Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of Australia Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083
Adopted: 1 July 2004
Summary (0.1 Mb)
Report (0.2 Mb)
Annex (0.3 Mb)
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Australia, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Australia. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Australia as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
In the case of Australia, an extremely or very unstable system was exposed to a very low or negligible challenge through the import of cattle. Under these conditions, it is highly unlikely that any internal challenge occurred. Given the negligible level of external challenge through meat and bone meal (MBM), it is highly unlikely that any internal challenge occurred.
The risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Australia and were, at least partly, rendered for feed, due to imported cattle from BSE-risk countries has been very low to negligible throughout the considered period. Some imports of cattle in the early 80s from the UK and from the mid-80s onwards from USA, Canada and European countries increased the risk of BSE infectivity entering the feed chain. However, the probability that BSE contaminated material entered processing is seen as being very low.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR Australia level is I, i.e., it is highly unlikely that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the possibility of cross-contamination exists and there are no serious changes in rendering, the system will continue to be very unstable. Thus, the possibility of cattle being (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent will remain at a low level.
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of AUSTRALIA.
Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083 Adopted July 2004
EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 6, 1-5 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of Australia.
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Australia was exposed to a very low external challenge for the period 1980-1985, a negligible external challenge for the period 1986-1995, a very low external challenge for period 1996-2000, and a negligible external challenge for the period 2001-2003.
For the overall assessment of the stability, the impact of the three main stability factors, (i.e. feeding, rendering and SRM-removal) and of the additional stability factor surveillance has to be estimated. Again, the guidance provided by the SSC in its opinion on the GBR of July 2000 (as updated in 2002) is applied. Taking the above-summarised discussion of the most relevant stability factors into account, it is concluded that the BSE/cattle system of the Australia was extremely unstable at least until 2001, and slightly improved since then, to very unstable.
Until October 1997, ruminant Meat and Bone Meal (ruminant-MBM) was legally fed to cattle. Feeding was therefore "not OK". In October 1997, a ruminant MBM-ban was introduced but feeding of non-ruminant mammalian MBM to cattle remained legal as well as feeding of ruminant-MBM to non-ruminant animals (farm animals and pets). This made control of the feed ban very difficult because analytical differentiation between ruminant and non-ruminant MBM is difficult if not impossible. The ban was further strengthened in 1999 and a comprehensive ban on the feeding of vertebrate MBM to ruminants was put in place in 2001. Given that procedures for auditing and enforcing the ban were also in place by that time, it is assumed that the stability of the system in relation to feeding has been “reasonably OK” since 2001, i.e., voluntary feeding is unlikely but cross contamination cannot be excluded.
The rendering industry is operating processes that are not tested with regard to their capacity to reduce BSE-infectivity. It is therefore concluded that rendering was and is "not OK".
SRM were and are still rendered for feed, as are (parts of) the fallen stock. SRM-removal is therefore regarded as "not OK".
• From 1990 to 1997 BSE surveillance remained insufficient, even if a TSE-surveillance program was introduced.
• In 1998, the surveillance system became able to detect BSE to the level set out in the OIE code as a result of the introduction of the NTSESP.
The European Food Safety Authority concludes:
1. In the case of Australia, an extremely or very unstable system was exposed to a very low or negligible challenge through the import of cattle. Under these conditions, it is highly unlikely that any internal challenge occurred. Given the negligible level of EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 6, 1-5 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of Australia.
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external challenge through MBM, it is highly unlikely that any internal challenge occurred.
2. The risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Australia, and were at least partly rendered for feed, due to imported cattle from BSE-risk countries has been very low to negligible throughout the considered period. Some imports of cattle in the early 80s from the UK and from the mid-80s onwards from USA, Canada and European countries increased the risk of BSE infectivity entering the feed chain. However, the probability that BSE contaminated material entered processing is seen as being very low.
3. The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is I, i.e., it is highly unlikely that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.
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FOR IMPORTS OF LIVE CATTLE, MBM, GREAVES, ETC INTO AUSTRALIA PLEASE SEE ANNEX !
2. EXTERNAL CHALLENGES
2.1 Import of cattle from BSE-Risk2 countries
An overview of the data on live cattle imports is presented in table 1 and is based on data as provided in the country dossier (CD) and corresponding data on relevant exports as available from BSE risk countries that exported to Australia. Only data from risk periods are indicated, i.e. those periods when exports from a BSE risk country already represented an external challenge, according to the SSC opinion on the GBR (SSC July 2000 and updated January 2002).
• According to the CD, the import of live cattle has been prohibited from the UK and Ireland since 1988 and from all other countries other than New Zealand, New Caledonia, Canada and the USA since 1991. However, consignments of 42
1 For the purpose of the GBR assessment the abbreviation “MBM” refers to rendering products, in particular the commodities Meat and Bone Meal as such; Meat Meal; Bone Meal; and Greaves. With regard to imports it refers to the customs code 230110 “flours, meals and pellets, made from meat or offal, not fit for human consumption; greaves”.
2 BSE-Risk countries are all countries already assessed as GBR III or IV or with at least one confirmed domestic BSE case. Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 6, 1-18 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of Australia
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buffalo and 24 buffalo from Denmark were recorded in Australia’s import statistics for 1995 and 1996, respectively. The Australian authorities stated that the animals imported in 1995 originated in Italy and that the animals imported in 1996 originated in Bulgaria. Imports from New Caledonia were suspended in 1995.
• The CD states that 204 live cattle were imported for breeding purposes from the UK between 1980 and 1988. According to EUROSTAT, however, 194 cattle were imported during the same period.
• A detailed risk assessment was carried out by the Australian authorities on the cattle that were imported from the United Kingdom. Sixty-two of the imported animals were dairy cattle and nine were dual-purpose animals. Details were provided in the CD in relation to the fate of the imported animals. According to the Australian authorities, 127 of these died and were not rendered. Seven animals remain alive. The remaining seventy animals were slaughtered and presumably entered the food and feed chains.
• In addition to cattle imported from the UK, Australia also imported cattle from other BSE risk countries. According to the CD, Australia imported cattle from Canada (31), Denmark (128), France (185), Ireland (1), Japan (24), and the USA (675). Most of these imports occurred between 1988 and 2003.
• The Eurostat figures are reasonably consistent with those of the CD for Denmark, France and Ireland. However, they indicate that cattle were also imported from Austria (33), Cyprus (1), Germany (86), Hungary (35), Netherlands (124) and Switzerland (9) between 1986 and 2002.
• A detailed risk assessment was carried out by Australian authorities on the imports from European countries other than the UK. This assessment indicates lower numbers of imports from European countries than indicated in the Eurostat data, which are currently being cross-checked by the Australian authorities.
• Information from the Austrian authorities indicated that the export of 33 cattle to Australia from Austria did not, in fact, occur; the country of destination was wrongly coded as AU (Australia) rather than UA (Ukraine), the actual destination of the cattle.
• According to the CD, imports from the Netherlands and Hungary did not occur. However, evidence could not be provided.
• The official USA export figures indicate that a total of 1,441 cattle were exported to Australia from the USA during the period 1993 and 2001. However, information subsequently provided by the only pre-USA export quarantine station that was approved during the time period in question indicated that only 493 cattle were exported to the Australia from the USA during that period. According to the Australian authorities, 190 of the animals imported into Australia between 1996 and 2003 were still alive in early 2004. A further 11 of these animals had died but did not enter the rendering system.
• Official export data were not available for Canada. According to the Australian authorities, 16 of the 21 animals imported from Canada between 1996 and 2003 were still alive in early 2004.
• Official export data were not available for Japan. According to the Australian authorities, 22 of the 24 animals imported from Japan in 1988 were still alive in early 2001 and placed in lifetime quarantine and 2 died on farm and did not enter the rendering system.
2.2 Import of MBM or MBM-containing feedstuffs from BSE-Risk countries
An overview of the data on MBM imports is presented in table 2 and is based on data provided in the country dossier (CD) and corresponding data on relevant exports as available from BSE risk countries that exported to Australia. Only data from risk periods are indicated, i.e. those periods when exports from a BSE risk country already represented an external challenge, according to the SSC opinion on the GBR (SSC, July 2000 and updated January 2002).
• According to the CD, Australia has imported no MBM from any BSE risk country between 1980 to 2001, as the import of MBM from all countries except New Zealand has been prohibited since 1966. The official import records show that 18 tons of MBM material was imported into Australia from the UK in 1988 and 3 tons in 1994 under the customs code 230110. An investigation by the Australian authorities showed that these imports were fishmeal and packaged dog food. The official import records also show that 7 tons of MBM material was imported into Australia from the USA in 1999 and 9 tons in 2001 under the customs code 230110. An investigation by the Australian authorities showed that the figure for 1999 referred to dried bio-flavour and that the figure for 2001 referred to prepared and packaged dog food for market testing.
• According to Eurostat and other data, Australia has imported no MBM from the UK but has imported 1,824 tons of similar material from other BSE risk countries in Europe. Of these, 43 tons were imported from Denmark in 1996 and 1997, 1,615 tons were imported from France between 1983 and 1985, 22 tons were imported from Germany in 2002, 143 tons were imported from Ireland in 1994 and 1 ton was imported from Italy in 1995.
• The official export figures from the USA showed that 857 tons of MBM was exported to Australia between 1996 and 2001. The official export figures from Canada showed that 163 tons of MBM was exported to Australia in 1998.
• According to the CD, the imports of MBM from Denmark did not take place; however, conclusive evidence was not provided.
• The Australian authorities indicated that coding errors were the most likely reason for these discrepancies. This conclusion was supported by information received from the countries of origin. Such coding errors could include misrepresenting Austria (AUT) as Australia (AUS) or misrepresenting fishmeal and pet food flavourings as meat and bone meal. They pointed out that custom code 230110 may also have been mistakenly used instead of custom code 230910; the latter refers to “dog/cat food put up for retail sale”. Another possibility is that the consignments were refused entry into Australia and were therefore diverted to other markets.
2.3 Overall assessment of the external challenge
The level of the external challenge that has to be met by the BSE/cattle system is estimated according to the guidance given by the SSC in its final opinion on the GBR of July 2000 (as updated in January 2002).
Live cattle imports:
In total, the country imported over the period 1980 to 2003, 1,248 live cattle from BSE-risk countries, of which 204 came from the UK according to the CD or 2,238 live cattle from BSE-risk countries, of which 194 came from the UK according to other sources. The numbers shown in table 1 are the raw import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted imports for the assessment of the external challenge. Broken down to 5-years periods the resulting external challenge is as given in table 3. This assessment takes into account the different aspects discussed above that allow us to assume that certain imported cattle did not enter the domestic BSE/cattle system, i.e. were not rendered into feed. Following a review of the Australian data, it was decided to exclude all animals imported from the UK that were born before June 1976 or were still alive. Imported animals that died on farm were also excluded on the basis of an assurance from the Australian authorities that these animals were placed in lifetime quarantine and, consequently, did not enter the feed chain. A trace back by the Australian authorities showed that some of the animals that were imported from the UK were over 10 years of age at the time of slaughter or death. The Australians considered that the likelihood of these animals contaminating the feed chain with the BSE agent was very low. However, such animals were not excluded from the current assessment because of the fact that many BSE cases have been confirmed in animals over ten years of age in Europe. The Australian risk analysis also took into account the history of the UK farm of origin. Animals from herds of origin in which no cases of BSE were recorded were considered to present no risk. For many of the animals from farms in the UK that did subsequently disclose cases of BSE, the Australian authorities considered that the risk was low because there was a long interval between the data of birth of the imported animals and the date of birth of the cases in the herds of origin. However, such animals were not excluded from the current risk assessment, as per the general procedure of this process, because of the possibility of unreported cases in the herds of origin and the fact that the imported animals could have been the only animals infected with the BSE agent in the herd of origin.
The level of the external challenge as a result of animals imported to Australia from the USA was changed from 1,441 to 493 on the basis of data received from the pre- US export quarantine station. In addition, animals that were still alive or that had been slaughtered but not rendered were removed from the external challenge. Sixteen of the twenty-one animals imported from Canada in 1996 to 2001 were excluded from the external challenge on the basis of information received from the Australian authorities that they were still alive in early 2004. Likewise, the animals imported from Austria in 2001 were excluded from the external challenge on the basis of the explanation from the Austrian authorities that these animals were, in fact, exported to the Ukraine rather than Australia.
In total the country imported, over the period 1980-2003, 37 tons under the import code 230110 from BSE-risk countries, of which 21 tons came from the UK according to the CD. Other sources, such as EUROSTAT, indicate that the total import of MBM was 2,844 tons none of which came from the UK. The numbers shown in table 2 are the raw import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted imports for the assessment of the external challenge. Broken down to 5-year periods the resulting external challenge is as given in table 3. This assessment takes into account the different aspects discussed above that allow us to assume that certain imported MBM did not enter the domestic BSE/cattle system or did not represent an external challenge for other reasons. Following a review of the Australian data, the 22 tons said to have been exported from Germany in 2002 was excluded from the external challenge because the export of processed animal proteins was prohibited from European Union countries from 2001 unless a letter agreement was signed by both countries and the Australians claim (letter dated 21 April 2004) that this was not the case. The 21 tons said to have been exported from the UK in 1988 and 1994 were excluded from the external challenge on the basis of evidence from the Australian authorities that these consignments consisted of fishmeal or dog food. The 143 tons said to have been exported from Ireland in 1994 were excluded from the external challenge on the basis of an assurance from the Irish Chief Veterinary Officer that there was no trade of MBM between Ireland and Australia during the relevant period. All of the imports from Canada, France and the USA were also excluded on the basis of similar assurances from the Chief Veterinary Officer from those countries.
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COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Proof Committee Hansard
SENATE RURAL AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRANSPORT REFERENCES COMMITTEE Reference: Import restrictions on beef
FRIDAY, 5 FEBRUARY 2010 CANBERRA CONDITIONS OF DISTRIBUTION
This is an uncorrected proof of evidence taken before the committee. It is made available under the condition that it is recognised as such. BY AUTHORITY OF THE SENATE [PROOF COPY] TO EXPEDITE DELIVERY, THIS TRANSCRIPT HAS NOT BEEN SUBEDITED
Friday, 5 February 2010 Senate RRA&T 1
RURAL AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRANSPORT
Committee met at 9.01 am
CHAIR (Senator Nash)—I declare open this public hearing of the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee. The committee is hearing evidence on the committee’s inquiry into the impact and consequences of the government’s decision to relax import restrictions on beef. Before the committee starts taking evidence I remind all witnesses that, in giving evidence to the committee, they are protected by parliamentary privilege. It is unlawful for anyone to threaten or disadvantage a witness on account of evidence given to a committee and such action may be treated by the Senate as a contempt. It is also a contempt to give false or misleading evidence to a committee. The committee prefers all evidence to be given in public but, under the Senate’s resolutions, witnesses have the right to request to be heard in private session. It is important that witnesses give the committee notice if they intend to ask to give evidence in camera. If a witness objects to answering a question, the witness should state the ground upon which the objection is taken and the committee will determine whether it will insist on an answer, having regard to the ground which is claimed. If the committee determines to insist on an answer, a witness may request that the answer be given in camera. Such a request may, of course, also been made at any other time. On behalf of the committee, I thank all those who have made submissions and sent representatives here today for their cooperation in this inquiry.
RRA&T 2 Senate Friday, 5 February 2010
RURAL AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRANSPORT
BELLINGER, Mr Brad, Chairman, Australian Beef Association
CARTER, Mr John Edward, Director, Australian Beef Association
CHAIR—Welcome. Would you like to make an opening statement?
Mr Bellinger—Thank you. The ABA stands by its submission, which we made on 14 December last year, that the decision made by the government to allow the importation of beef from BSE affected countries is politically based, not science based. During this hearing we will bring forward compelling new evidence to back up this statement. When I returned to my property after the December hearing I received a note from an American citizen. I will read a small excerpt from the mail he sent me in order to reinforce the dangers of allowing the importation of beef from BSE affected countries. I have done a number of press releases on this topic, and this fellow has obviously picked my details up from the internet. His name is Terry Singeltary and he is from Bacliff, Texas. He states, and rightfully so:
You should be worried. Please let me explain. I’ve kept up with the mad cow saga for 12 years today, on December 14th 1997, some four months post voluntary and partial mad cow feed ban in the USA, I lost my mother to the Heinemann variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). I know this is just another phenotype of the infamous sporadic CJDs. Here in the USA, when USA sheep scrapie was transmitted to USA bovine, the agent was not UK BSE—it was a different strain. So why then would human TSE from USA cattle look like UK CJD from UK BSE? It would not. So this accentuates that the science is inconclusive still on this devastating disease. He goes on to state:
The OIE— the International Organisation of Epizootics, the arm of the WTO— is a failed global agent that in my opinion is bought off via bogus regulations for global trade and industry reps. I have done this all these years for nothing but the truth. I am a consumer, I eat meat, but I do not have to sit idly by and see the ignorance and greed of it all while countless numbers of humans and animals are being exposed to the TSE agents. All the USA is interested in is trade, nothing else matters.
Even Dr Stanley Prusiner, who incidentally won the Nobel Health Prize in 1997 for his work on the prion—he invented the word ‘prion’, or it came from him—states:
The BSC policy was set up for one purpose only, trade—the illegal trading of all strains of TSE globally throughout North America, which is home to CBSC, IBSC and HBSC, many scrapie strains and two strains of CJD to date. (please note typo error, those should have read cBSE, lBSE, and hBSE...tss)
I would also like, while I have the opportunity, to explain the beef-off-the-shelves myth. At the first Senate hearing on 14 December, it was explained that the reason why they allowed BSC beef into Australia was the beef-off-the-shelves policy, whereby if we found a case of BSC in Australia they would have to recall all—
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Senator HEFFERNAN—Which of course is total BS.
Mr Bellinger—Correct. This is written in the FSANZ document—Food Standards Australia New Zealand. Why isn’t this same policy in New Zealand? It is not—it is only in Australia. We are the only country in the world to have this idiotic policy. So we again call for the tabling of the WTO obligations paperwork. We do not believe that exists.
Mr Carter—We have an additional concern about human health. We are not scientists, but on 18 December, four days after the last hearing here, the BBC reported a new wave of deaths due to variant CJD linked to eating BSE infected beef could be underway. This is based on the work of Professor John Collinge of the National Prion Clinic, who reported that a 2009 death in Scotland was from a different genetic pool to that of the 166 deaths already reported in the UK. Those are all thought to share one gene, but Professor Collinge and his colleagues estimate that up to 350 people in this new group, represented by the person who died in Scotland, could get CJD. He thinks that CJD has moved into a new phase, and the incubation period is a long one. We tender the Australian Red Cross donor policy sheet, which bears out what Senator Back brought up last time, questioning the Chief Medical Officer, and we say that blood from people who were in the UK between 1980 and 1996 is not acceptable. That is the current ruling. We believe this now should be extended to anyone who has visited the UK, and this new evidence should ensure that Australia revisits the science of CJD.
CHAIR—Thank you, Mr Carter. Before we kick off, can I just remind colleagues that we are short of time today, so I ask that we do not traverse ground the we have previously covered and make sure that we stick to new information that is required. Mr Bellinger, when you started you referred to your view that this decision to allow the importation was politically based. I know you are going to go into this in the course of the next 20 minutes or so, but could you just give us a quick outline of what your definition of politically based is and why you think the decision was politically based?
Mr Bellinger—On the lowering of BSE standards: if you go back to 2006, for example, there were five categories for describing countries that had BSE and Australia was in the category for BSE free. Suddenly, by the time the United States got their third instance of BSE, through the influence of Robert Zoellick—who was the trade minister that signed the BSE corresponding side letter in 2004 and was George Bush’s appointment to the WTO—they suddenly changed the five categories to three categories and, instead of being BSE free, Australia became BSE negligible risk. At the time I put out a press release alerting the media to the dangers of this happening, and we are coming to the stage here when suddenly our government is saying, ‘Now let’s allow the importation of beef from BSE affected countries.’ I believe that the WTO has been influenced by large multinational meat processors and retailers to change and allow the trading of BSE beef throughout the world.
CHAIR—Thanks, Mr Bellinger.
Mr Carter—Of course, the side letter that Minister Vaile signed was at the request of Mr Zoellick, who is now in the position that Mr Bellinger has explained.
Senator HEFFERNAN—I just want to put the committee on notice that, if we do not get through what we have got to get through today, I suggest we have another hearing, because this
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is the greatest ambush of Australia’s farmers of all time by a government. The evidence given at the last meeting was deadset lies. The proposition that this whole change of government policy was led by the industry is a deadset lie. While Simon Crean might want to change his mind because of the WTO and his lack of knowledge, the Australian beef industry, as you know, is under great challenge, not only from the currency but also from the undermining of our markets. This is a disgrace.
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Tuesday, March 16, 2010
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Hansard Import restrictions on beef FRIDAY, 5 FEBRUARY 2010 AUSTRALIA
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Proof Committee Hansard
snip...see full text 110 pages ;
for those interested, please see much more here ;
The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.
USA MAD COW FEED AND SRM IN COMMERCE UPDATE
To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009
I ask Professor Kong ;
Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment
''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''
Professor Kong reply ;
''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete.
Thanks for your interest.''
Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
I look forward to further transmission studies, and a true ENHANCED BSE/atypical BSE surveillance program put forth testing all cattle for human and animal consumption for 5 years. a surveillance program that uses the most sensitive TSE testing, and has the personnel that knows how to use them, and can be trusted. I look forward to a stringent mad cow feed ban being put forth, and then strictly enforced. we need a forced, not voluntary feed ban, an enhanced feed ban at that, especially excluding blood. we need some sort of animal traceability. no more excuses about privacy. if somebody is putting out a product that is killing folks and or has the potential to kill you, then everybody needs to know who they are, and where that product came from. same with hospitals, i think medical incidents in all states should be recorded, and made public, when it comes to something like a potential accidental transmission exposure event. so if someone is out there looking at a place to go have surgery done, if you have several hospitals having these type 'accidental exposure events', than you can go some place else. it only makes sense. somewhere along the road, the consumer lost control, and just had to take whatever they were given, and then charged these astronomical prices. some where along the line the consumer just lost interest, especially on a long incubating disease such as mad cow disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy. like i said before, there is much more to the mad cow story than bovines and eating a hamburger, we must start focusing on all TSE in all species. ...TSS
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
Atypical BSE in Cattle
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518