 M05544 P FAIR GROVE, MO 6/15/06 6/22/06 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

RANDALL MEAT COMPANY 10669 M HOT SPRINGS, AR 7/1/05 7/28/05 10/12/05 10/24/05 X X X 5/19/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

ROCK CREEK SLAUGHTER CO. 09150 M09150 P LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, GA 3/16/06 4/14/06 6/30/06 X X X X On 3/16/06, an enforcement action concerning failure to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E.coli) was issued. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

SAVORY CONNECTION, INC., 31764 M31764 P, SELINGSGROVE, PA. ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL.

snip...

STEAK MASTER, 21159 M21159 P, ELWOOD, NE. ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL.

snip...

THE MEAT SHOP 31561 M BENSON, VT 8/18/05 9/6/05 9/9/05 X X X X X 4/4/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, INC. 31647 M31647 P LEWISTON, UT 7/25/05 7/29/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

WALNUT VALLEY PACKING L.L.C. 32007 M32007 P EL DORADO, KS 12/15/05 12/30/05 X X X 5/4/06 The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q3_FY2006.pdf

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT January 1, 2006 through March 31, 2006

Table 5. Administrative Actions: Large HACCP Plants (1/01/06 to 3/31/06)

CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS 00086K M DODGE CITY, KS X X 3/13/06 On 10/11/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

snip...

EXCEL CORP. 00086R M FORT MORGAN, CO 8/11/04 2/22/05 X X On 8/11/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

On 12/22/04, plant appealed the withholding action. Appeal was denied on 1/25/05.

snip...

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245L M 3/12/04 3/18/04 X

LEXINGTON, NE

X X On 3/10/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

snip...

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 09268 M PASCO, WA X X On 7/28/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245D M EMPORIA, KS X X On 12/23/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

snip...

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

GULF PACKING COMPANY, 00696 M00696 P, SAN BENITO, TX, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

snip...

HI COUNTRY BEEF JERKY, 01248 M01248 P, LINCOLN, MT, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

snip...

HITCHIN POST STEAK COMPANY, 20773 M20773 P, KANSAS CITY, KS, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

snip...

NORTHERN PACKING COMPANY INC. 00571 M BRIAR HILL, NY 12/9/05 12/23/05 X X X X The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

ROCK CREEK SLAUGHTER CO., 09150 M09150 P, FAIRBURY, NE, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

snip...

WEST MISSOURI BEEF 05821 M ROCKVILLE, MO 3/2/06 3/16/06 X X X The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

Table 7. Administrative Actions: Very Small HACCP Plants (1/01/06 to 3/31/06)

A.J. CEKAK'S MEAT MARKET 21562 M ORD. NE, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

snip...

ALTA VISTA LOCKER 31931 M ALTA VISTA, KS, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

snip...

C&C MEAT SALES, INC. 18494 M18494 P UPPER MARLBORO, MD 2/27/06 3/16/06 X X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

FRESH FARMS BEEF 18579 M RUTLAND, VT 12/16/05 12/28/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

H AND P MEATS 21352 M SOUTH PITTSBURG, TN 7/28/05 8/8/05 8/17/05 8/19/05 X X 3/6/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

PARADISE LOCKER MEATS 31865 M31865 P TRIMBLE, MO 9/21/05 10/7/05 X X 1/13/06 The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

PARAGON SPRAY DRYING, L.L.C. 31762 M31762 P WAUKON, IA 9/6/05 9/12/05 X X X 2/9/06 The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

RANDALL MEAT COMPANY 10669 M HOT SPRINGS, AR 7/1/05 7/28/05 10/12/05 10/24/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

SAVORY CONNECTION, INC. 31764 M31764 P SELINGSGROVE, PA 3/14/06 3/31/06 X X X The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

STEAK MASTER, 21159 M21159 P, ELWOOD, NW, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

snip...

TEARS MARKET, 04535 M04535 P, PENN YAN, NY, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

snip...

THE MEAT SHOP, 31561 M BENSON, VT, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

snip...

THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, INC. 31647 M31647 P, LEWISTON, UT, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

snip...

TOOELE VALLEY MEATS 20594 M20594 P, GRANTSVILLE, UT, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL

snip...

WALNUT VALLEY PACKING L.L.C. 32007 M32007 P EL DORADO, KS 12/15/05 12/30/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

WILLIAM. G. MEST PACKING CO. 04431 M STRYKERSVILLE, NY 2/2/06 2/23/06 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. On 3/21/06, NOIE was modified and

reissued. On 6/29/06, NOIE was

rescinded.

YODER BROTHERS MEAT PROCESSING 17301 M PARIS, TN 10/3/05 10/12/05 X X 2/23/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

snip...

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q1_FY2006.pdf

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT October 1, 2005 through December 31, 2005

SRM REMOVAL USA

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICEQUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT October 1, 2005 through December 31, 2005

snip....

CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS 00086K M DODGE CITY, KS X X On 10/11/05, awithholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery Systemproduct was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

EXCEL CORP 00086R M FORT MORGAN, CO 2/22/05 X X On 8/11/04, a withholdingaction concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was takenin accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8. On 12/22/04, plant appealed thewithholding action. Appeal was denied on 1/25/05.

00245L M LEXINGTON, NE 3/12/04 3/18/04 X 5/4/05 X X On 3/10/05, awithholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery Systemproduct was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

9/16/05 9/29/05 X X TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 09268 M PASCO, WA X X On 7/28/04,a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery Systemproduct was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. X X 00245D M EMPORIA, KS On 12/23/04, a withholdingaction concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was takenin accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.

DESERET MEAT 04852 M SPANISH FORK, UT 7/20/05 8/1/05 X X 12/29/05 Theenforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment tocomply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

NORTHERN PACKING COMPANY INC. 00571 M BRIAR HILL, NY 12/9/05 12/23/05 X X XX The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishmentto comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

A.J. CEKAK'S MEAT MARKET 9/1/05 9/20/05 X X X On 9/1/05, an enforcementaction21562 Mconcerning failure to meet regulatory ORD, NE requirements for Escherichiacoli Biotype 1 (E. coli) was taken. The enforcement action included, as abasis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirementsconcerning specified risk material.

ALTA VISTA LOCKER10/5/05 10/26/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a 31931 M basis,failure of the establishment toALTA VISTA, KS comply with Agencyrequirementsconcerning specified risk material.

BROWN'S PROCESSING 13100 M13100 P ELSBERRY, MO 8/8/05 8/16/05 X X X 11/16/05The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment tocomply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

CHAMPLAIN BEEF INC 2/28/05 3/4/05 3/8/05 X X X08547 MWHITEHALL, NY10/17/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of theestablishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified riskmaterial.

FIVE STAR PACK INC. 9/1/05 9/9/05 X X 12/29/05 On 9/1/05, an enforcementaction08725 M08725 Pconcerning failure to meet regulatory GOLDEN CITY, MO requirements forEscherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli) was taken. The enforcement actionincluded, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agencyrequirements concerning specified risk material. FRESH FARMS BEEF 12/16/0512/28/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a 18579 M basis, failureof the establishment toRUTLAND, VT comply with Agency requirementsconcerning specified risk material.

GOETZ AND SONS WESTERN 11/15/05 11/23/05 12/1/05 X XMEATS INC06245 M06245 PEVERETT, WA12/17/05 12/28/05 X X X On 12/17/05, firm violated a regulatory controlaction by selling U.S.D.A retained product.

H AND P MEATS 21352 M SOUTH PITTSBURG, TN 7/28/05 8/8/05 8/17/05 8/19/05 X XThe enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment tocomply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

HOPKINS PACKING COMPANY 11069 M BLACKFOOT, ID 7/28/05 8/1/05 X X Theenforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment tocomply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

NORTHWEST PREMIUM MEATS LLC 11032 M11032 P NAMPA, ID 7/26/05 7/29/05 X X11/15/05 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of theestablishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified riskmaterial.

PARADISE LOCKER MEATS 31865 M31865 P TRIMBLE, MO 9/21/05 10/7/05 X X Theenforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment tocomply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. PARAGONSPRAY DRYING, LLC 31762 M31762 P WAUKON, IA 9/6/05 9/12/05 X X X Theenforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment tocomply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

RANDALL MEAT COMPANY 10669 M HOT SPRINGS, AR 7/1/05 7/28/05 10/12/0510/24/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of theestablishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified riskmaterial.

S & S MEAT COMPANY 01046 M01046 P KANSAS CITY, MO 8/4/05 8/19/05 X X11/16/05 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of theestablishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified riskmaterial.

STEAK MASTER 21159 M21159 P ELWOOD, NE 11/4/05 11/17/05 X X X Theenforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment tocomply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

THE MEAT SHOP 31561 M BENSON, VT 8/18/05 9/6/05 9/9/05 X X X X X Theenforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment tocomply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, INC 31647 M31647 P LEWISTON, UT 7/27/05 7/29/05 X XThe enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment tocomply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

TOOELE VALLEY MEATS 20594 M20594 P GRANTSVILLE, UT 7/25/05 8/1/05 X X Theenforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment tocomply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

WALNUT VALLEY PACKING LLC 32007 M32007 P EL DORADO, KS 12/15/05 12/30/05 X XX The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishmentto comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

YODER BROTHERS MEAT PROCESSING 17301 M PARIS, TN 10/3/05 10/12/05 X X Theenforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment tocomply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.

full text 54 pages ;

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q1_FY2006.pdf

Subject: USDA FSIS QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT (BSE) July 1, 2005 through September 30, 2005 Date: March 20, 2006 at 12:58 pm PST

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT July 1, 2005 through September 30, 2005

snip...

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

snip...

DESERET MEAT 04852 M SPANISH FORK, UT 07/27/05 08/01/05 X X On 7/27/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.

snip...

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

snip...

MONTEBELLO MEAT PROCESSING, INC 19075 M19075 P MANATI, PR 08/01/05 08/18/05 X X X 09/26/05 On 8/1/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

snip...

Table 7. Administrative Actions: Very Small HACCP Plants (7/01/05 to 9/30/05)

snip...

A.J. CEKAK'S MEAT MARKET 09/01/05 09/20/05 On 9/1/05, an enforcement action

21562 M

concerning failure to meet regulatory ORD, NE requirements for Escherichia coli X X X Biotype 1 (E. coli) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy/Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

snip...

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

snip...

BROWN'S PROCESSING 13100 M13100 P ELSBERRY, MO 08/08/05 08/16/05 X X X On 8/8/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

snip...

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

snip...

FIVE STAR PACK INC. 08725 M08725 P GOLDEN CITY, MO 09/01/05 09/09/05 X X On 9/1/05, an enforcement action concerning failure to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy/Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

snip...

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

snip...

H AND P MEATS 21352 M SOUTH PITTSBURG, TN 07/28/05 08/08/05 08/17/05 08/19/05 X X On 8/17/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.

snip...

HOPKINS PACKING COMPANY 11069 M BLACKFOOT, ID 07/28/05 08/01/05 X X On 7/28/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.

snip...

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

snip...

NORTHWEST PREMIUM MEATS LLC 11032 M11032 P NAMPA, ID 07/26/05 07/29/05 X X On 7/26/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.

snip...

PARADISE LOCKER MEATS 31865 M31865 P TRIMBLE, MO 09/21/05 X X On 9/21/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

PARAGON SPRAY DRYING, LLC 31792 M31792 P WAUKON, IA 09/06/05 09/12/05 X X X On 9/6/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

snip...

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

snip...

RANDALL MEAT COMPANY 10669 M HOT SPRINGS, AR 07/01/05 07/28/05 X X X On 7/1/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

snip...

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

snip...

08/04/05

08/19/05

On 8/4/05,

an enforcement action 01046 M01046 P concerning Bovine SpongiformKANSAS CITY, MO X X Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]

snip...

THE MEAT SHOP 08/18/05 09/06/05

09/09/05

On 9/6/05, a suspension action 31561 M concerning Bovine SpongiformBENSON, VT Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3. XX X X X

THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, 07/27/05 07/29/05

On 7/27/05, a suspension action INC concerning Bovine Spongiform31647 M31647 P Encephalopathy and Specified Risk X X

LEWISTON, UT Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.

TOOELE VALLEY MEATS 07/25/05 08/01/05

On 7/25/05, a suspension action 20594 M20594 Pconcerning Bovine Spongiform

GRANTSVILLE, UT X X Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.

snip...

52 pages

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q4_FY2005.pdf

PREVIOUS

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q3_FY2005.pdf

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q2_FY2005.pdf

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q1_FY2005.pdf

IF i remember correctly, the infamous PURINA FEED MILL incident in Gonzales TEXAS, where at one feeding, those cows could not have consumed more than......or no more than 5.5 grams...etc. so, how many feedings does a feeder and or dairy calf have in there lifespan ? wouldn't you multiply that by those figures by that ??? be a lot of potential mad cow protein IN COMMERCE, and still is in 2006......tss FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2001/NEW00752.html

http://www.fda.gov/ora/about/enf_story/archive/2001/ch5/default.htm

1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8

Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.

Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.

PMID: 6997404 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6997404&dopt=Abstract

look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;

Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates

Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.

snip...

BSE bovine brain inoculum

100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg

Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)

Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)

RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)

PrPres biochemical detection

The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was

inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of

bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.

Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula

Published online January 27, 2005

http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa

It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf

6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley’s answer (that it would take less than say 100

grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight; particularly if one

considers that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses his surprise that it

could take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the oral route within the

same species. This information did not become available until the "attack rate"

experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a titration experiment

designed to ascertain the infective dose. A range of dosages was used to ensure

that the actual result was within both a lower and an upper limit within the study

and the designing scientists would not have expected all the dose levels to trigger

infection. The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that time

ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the designing

scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all the

dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s147f.pdf

2) Infectious dose:

To cattle: 1 gram of infected brain material (by oral ingestion)

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/bio/bseesbe.shtml

Subject: Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route Date: September 29, 2007 at 12:50 pm PST

P04.27

Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route

Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany

Background:

In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.

Aims:

The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.

Methods:

Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).

Results:

In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.

Conclusions:

Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian v CJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.

The work referenced was performed in partial fulfilment of the study “BSE in primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).

http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf

THE FDA MAD COW FEED BAN I.E. RUMINANT TO RUMINANT AUGUST 4, 1997 PARTIAL, AND VOLUNTARY AT THAT, WAS NOTHING MORE THAN INK ON PAPER. ...tss

Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION]

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt

Docket Management Docket: 02N-0273 - Substances Prohibited From Use in

Animal Food or Feed; Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed

Comment Number: EC -10

Accepted - Volume 2

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be07.html

PART 2

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be09.html

PDF]Freas, William TSS SUBMISSION

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat -

Page 1. J Freas, William From: Sent: To: Subject: Terry S. Singeltary

Sr. [flounder@wt.net] Monday, January 08,200l 3:03 PM freas ...

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/slides/3681s2_09.pdf

Asante/Collinge et al, that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine

genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable

from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest _sporadic_ CJD;

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm

Docket Management Docket: 96N-0417 - Current Good Manufacturing Practicein Manufacturing, Packing, or Holding Dietary Ingredients aComment Number: EC -2Accepted - Volume 7

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Mar03/031403/96N-0417-EC-2.htm

[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified RiskMaterials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition ofNon-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle

9/13/2005

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf

[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of BovineSpongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf

Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMALIMPORTS FROM CANADA

https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed

Subject: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No.05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSIONDate: August 24, 2005 at 2:47 pm PSTAugust 24, 2005

Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1]RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION

Greetings APHIS ET AL,

My name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

I would kindly like to comment on [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 ;

snip...

THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances withhuman and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in differentspecies to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE incattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with differentstrains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typicalscrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to havepassed to sheep. all of which have beenrendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, afrightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with humanlife around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from theUSA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, withpotential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot beundone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily andextensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97.I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue tobelieve in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only thisone strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, willonly lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from allstrains of TSE, and possibly manymore needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sourcesvia many studies with primates and rodents and other species.

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, butthe USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than adrum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100%sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animalconsumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK didwith there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, allthe while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing morethan a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE andGW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure. ...

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.P.O. Box 42Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

Comment SubmittedComment Receipt

Thank you. Your comment on Document ID: APHIS-2006-0041-0001 has beensent. Comment Tracking Number: APHIS-2006-0041-DRAFT-0028

Attachments: C:\My Music\My Documents\APHIS-2006-0041_January 28.doc

If you wish to retain a copy of the receipt, use the following link toprint a copy for your files. Print

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main

THE only difference between the UK poisoning the globe, and the USA, it isnow legal with GWs and OIEs BSE MRR policy ;

IT's O.K. to poison 3rd world countries ;

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1994/05/20002001.pdf

On 20 February 1990, Dr Pickles wrote to Ms Verity(APS/CMO). Dr Picklesí minute included the following: 1. Mr Meldrum is arguing that MAFF have already taken all thenecessary and responsible steps to warn importing countries of the BSE dangers in UK meat and bone meal. Yet the action takenso far overseas suggest the message has not got through, or where it has this has been late. The first nationthat woke up to the danger did so a year after our own feed ban. It seems even now several EC countries neither ban ourimports or the general feeding of ruminant protein. It also seems the OIE and CVO have yet to inform the rest of the world. 2. I do not see how this can be claimed to be responsibleí. Wedo not need an expert group of the Scientific Veterinary Committee to tell us British meat and bone meal is unsafe forruminants. I fail to understand why this cannot be tackled from the British end which seems to be the only sure way of doingit, preferably by banning exports. As CMO says in his letter of 3 January surely it is short sighted for us to riskbeing seen in future as having been responsible for the introduction of BSE to the food chain in other countries.íí[79]

http://www.bse.org.uk/dfa/dfa25.htm

http://www.mad-cow.org/00/jul00_dont_eat_sheep.html#hhh

Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease inthe United States

http://cjdusa.blogspot.com/

i am reminded of a few things deep throat (high ranking official at usda)told me years ago;

==========================================

The most frightening thing I have read all day is thereport of Gambetti's finding of a new strain ofsporadic cjd in young people.........Dear God,

https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7842737484277562285&postID=5759550357128128100

BSE BASE MAD COW TESTING TEXAS, USA, AND CANADA, A REVIEW OF SORTS

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/

MADCOW USDA the untold story

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/

MADCOW USDA the untold story continued

https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6472149427883113751&postID=4829467681293855400

USA NOR-98 SCRAPIE UPDATE AUGUST 31, 2007 RISES TO 5 DOCUMENTED CASES

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/

Government Accountability Project

https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=3995372399492420922&postID=295754279213239559

Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy TME

http://transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.blogspot.com/

TME hyper/drowsy, INTER-SPECIES TRANSMISSION CWD and strainproperties

https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=37955408&postID=116577315153980667

USA NVCJD BLOOD RECALLS ONLY ;

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=CJD+BLOOD+RECALLS+TSS&btnG=Search

vCJD case study highlights blood transfusion risk

http://vcjdblood.blogspot.com/

CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE MAD COW BASE, CWD, SCRAPIE UPDATE OCT 2007

http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/

TSEAC MEETINGS

http://tseac.blogspot.com/

MRSA

http://staphmrsa.blogspot.com/

ABSTRACTS SPORADIC CJD AND H BASE MAD COW ALABAMA AND TEXAS SEPTEMBER 2007

Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2007 21:31:55 -0500

I suggest that you all read the data out about h-BASE and sporadic CJD, GSS,blood, and some of the other abstracts from the PRION2007. ...

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0709&L=sanet-mg&T=0&F=&S=&P=19744

*** PLEASE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THIS !!! THE PRICE OFPOKER INDEED GOES UP. ...TSS

USA BASE CASE, (ATYPICAL BSE), AND OR TSE (whatever they are calling ittoday), please note that both the ALABAMA COW, AND THE TEXAS COW, both were''H-TYPE'', personal communication Detwiler et al Wednesday, August 22, 200711:52 PM. ...TSS

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0708&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=19779

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."Subject: CWD UPDATE 88 AUGUST 31, 2007

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0709&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=450

PLEASE NOTE IN USA CJD UPDATE AS AT JUNE 2007, please note steady increasein ''TYPE UNKNOWN''. ...TSS

1 Acquired in the United Kingdom; 2 Acquired in Saudi Arabia; 3 Includes 17inconclusive and 9 pending (1 from 2006, 8from 2007); 4 Includes 17 non-vCJD type unknown (2 from 1996, 2 from 1997, 1from 2001, 1 from 2003, 4 from 2004, 3from 2005, 4 from 2006) and 36 type pending (2 from 2005, 8 from 2006,

*** 26 from 2007)

http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf

Terry S. Singeltary SR.

P.O. Box 42

Bacliff, Texas USA 77518